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An in-depth analysis of primary source material indicates that the conspiracies hatched 
against Napoleon served as the impetus for his decision to change the government from the 
Consulate to the Empire.  His ambitious personality drove him to achieve as much power and 
prestige for himself as possible, a point discussed by numerous historians, but the conspiratorial 
actions designed to strike him down provided the opportunity.  He was a master of manipulating 
situations—and people—in order to achieve his ambitious goals.  Knowing that his constituents 
worried over renewed political turmoil if something happened to him, Napoleon used their fears 
to strengthen his personal grasp on power.  By accepting the position of First Consul for life, he 
made a promise to French citizens that he would protect and serve them for the duration of his 
life.  By then taking the title of Emperor, he promised that his family would protect and serve the 







The retreat of the Grand Armée from the disastrous Russian campaign of 1812 was 
already underway, but distressing news from Paris prompted Napoleon to rush back to the capital 
ahead of his troops, leaving them to languish in miserable conditions.  A political malcontent had 
gathered a group of similarly dissatisfied individuals to attempt to overthrow the imperial 
government.  Accomplishing the arrest—or recruitment—of numerous high-ranking political 
officials, the conspiracy had nearly succeeded.  Napoleon was horrified that an escaped political 
prisoner could so easily threaten all he had created. 
The nearly-successful conspiracy launched by General Claude François de Malet on the 
night of 22 October 1812 was not the first plot Napoleon endured.  It was, however, the one that 
frightened him the most because there was no way to use it to his advantage.  Previously, he had 
transformed conspiracies designed to destroy his regime into opportunities for strengthening his 
power.  A poorly conceived and clumsily executed plot on 10 October 1800 provided the First 
Consul with the excuse to rid himself of 130 Jacobin dissidents by deporting them without trial.  
Less than three months later, on 24 December, a Royalist plot missed assassinating Napoleon by 
mere seconds.  In response, the First Consul authorized the establishment of special criminal 
courts in more than half of the nation’s departments.  He also strengthened his resolve to reach a 
compromise with the Catholic Church, a move he knew would weaken the Royalist support base.  
After a reprise of several years from conspiratorial opposition, Napoleon faced another plot in 
winter 1804.  The Royalists planned a final attempt against him, though it never came to fruition.  
Betrayed by people within the conspiracy itself, the group failed to take even the slightest action 





position as Consul for Life to that of Emperor, finalizing his post as the sole political leader of 
France. 
In the work that follows, I show that the conspiracies hatched against Napoleon served as 
the impetus for his decision to change the government from the Consulate to the Empire.  His 
ambitious personality drove him to achieve as much power and prestige for himself as possible, a 
point discussed by numerous historians, but the conspiratorial actions designed to strike him 
down provided the opportunity.  He was a master of manipulating situations—and people—in 
order to achieve his ambitious goals.  Knowing that his constituents worried over renewed 
political turmoil if something happened to him, Napoleon used their fears to strengthen his 
personal grasp on power.  By accepting the position of First Consul for life, he made a promise 
to French citizens that he would protect and serve them for the duration of his life.  By then 
taking the title of Emperor, he promised that his family would protect and serve the nation in 
perpetuity.   
At first glance, the conception of conspiracy seems easy to define:  a secret plot designed 
by a group of people to enact some type of change.  The explanation is not, in fact, so simple.  
Historians have dated the use of terms concerning conspiracy in French to as early as the twelfth 
century.1  The meaning of said terms, however, has changed a great deal over time and often 
illustrates concerns of the time period.  A French dictionary published in 1761, for example, 
defines conjuration as “a group of men united together against the interests of a State, of a 
Sovereign, etc.”2  The exclusion of the government as a possible perpetrator derives from the 
                                                 
1 These early terms include conspirer (“to conspire”), conspiration, compot, and conjuration, 
each of which best translates as “conspiracy.”  The term conspirateur (“conspirator”) did not 
develop until much later, in the fourteenth or fifteenth century. 
2 The idea that the government was the victim, rather than the perpetrator, of conspiracies is 





government’s control of publications and, as some historians have argued, from its desire to 
“appear paternal.”3  The authority of the monarchy depended on the people’s belief that it looked 
out for their interests.  If the government plotted against them, rather than protect them, it no 
longer served its purpose.   
 Modern conceptions of conspiracy, unlike those of eighteenth-century France, allow for 
the government as the conspirator.  Dictionary definitions for conspiratorial terms, however, 
have become less specific over time and often do not explain who was involved, either as the 
plotter or the victim.  A modern French dictionary, for example, defines conjuration as “an 
action prepared secretly by a group of people (against someone or something).”4  Here, anyone 
could be involved on any side of the plot and for any reason.  Unlike earlier definitions which 
indicated that conspiracies were inherently political, modern explanations are intentionally vague 
and allow for more possibilities, such as Ponzi schemes, cover-ups of alien invasions and the 
intentional creation of epidemics. 
 The purpose of a dictionary is to provide the most concise definition possible, allowing 
little space for examples or in-depth explanations.  Historians, philosophers, and other scholars 
are not constrained in such a manner and provide more thorough descriptions in their works.  
They write that plots and their participants must meet certain criteria to justify describing the 
                                                 
Pierre Richelet, Dictionnaire portatif de la langue françoise, extrait du grand dictionnaire de 
Pierre Richelet; contenant tous les mots usités, leur genre & leur définition, avec les différentes 
acceptions dans lesquelles ils sont emploïés, au sens propre, comma au figuré, second edition 
(Lyon:  Chez Pierre Bruyset-Ponthus, 1761), 263-264, 267.  Claude-Marie Gattel, Dictionnaire 
universel portatif de la langue française, avec la prononciation figurée, second edition (Paris:  
Chez Lefevre, 1813), 1: 414. 
3 Léon Biollay, Études économiques sur le XVIIIe siècle:  Le Pacte de famine, l’administration 
du commerce (Paris:  Librairie Guillaumin et Cie, 1885), 4. 
4 Alain Rey, ed., Le Robert Micro:  Dictionnaire d’apprentissage de la langue française, third 





actions as conspiratorial.  Without considering these conditions, one could name nearly any 
planned event as a conspiracy, such as “conspiracies to throw surprise birthday parties for friends 
or attempts by parents to deceive young children about the existence of magical beings.”5  One 
of the most thorough discussions of conspiracies comes from Niccolo Machiavelli, writing 
during the Renaissance era.  In his work, he identified five necessary traits to elevate a simple 
plan to the level of a conspiracy. 
To start, the plot must involve at least two participants.  A single individual could never 
hatch a conspiracy, regardless of whether the plot met other necessary criteria.  This conception 
originates with the etymology of the term conspiracy:  “con,” meaning with and “spire,” from the 
Latin meaning to breathe.  Not only must there be multiple participants, but the conspirators 
must also be so closely united in their efforts that they “breathe together as if they are, in a 
sense, one being—one animal.”6  Although he prescribes no upper limit on the number of people 
who can participate in a conspiracy, Machiavelli warns that if the group’s membership “exceeds 
three or four,” the plot is almost guaranteed to fail because it will be discovered by authorities. 7  
The more people who are involved, the more chance there is that someone will betray the plot, 
intentionally or not.   
 In addition to urging a limit on the number of plotters, Machiavelli argues that only a 
certain type of person should dare to concoct such a scheme.  In his opinion, participants in a 
                                                 
5 Brian L. Keeley, “Of Conspiracy Theories,” The Journal of Philosophy 96, no. 3 (March 1999):  
118. 
6 Jens David Ohlin, “Group Think:  The Law of Conspiracy and Collective Reason,” The Journal 
of Criminal Law and Criminology 98, no. 1 (Fall, 2007):  157-158. 
7 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Historical, Political and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolo Machiavelli, 






conspiracy must either be well-off or “madmen.”8  Only “great men of state, or those on terms of 
familiar intercourse with the prince,” he explains, have any hope of leading a successful 
conspiracy.9  These men have the contacts and financial means to support their plot sufficiently.  
They have the ability to assure their cohorts of significant gains for joining the project.  Should 
someone undertake a conspiracy without plentiful assets, he will likely fail because he will not 
have the means to ensure payment for his colleagues’ participation.  Once informed of the plot, if 
the accomplices are unsure of the advantages they will earn by participating, they are likely to 
denounce the scheme in order to receive any reward offered by the authorities.  Machiavelli also 
explains that a conspirator who lacks high standing (political, military or social) will only attract 
others of equally low or even lesser standing.  He implies that men “of low condition” are 
inherently less trustworthy and are more likely to denounce a plot than men of considerable 
rank.10 
 The danger of denunciation coincides with what Machiavelli views as another 
fundamental trait of conspiracies:  secrecy.  If the plotters met and planned openly, concerned 
citizens or the authorities would inevitably move against them.  Machiavelli discusses three 
particular methods of discovery that often hinder conspiratorial efforts, each of which depends 
directly on the reliability of the intriguers.  Discovery from imprudence occurs when a 
conspirator unwittingly speaks freely enough that some uninvolved person overhears details of 
the plot.  Such detection might take place, for example, when a servant overhears part of a 
conversation when entering a room.  Discovery of the plot may also take place through 
carelessness when a conspirator willingly, though foolishly, discloses information to a family 
                                                 
8 Machiavelli, The Historical, Political and Diplomatic Writings, 2: 332. 
9 Machiavelli, The Historical, Political and Diplomatic Writings, 2:  332. 





member or some other person he deems trustworthy.  Because of the friendship or familial ties 
between them, the plotter does not expect that he has put himself or the plot in danger.  The final 
form of discovery is through treason.  If a participant takes it upon himself to denounce the plot 
outright to authorities, he has intentionally and voluntarily betrayed the group.  He may decide to 
take such actions if he thinks better of the plot, if he feels that the rewards do not outweigh the 
risk (fear for his freedom, his life, or his family, for example), or if he feels that his cohorts are 
treating him unfairly.  While he would certainly earn the ire of his former co-conspirators, a 
participant who denounced plots to authorities often received much lighter punishments or even 
compensation.   
 Machiavelli identifies two more traits necessary for a plot to constitute a conspiracy:  
political nature and violence.  Conspiracies are, in his opinion, “made either against the country 
or against the prince.” 11  Much like the definition of conspiratorial terms in eighteenth-century 
France, he does not allow for the possibility of the government’s plotting against its subjects.  
The political character of the plot is exactly what necessitates the use of violence.  Although he 
does not explain this correlation directly, when discussing historical conspiracies, he centers his 
examples on assassinations, kidnappings, and other unlawful activities.  A group of disgruntled 
citizens cannot spontaneously remove a political leader from power through legal means.  
Violence is necessary to enact immediate and dramatic political change. 
 Augustin Barruel, author of Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire du jacobinisme, which 
some consider “the bible of the secret society mythology,” agrees with Machiavelli on two 
inherent traits of conspiracies. 12  While both men conclude that conspiracies are violent, Barruel 
                                                 
11 Machiavelli, The Historical, Political and Diplomatic Writings, 2: 329. 





does not believe that a plot’s political nature is the cause.  Instead, he reveals that the radical 
disposition of the masterminds of the plot are responsible for its violence.  Extremist leaders, 
with a vehement opposition to any form of compromise, find themselves with violence as their 
only course of action.  This claim implies that rational-minded people do not devise conspiracies.  
Machiavelli and Barruel also agree that secrecy is required for a conspiracy to exist, but each 
approaches this trait differently.  Whereas Machiavelli focuses on the problems a lack of secrecy 
would bring to a plot, Barruel describes exactly what it is that must remain secret.  He argues that 
it is not the plot’s goal that needs to remain confidential, though one can imagine the more 
secrecy the conspirators maintain, the better the chance of success.  What is crucial for the 
plotters to keep private is “the names of the conspirators, and the means they employed.” 13  If 
authorities discovered a plot against the government, they could take little action if the specific 
intended activities and the people involved remained unknown to them. 
 Going beyond Machiavelli’s discussion, Barruel identifies two additional traits of 
conspiracies.  He argues that conspirators arranged themselves in a hierarchy to allow for better 
organization and a higher chance of success.  This method of organization strengthens the level 
of secrecy that the group could achieve.  Such a system allows the elites of the group to make 
decisions for everyone and to disseminate just enough information to keep everyone informed of 
his own personal role.  The fewer details shared among the participants, the less chance of 
discovery.  After all, if a low-ranked conspirator reveals everyone’s identities and contacts 
during an interrogation, the entire group faces prosecution.  If, on the other hand, he is only 
                                                 
13 Augustin Barruel, Memoirs Illustrating the History of Jacobinism, Vol. I:  The Antichristian 





aware of a handful of people involved, with the most superior members remaining unknown to 
him, the group can survive an interrogation, even if the conspirator reveals all he knows. 
Barruel discusses a final characteristic of conspiratorial plots, one only recognizable after 
their implementation:  a self-destructive nature.  He argues that if a conspiracy manages to avoid 
discovery and to achieve its goal, the success will be short-lived.  The idea that a conspiracy will 
ultimately self-destruct provides some scholars with a partial explanation for the violent 
opposition to Napoleon and his regimes.  It was, after all, a conspiracy that brought him to power 
on 18 Brumaire.  Benjamin Constant, a contemporary of Barruel, agrees that a regime 
established through arbitrary or conspiratorial means has little change of long-term survival.  In 
his De la force du gouvernement actuel de la France et de la nécessité de s’y rallier, he explains 
that such governments lack “dignity and lasting strength,” and will find themselves constantly 
embroiled in conflict, both domestic and foreign.14  Historian François Guizot, who lived to see 
both Napoleon and his nephew rule France, concurs with Constant’s conclusion about the 
inherent weakness of regimes founded on the sudden destruction of its predecessor.  He argues 
that a “new government founded on the ruins of another has real enemies who desire its fall and 
rejoice in that which can contribute to it.”15 
Augustin Barruel also discusses the importance of secretive plots to history in his work.  
He contends that conspiracies—the participants, decisions, and outcomes—are a major driving 
force behind the progression of history.  Modern historians frequently argue against this idea.  
Karl Popper’s Conjectures and Refutations:  The Growth of Scientific Knowledge concludes that 
                                                 
14 Benjamin Constant, De la force du gouvernement actuel de la France et de la nécessité de s’y 
rallier (Oxford:  Pergamon Press, 1796?), 103-104. 






conspiratorial actions do not have the influence or the power to determine the outcome of 
history.  Instead, Popper finds that it is chance and other intangible forces that guide individuals 
and nations down their paths.  I find Barruel’s argument more convincing.  A conspiracy placed 
Napoleon in power, and plots against him resulted in his ability to achieve a hereditary grasp on 
political control of the nation.  He used conspiracies against the Consulate to rid the nation of 
dozens of his political opponents, to strengthen and control better the judicial system, and to 
justify his promotion to Emperor.  Without the plots against him and the fear they caused among 
the nation’s general population, Napoleon may not have achieved such complete control of the 
country, and certainly not as quickly as he did. 
I believe that the argument of an inherent weakness in the Consular and Imperial regimes 
because of their conspiratorial naissance presents only a partial picture of the situation.  Surely 
people resented the manner in which Napoleon came to power, but the complexity of the 
political situation in fall 1799 would have prevented any regime from enjoying immediate 
stability and security.  The numerous factions that caused constant turmoil for the Revolutionary 
governments still existed, at least in part, at the introduction of the Consulate.  In agreement with 
my conclusion is Émile Marco de Saint-Hilaire’s Histoire des conspirations et attentats contre le 
gouvernement et la personne de Napoléon.  Saint-Hilaire contends that there were simply too 
many differing opinions for a regime not to face open and violent opposition at the time.  He 
illustrates the point by describing the opinions of Napoleon:  “murderer of liberty for the 
republicans, usurper of the throne of Louis XVI for the royalists, oppressor of the people for a 
third part who recruited their henchmen from the heart of German secret societies.”16 
                                                 
16 Émile Marco de Saint-Hilaire, Histoire des conspirations et attentats contre le gouvernement 





Until now, historical sources have given little attention to the role played by conspiracies 
in Napoleon’s transition from First Consul to Emperor.  The majority of available materials, 
most of which are biographical or are almost entirely focused on military affairs, discuss the 
schemes in less than a paragraph.  In fact, many modern works do not discuss them in any detail 
at all.  Books that offer more thorough accounts of the conspiracies against Napoleon are more 
than a century old, and are, more often than not, written in French.  They also fail to explain the 
importance of the events to Napoleon’s career.  Further distorting the importance of 
conspiratorial actions is the traditional emphasis on the military aspect of Napoleon’s leadership.  
Although it is both impossible and improper to attempt a general discussion of this period of 
history without considering Napoleon’s focus on the military, this aspect of his career was not 
responsible for his ability, or even for his desire to convert the Consulate into the Empire.  It is 
these issues and this gap in the scholarship that my work remedies. 
By highlighting a sense of disillusionment with Napoleon’s leadership in the military, 
several sources imply that active servicemen were the most likely citizens to conspire against the 
Consulate and Empire.  One such source is Frank McLynn’s Napoleon:  A Biography.  The work 
presents the argument that the incessant fighting that marked Napoleon’s regimes prompted 
servicemen to plot against the leader simply to achieve peace for a war-weary nation.  Édouard 
Guillon’s Les Complots militaires sous le Consulat et l’Empire also implies that the military 
provided the majority of conspirators, but not due to any warmongering by Napoleon.  Instead, 





with the court of Rome for the Concordat” caused servicemen to take unlawful action against 
Napoleon.17 
The implications of both McLynn’s and Guillon’s arguments are misleading.  Soldiers 
and civilians alike did grow tired of constant warfare, but the weariness did not play a significant 
role in the development of conspiracies against Napoleon.  Although high-ranking officers 
participated in all but one of the plots discussed in my work, only one individual described a 
desire for peace as his motivation.  This individual was General Malet, whose most significant 
efforts took place in 1812 when Napoleon’s streak of victories on the battlefield had been 
disastrously broken.  Even during his two earlier efforts against the leader, Malet cited different 
reasons for conspiring. 
Guillon’s argument that many soldiers resented Napoleon’s willingness to compromise 
with the Catholic Church is correct, but again, it did not serve as a significant cause of 
conspiratorial action.  Only two participants in a single plot considered the negotiations offensive 
enough to warrant action.  These men were Dominique Demerville and François Jean-Baptiste 
Topino-Lebrun, who participated in the conspiration des poignards (conspiracy of the daggers) 
in October 1800.  Their other accomplices did not describe the possibility of France’s renewed 
relationship with the Church as a motivating factor, nor did any conspirators who acted later.18 
In L’épisode napoléonien, Louis Bergeron dedicates three pages to a discussion of 
conspiracies launched against Napoleon.  He begins by arguing that only “a military plot would 
                                                 
17 Édouard Guillon, Les Complots militaires sous le Consulat et l’Empire:  d’après les 
documents inédits des Archives (Paris:  E. Plon, Nourrit & Co., 1894), 6. 
18 It is important to note that the conspiration des poignards took place well before the signing of 
the Concordat.  If the relationship between Church and State was as offensive to French 
servicemen as Guillon argues, one would expect to see more conspiracies at the time of the 





have presented a real danger, of clear political significance, if solidly planned with civilian 
participation.”19  Only Malet attempted what one could consider “a military plot,” fooling an 
entire garrison of troops into supporting his cause.  He did not, however, benefit from any 
civilian support.  Bergeron’s argument implies that plots without military backing could not pose 
serious threats, dismissing the importance of the conspiration des poignards, the explosion of the 
infernal machine on 24 December 1800, and the Royalist effort of winter 1804.  He offers little 
information about these particular events.  Discussing them in the vaguest of terms, he provides 
only dates and the names of the primary participants.   
Bergeron is not the only scholar to misrepresent the motivating factors behind 
conspiracies against Napoleon.  In the introduction to Conspiracies and Conspiracy Theory in 
Early Modern Europe:  From the Waldensians to the French Revolution, historians Barry 
Coward and Julian Swann contend that people resort to “cloak and dagger methods” when they 
feel there is no longer any “space for public expressions of opposition or dissent.”20  According 
to these two historians, the perception that no other recourse is available makes conspiratorial 
efforts “understandable.”21  This particular term poses subjectivity issues.  Because 
“understandable” seems inappropriate where murder and other unlawful activities form the basis 
of discussion, I believe a more acceptable term is “rational”:  it allows a sense of empathy toward 
the conspirator without justifying his actions. 
                                                 
19 Louis Bergeron, L’épisode napoléonien, aspects intérieurs:  1799-1815 (Paris:  Éditions du 
Seuil, 1972), translated by R. R. Palmer as France Under Napoleon (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 1981), 97. 
20 Barry Coward and Julian Swann, introduction to Conspiracies and Conspiracy Theory in 
Early Modern Europe:  From the Waldensians to the French Revolution, ed. Barry Coward and 
Julian Swann (Burlington, VT:  Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004), 5. 





The idea that individuals resort to conspiracies when they feel there is no alternative is 
upheld by Mark Fenster.  He explains that a population—or an individual element therein—often 
adopts subversive actions when it feels helpless to change its social, political or economic 
situation through legal means.  A conspiracy seeks, he argues, to correct situations that have left 
“the political subject without an ability to be recognized or to achieve representation in the 
public realm.”22 
It is a fact that French citizens saw fewer opportunities for voicing dissenting opinions 
under Napoleon’s leadership, but this was not responsible for widespread conspiratorial actions 
as Coward, Swann, and Fenster imply.  As the opportunity for lawful opposition to the 
government diminished, the number of conspiracies hatched against the Consulate—and against 
Napoleon personally—increased, but only until the institution of the Imperial regime.  Once 
Napoleon became Emperor, the expectation of having a voice in the government faded 
completely.  Instead of prompting even more conspiracies, the creation of the French Empire 
stopped them.  Conspirators only resented not being able to voice an oppositional opinion when 
the expectation of doing so was present.  The establishment of the Imperial government removed 
the expectation of a popular voice in politics, with a result in the decline in conspiratorial actions. 
Offering still more possible motivating factors behind the conspiracies against Napoleon 
is Ernest Hamel’s Histoire du Premier Empire faisant suite à l’histoire de la République sous le 
Directoire et le Consulat.  He discusses weariness caused by continuous conscription practices, 
the reestablishment of the nobility (14 August 1806), and the oppression of freedom of speech 
and freedom of the press as reasons for conspirators to act against the nation’s leader.  He 
                                                 
22 Mark Fenster, Conspiracy Theories:  Secrecy and Power in American Culture (Minneapolis:  





contends that freedom of the press had never been as restricted as it was under the First Empire.  
Other complaints expressed by Frenchmen receive attention as well, but Hamel does not consider 
them as offensive.  He explains, for example, that Napoleon’s revitalization of the feudal terms 
monsieur and madame annoyed Republicans, even those who may have supported him.  The 
situations Hamel discusses certainly did cause disappointment among French citizens, but my 
research shows that none of those who chose to plot against Napoleon listed them as their 
motivation. 
In agreement with my findings are those of Steven Englund.  In his Napoleon:  A 
Political Life, he acknowledges that the leader made decisions that directly diminished some of 
the gains of the Revolution, but he does not believe they were as significant a cause of 
disappointment among Frenchmen as other scholars have claimed.  For example, whereas Hamel 
explains that the censorship of the press was a leading cause of dissent in Napoleonic France, 
Englund counters that the “tight official grip on the press was a policy that French society found 
largely unobjectionable.”23 
The misrepresentation of motivating factors in the above-mentioned works may be 
explained by Bergeron’s conclusion that when it comes to conspiratorial activities, “it is simply 
impossible to unravel the true from the imaginary, or conspiracy from provocation.”24  The 
argument is not convincing, though it is excusable given the sweeping nature of the works 
discussed thus far.  These were not books specifically about conspiracy, but about Napoleon, his 
leadership, and life in the Consulate and Empire in general.  One would not expect the authors, 
therefore, to have dedicated as much time to researching the clandestine events.  My specific 
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focus on conspiracies launched against Napoleon results in the conclusion that neither military 
concerns nor the inability to voice dissenting opinions caused the plots.  The close examination 
of primary source materials allows me to provide a detailed case by case explanation of what 
motivated the conspirators, of what they hoped to achieve, and of how they planned to act. 
I used three types of primary source materials—letters, memoirs, and court records—as 
the basis for analyzing the conspiracies.  The letters form the smallest portion of my research as 
they are not as plentiful or readily available as other sources.  Conspirators were careful not to 
keep written accounts of their plans or actions, as they would be almost entirely impossible to 
refute in court.  Conspiratorial correspondence that does exist is written in code, utilizes aliases, 
or includes no names whatsoever.  Because codes can be broken, aliases discovered, and 
handwriting analyzed, the letters offer historians insight into the personalities and mentalities of 
the citizens who felt that their only hope of escaping Napoleon’s leadership was through 
unlawful plots.  Unfortunately, none of the letters provide details about the plots themselves.  
There is no incriminating evidence in them, for example, to explain who was to take what 
specific action or when. 
Memoirs from the period are abundant and offer explanations of how the conspiracies 
unfolded.  In the case of the Royalist effort of winter 1804 and Malet’s plot of 1812, historians 
benefit from accounts written by some of the conspirators themselves.  Louis Fauche-Borel 
served as an intermediary between the Bourbon princes in England and their supporters in 
France, such as General Jean-Charles Pichegru.  In Notices sur les généraux Pichegru et 
Moreau, he explains the relationship between the two generals and how they came to be involved 
in a plot designed to reestablish the Bourbon monarchy.  His account is reliable as it makes no 





and identifying each of the participants.  Abbé Jean Baptiste Hyacinthe Lafon, one of Malet’s 
accomplices from the outset in 1812, escaped Paris after the conspiracy fell apart and published 
Histoire de la conjuration du Général Malet two years later.  His account is the most informative 
source for background information about less crucial members of the team.  He provides, for 
example, an explanation of the legal troubles that landed Joseph Boccheiampe in prison, from 
where Malet recruited him.  This information is not available in other sources, even in the court 
records which provide biographical and criminal information about many of the other 
participants. 
Memoirs written by citizens outside of the plots provide an understanding of reactions to 
the conspiracies.  Laure Junot, Duchess of Abrantès, describes in her memoirs the panic that 
ensued at the Theatre of the Republic and of the Arts when the audience heard the explosion of 
the infernal machine on Christmas Eve 1800.  Napoleon’s secretaries and other high-ranking 
officials also published memoirs, which offer insight into the leader’s own reaction to and 
opinion of the plots against him.  Louis Antoine Fauvelet de Bourrienne recorded in his Life of 
Napoleon Bonaparte that the First Consul described the conspiration des poignards as one of the 
most serious threats he had endured during his reign.  He also explained, however, that he 
doubted that Napoleon had actually made such a comment.  The secretary believed that the First 
Consul wanted it to seem as if the plot had disturbed him, though in reality, it had not.  Joseph 
Fouché, the infamous minister of police, stated directly in his Memoirs that the plot had not been 
truly dangerous, but that Napoleon wanted it portrayed as such to use it to his greatest advantage. 
The most informative resources about the conspiracies are court records.  I have based 
my telling of the conspiracies themselves on two particular types of court document:  the acte 





identity of each of the accused, an explanation of the charges brought against them, and a 
summary of events and developments relevant to said charges.  It includes an extremely detailed 
summary of the information divulged by each of the defendants during their interrogations.  In 
the acte d’accusation concerning the Royalist conspiracy in winter 1804, the section about Louis 
Picot contains the fact that he testified to possessing “blue hunters’ uniforms” for himself and his 
accomplices to wear.25  Even more useful to a historian is the verbatim reproductions of 
evidentiary documents.  The acte d’accusation for the 1804 plot includes the letters written by 
General Jean-Victor Marie Moreau denouncing General Pichegru for his involvement with the 
Royalists in 1797.  These letters were not directly related to the charges filed in 1804, but the 
prosecution used them to demonstrate that both generals had been dealing with the Royalists for 
the better part of a decade. 
The procès includes much of the same information as the acte d’accusation.  
Descriptions of each of the defendants provide full names (usually), aliases, ages, places of birth, 
job titles, and current (or the most recently known) street addresses.  They also include the 
explanation of the charges and a summary of events relevant to them, though not in as much 
detail as the acte d’accusation.  Verbatim reproductions of evidentiary documents appear here as 
well, but even more useful are the word-for-word depositions given by each of the defendants 
shortly after their arrests.  These are often woven into the testimony underway at the trial, 
separated by headers with dates to illustrate when the information was recorded.  At the end of 
the document are the findings of the jury, any information concerning appeals, and the final 
verdict and sentence. 
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By considering all primary source materials simultaneously, I am able to conclude that 
each conspiracy was driven by different motivations.  The conspiration des poignards in October 
1800 resulted from the participants’ resentment of Napoleon’s “abandonment” of the Italian 
Republics he had created, their disgust over the increasing tolerance toward and ongoing 
negotiations with the Catholic Church, and personal vendettas held against the First Consul.  
Édouard Guillon discussed the fact that many Frenchmen resented the signing of the Concordat, 
but the only time the revitalization of religion was listed as a cause of conspiracy was prior to the 
creation of this document.  Guillon also implies that the bitterness toward the renewed 
relationship between Church and State was most prevalent in the military, but of the two 
conspirators who took action because of it, only one had served in the military.  No historical 
analyses discuss the role played by personal vendettas in prompting unlawful actions against 
Napoleon, though two conspirators in the conspiration des poignards listed it as their motivation. 
The infernal machine plot of 24 December 1800 and the effort of winter 1804 were 
Royalist creations.  The ultimate motivating factor for the conspirators was their desire to restore 
the Bourbon family to the throne of France.  Beyond that, however, was the participants’ desire 
to obtain personal power, prestige, and wealth.  By serving the Bourbon family the conspirators 
stood to receive titles, property, and substantial salaries.  In 1804, for example, Louis Joseph de 
Bourbon, the Prince of Condé, offered General Jean-Charles Pichegru the estate at Chambord, a 
massive annual salary, and a stipend for his descendants “in perpetuity, until the extinction of his 
line.”26 
Only General Claude François de Malet provided reasons for plotting against Napoleon 
that correspond with the ideas presented in historical works.  He lamented the loss of 
                                                 





Revolutionary gains, specifically the citizens’ direct involvement in politics.  Even more 
important to him, however, was the desire to put an end to the nearly constant warfare that 
characterized Napoleon’s reign.  Malet’s was the only effort that enjoyed any level of success, 
which is attributable to his organizational skills and his patience. 
Despite the number of conspiracies launched against Napoleon, the high status of some of 
their participants, and the reactions the leader had toward them, these events receive little 
attention in the existing literature on Napoleonic France.  Because Napoleon was able to 
transform the plots into excuses to increase his personal grasp on political control of the nation, 
they deserve detailed and thorough discussions.  I intend for my work to provide this information 







LEADERSHIP OF NAPOLEON 
 By the time Napoleon Bonaparte seized power in 1799, France had experienced the 
abolition of its monarchy and three failed Republican governments comprising constantly 
warring factions.  Frenchmen had little expectation that any new regime would last and even less 
faith that it would improve their daily situation.  Napoleon made significant strides toward a 
bettering of people’s lives, but in so doing, he also stoked the flames of political opposition.  
Compromise worked well for the Frenchmen who concerned themselves more with day-to-day 
life than with politics.  For those with intense political passions, however, the Revolution’s 
wounds ran deep.  Any attempt at healing brought relief to some citizens, but renewed suffering 
to others.  The precarious situation Napoleon took possession of on 18 Brumaire meant that he 
and his government were destined to face incessant political opposition. 
 In July 1790, France had replaced its absolutist monarchy with a constitutional one.  Most 
Revolutionaries supported the regime, as even those who desired a full-fledged republic 
acknowledged that France was not yet ready for such a government.  National Guardsman 
Claude-François de Malet explained this train of thought in a letter dated 13 December 1791:  “I 
would prefer a Republic, but I am convinced that it would not suit us at this particular time.  We 
are still experiencing too many effects from the corruption of the old regime, and the Republic 
can only exist with and by the virtues that unfortunately, we do not yet possess and that only 
experience can give us.”27  One gains experience through trial and error, and France’s efforts 
with creating a Republican government were just that.  Due to threats from foreign nations’ 
leaders, Louis XVI’s unwillingness to adhere to the constitution that he had supposedly accepted, 
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and the royal family’s effort to escape France, the nation found itself challenged with creating its 
third government by September 1792.28 
 Although another regime eventually succeeded it, the latest government, the National 
Convention, caused the nation’s deepest political wound.29  Declaring France a republic on 22 
September 1792, the government then found Louis XVI guilty of crimes against the state and the 
public’s liberty.30  With the monarchy violently dispatched, the political lines were clear.  
                                                 
28 The royal family had attempted to flee from France in June 1791, intending to travel to Austria 
where the monarchs hoped to receive support and protection from Marie-Antoinette’s imperial 
family.  Recognized by Jean-Baptiste Drouet along the way, the family found itself under arrest 
at Varennes.  The so-called “flight to Varennes” was a clear sign that Louis XVI was entirely 
unwilling to accept ruling as a constitutional monarch.  He intended to rule, as his ancestors had 
done, in an absolute fashion.  Anything less would, as the attempted escape proved, be met with 
hostility and opposition. 
On 1 August 1792, Parisians received a document written by Charles William Ferdinand, 
the Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, announcing the intention of the Holy Roman Empire to 
restore the French monarchy to the ancien régime standards and threatening the city if any ill 
befell their Bourbon monarchs.  He menaced:  “if the chateau of the Tuileries is entered by force 
or attacked, if the least violence be offered to their Majesties the king, queen, and royal family, 
and if their safety and their liberty be not immediately assured, they will inflict an ever 
memorable vengeance by delivering over the city of Paris to military execution and complete 
destruction, and the rebels guilty of the said outrages to the punishment that they merit.”  James 
Harvey Robinson, ed., Readings in European History:  A Collection of Extracts from the 
Sources, Chosen with the Purpose of Illustrating the Progress of Culture in Western Europe 
since the German Invasions (Boston:  Ginn and Company, 1906), 2:  445. 
 Historians debate the true authorship of the Brunswick Manifesto.  D. M. G. Sutherland 
says the émigrés actually authored the document.  H. A. Barton states that it was Count Axel von 
Fersen who “commissioned the draft manifesto ultimately signed by the Duke of Brunswick.”  
D. M. G. Sutherland, France, 1789-1815:  Revolution and Counterrevolution (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 1986), 149.  H. A. Barton, “The Origins of the Brunswick Manifesto,” 
French Historical Studies 5, no. 2 (Autumn, 1967):  147. 
 The previous two governments were the National Constituent Assembly (9 July 1789 – 
30 September 1791) and the Legislative Assembly (1 October 1791 – 20 September 1792). 
29 The Directory would be France’s final republican government before Napoleon’s political 
involvement began.  It ruled from 3 November 1795 – 9 November 1799. 
30 Of the Convention’s delegates, 683 found the monarch guilty of the 33 charges he faced and 
28 did not vote because they were absent from the assembly (8 sick, 20 away on business).  
When deciding the sentence for the crimes, 387 favored the death penalty with no conditions 
attached, and 334 favored a sentence of imprisonment, exile, or death with a pardon.  Twenty-





Supporters of the Bourbon monarchy rallied to install Louis XVII on his family’s throne, while 
the Revolutionaries turned their efforts to establishing a stable Republican government.  No 
Republican government could realistically expect to gain the support of the Royalists.  The 
Royalists, for their part, would have to fight an uphill battle to reinstate Bourbon control of a 
country whose population had grown to distrust and to loathe the monarchy and its excesses.  
Time would be the only permanent remedy for political division. 
 Napoleon Bonaparte and his personal ambitions could not wait for time to pass.  If he 
wanted to achieve his goals, he had to take matters into his own hands.  The nation’s public, 
constantly disillusioned by Revolutionary “heroes” such as Maximilien Robespierre, had begun 
looking to the military for its champions.  Napoleon Bonaparte was a household name 
throughout France—and even throughout Europe as a whole.  Madame Germaine de Staël 
explained the place he held in French minds as early as 1797:  “One already spoke a lot of 
General Bonaparte in Paris; the superiority of his business mind, together with the brilliance of 
his talents as general, gave his name an importance that no other individual had acquired since 
the beginning of the Revolution.”31  His victories on the battlefield may have won him a prized 
spot in the hearts of the masses, but many high-ranking military and political officials were not 
impressed.   
One of Napoleon’s own brothers, Lucien, who served as president of the Council of Five 
Hundred in fall 1800, had recognized from young age a controlling and ruthless personality in 
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the general:  “I have always been aware of a completely selfish ambition in Napoleone . . . .  He 
seems to me to have the potentialities of a tyrant and I believe that he would be one if he were a 
king.”32  Napoleon’s actions in Egypt as the campaign grew increasingly desperate incensed 
members of the Directorial government and military officers alike.  Jean-Baptiste Kléber, who 
felt that the general had abandoned him and his troops, complained bitterly to those who 
remained with him in Egypt:  “He’s left us with his breeches full of shit.  We’ll go back to 
Europe and rub it in his face.”33  Minister of War Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte argued in favor of 
arresting Napoleon on charges of desertion and circumventing the regulations requiring a 
quarantine on ships traveling to France from the Orient.  Officials may have wanted Bonaparte to 
face charges, but the public loved him, and, unwilling to upset the populace that had proven itself 
so volatile throughout the Revolution, the government took no action against him.34   
 Having returned from Egypt, Napoleon prepared to take advantage of his already obvious 
popularity and the mistrust and disappointment the nation felt in its current regime.  The 
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34 The Directory had, in fact, ordered Napoleon to return to France, with or without his troops, in 
May 1799.  Such correspondence sanctions his voyage, even though he opted to leave his 
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opportunity presented itself quickly when Revolutionary cleric abbé Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, 
the ringleader of a conspiracy to overthrow the Directory, approached the general about the 
possibility of working together.35  Eager to participate, Napoleon began scheming alongside the 
abbé and Roger Ducos and quickly proved more power-hungry than Sieyès had anticipated or 
desired.  The first step the trio needed to accomplish was ensuring the support of certain high-
ranking government officials.  Joseph Fouché, the recently appointed minister of police, made it 
clear that he would neither inform the Directory nor allow his subordinates to put down the plot.  
Such duplicitous actions had been—and remained—part of Fouché’s ingenious repertoire.  He 
often involved himself in schemes, sometimes ignoring them until they concluded on their own 
and other times thwarting them in their infancy, depending on whether he felt they could benefit 
him personally.36 As such, “French historians, no matter whether Royalist, republican, or 
Bonapartist—one and all spit venom as soon as his name comes up for discussion.”37 
 Support for the plot was even easier to gain from the President of the Council of Five 
Hundred, as Napoleon’s younger brother, Lucien, currently held the position.38  Gaining the 
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cooperation of the assembly’s members required more work.  The conspirators expected them to 
resist relinquishing power, especially when asked to bestow it upon a man whom many 
mistrusted and disliked.  While Sieyès knew that he had the support of the majority of the 
Council of Ancients, he could not risk the plan going awry.  To secure the desired outcome, he, 
Ducos, and Bonaparte developed an elaborate story centered on a fictional plot.  Upon hearing 
that Jacobin dissenters were prepared to “strike their daggers against the representatives of the 
nation,” the Council of Ancients passed two frantic decrees.39  First, it relocated all future 
gatherings to a more secure and defensible meeting place at the palace of Saint-Cloud just 
outside the capital.  Second, and more important for the conspiring trio, it placed control of the 
military troops garrisoned in Paris in Bonaparte’s hands.  The stage was set. 
 On 18 Brumaire VIII (9 November 1799), Napoleon directed his troops as they provided 
“protection” for the government’s move to Saint-Cloud.  By the time the Councilors realized that 
the supposed Jacobin plot was a sham, they found themselves surrounded by a force of over 
6,000 under the leadership of a man who they now knew was a co-author of their present 
circumstance.  Once settled in separate meeting rooms, the Five Hundred undertook to swear 
allegiance to the Constitution, while the Ancients suggested the appointment of a new Directory.  
Upon overhearing the Ancients’ proposal, an impatient Napoleon took matters into his own 
hands.  He burst upon them and began bungling his way through what was arguably the worst 
speech of his life.  How dare the Councilors oppose him, he cried, “remember that I walk 
accompanied by the god of war and the god of luck!”40  Growing confused and flustered, 
Napoleon retreated to the order and safety of his troops outside.  He had little time to pull 
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himself back together, however, as an urgent note from Fouché and Charles Maurice de 
Talleyrand-Périgord alerted him that the moment to strike a deathblow to the current regime was 
now or never.  Several Jacobin generals were supposedly trying to break the loyalty of his troops 
outside the palace.  Composing himself as much as possible, he made his way to the Orangerie to 
try his hand at addressing the Council of Five Hundred.  While the Ancients had damaged his 
ego, the Five Hundred seemed determined to damage him physically.  Councilors went mad, 
threw chairs at the intruder and his guards, and called for their deaths.  With everything deviating 
disastrously from plan, Lucien stepped in to salvage his elder brother’s botched efforts.  He 
announced to the troops his version of the situation in the meeting room:  “The immense 
majority of the council is now subdued by the terror of some representatives, armed with 
poignards . . ..  I declare to you that those audacious assassins . . . have threatened with an 
outlawry the very general entrusted with the wise measures of that council . . ..  Those assassins 
are not representatives of the people, but representatives of the poignard.”41  After initial 
hesitation, the soldiers rushed in, causing the Councilors to flee in fear.  Finally, the conspirators 
could initiate the plan for their new regime.  Under the direction of Sieyès and Ducos, the 
Ancients announced the establishment of a provisional government headed by the three plotters 
themselves.  The trio instituted, through overtly illegal means, France’s fifth regime since 1789. 
 Disappointed and disinterested in politics after having their hopes dashed numerous times 
by the regimes of the Revolution, the majority of Frenchmen cared not that the new Consular 
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government emerged from purely fraudulent means.  Every passing year had brought new 
political actors to the forefront, new governments taking control, and new promises of peace and 
prosperity.  Unfortunately, no one had delivered the expected benefits.  With the declaration of 
the latest regime, the common people immediately hailed Napoleon as a hero.  They believed he 
would deliver them from their daily struggles, just as he delivered them from the hands of their 
enemies on the battlefield.  Citizens who had retained their political passions—monarchists and 
Republicans alike—were not so convinced. 
 Initially, two committees of twenty-five men each replaced the legislative bodies of the 
Directory.  As the new assemblies began writing a new constitution for France, Sieyès, Ducos 
and Bonaparte guided the representatives, ensuring their own desired outcome.  The Constitution 
of the Year VIII, adopted in December 1799, placed executive power in the hands of three 
Consuls, Napoleon Bonaparte, Jean-Jacques de Cambacérès, and Charles-François Lebrun.  
Theoretically, four assemblies existed to prevent corruption or abuse, but separately, each held 
no power, and combined, they held little.  The First Consul proposed legislation to the Council of 
State, a thirty-to-forty member assembly, which then wrote up the bill.  Next, the Tribunate’s one 
hundred representatives discussed it but did not have the right to vote on the proposal.  The bill 
then moved to the three hundred men of the Legislature, who voted on it but had to do so without 
the benefit of discussion.  If the proposal passed both assemblies, it fell to the sixty members of 
Senate to ensure its constitutionality.  Guaranteeing that First Consul Bonaparte ultimately 
enacted any legislation that he wanted, despite the apparent system of checks and balances, 
Article 42 of the Constitution clearly explained the lesser role to be played by the Second and 
Third Consuls.  They were to “have a consultative voice:  they sign the register of these acts in 





decision of the First Consul suffices.”42  The conspiracy-born Consular government presented a 
Republican façade, but Bonaparte clearly intended to consolidate all real political power for 
himself. 
 As soon as the outcome of the events of 18 Brumaire became public knowledge, some 
citizens began to assert that Napoleon intended to destroy the liberties ushered in by the 
Revolution.  Such allegations began in earnest with the plebiscite introducing the Constitution of 
the Year VIII in December 1799, less than a month after the overthrow of the Directory.  One of 
the first outward signs of Napoleon’s less-than-Republican mindset was the proclamation he 
issued to the French people announcing the vote on the proposed Constitution.  He explained that 
the new document and the government it created were “based on true principles of representative 
government, upon the sacred rights of property, of equality, and of liberty.”43  He had placed two 
of the three traditionally accepted gains of the Revolution after the principle of property.  
Reminiscent of French values under the ancien régime, the idea that property would hold the 
same—or more—importance as equality and liberty was a conspicuous insult to Republicanism.  
Within the Constitution were several articles making it clear that Napoleon believed himself 
superior to his fellow Consuls and that he intended to be the only political figure with any true 
authority.  Article 41 announced that only the “First Consul promulgates the laws.”44  The same 
clause also explained that the First Consul alone held the power to appoint and dismiss “at will” 
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holders of nearly all of the nation’s high-ranking positions.45  Leading up to the plebiscite, a 
saying echoed throughout Paris:  “What is there in the Constitution?—There is Bonaparte.”46 
 Although all male citizens over the age of twenty-one had the right to vote on the 
Constitution, many Republicans considered the process as unfair and unbalanced.  Each 
commune had a register in which citizens simply signed their names, followed by a yes or no.  
Given the political retaliations enacted by previous Republican governments, some Frenchmen 
refused to vote, afraid of possible repercussions should they show support for the wrong side.  
Officials calmed the citizens’ fears and persuaded them to participate by promising to burn the 
registers after the counting of the votes.  Officially, the plebiscite’s outcome totaled 3,011,007 
votes to 1,562 in favor of the Constitution.47  France had effectively voted itself into an autocracy 
with a thin Republican veneer. 
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 Napoleon immediately disappointed Republicans as he began to tug at the veil covering 
his true political aspirations.  The very day after overthrowing the Directory, he had expressed 
his intention of censoring the press, violating one of the key freedoms established during the 
Revolution.  To justify these actions, he explained, “If I give free reign to the press, I will not 
remain in power three months.”48  On 17 January 1800, Napoleon imposed harsh regulations on 
the nation’s publications, reducing Paris’ seventy-three newspapers to thirteen.  Only a month 
later, he significantly reduced the direct influence citizens had on the government through the 
Law of 28 Pluviôse VIII (17 February 1800).  The new law removed the right to elect 
representatives directly.  Instead, an elaborate system of elections allowed the population to 
create a list of men from which the Senate chose members to serve in the Tribunate and 
Legislature.  Such a step did not detract from the support Napoleon enjoyed from the general 
public, but it did strengthen the belief held by Republicans and monarchists alike that France was 
returning to an autocracy. 
With every passing day, Napoleon’s Republican opponents believed him more and more 
dangerous:  a man working against the liberties gained during the chaos of the Revolution, a man 
intent upon destroying the citizens’ right to participate in the government, a man who wanted to 
return to the past by making himself France’s supreme leader.  While such prospects prompted 
fears among Republicans, they gave monarchists glimmers of hope that their own political goal 
could come to fruition.   
Recognizing Napoleon’s efforts to centralize power in himself, monarchists believed that 
citizens would begin to reject the idea of a Republican system and reacclimatize to rule by one 
individual.  They hoped that the First Consul would willingly allow, and even support, a 
                                                 





Bourbon restoration.  The future Louis XVIII, optimistic—more likely naïve—about the chance 
of such a transition, wrote himself to the First Consul on 20 February 1800 to explore the 
possibility.49  Not intending to surrender power to the hopeful monarch—or to anyone else for 
that matter—Napoleon replied:  “You must not hope for your return to France; you would have 
to walk over one hundred thousand corpses.  Sacrifice your interest to the peace and happiness of 
France; history will not overlook you.”50  Although he had verbally crushed the Bourbon’s hope 
of reclaiming the nation, Napoleon had not done so out of any Republican proclivities.  Had a 
representative from any of the nation’s Republican groups presented him with a similar request, 
he would have responded in the same fashion:  in his own best interest. 
Napoleon recognized that making peace—or pretending to—would strengthen his grip on 
political control in France.  Understanding that the populace wanted an end to the wars, he took 
as one of his first tasks making overtures of peace to his military opponents.  Pretending to 
entertain diplomatic means to ending current military aggressions, he wrote to both George III of 
England and Emperor Francis I of Austria on Christmas Day 1799, announcing France’s new 
government.  With his new authority, he claimed to seek a cessation of hostilities “on the basis of 
the status quo.”51  In his letter to Francis I, he declared that his primary interest was “to prevent 
the shedding of blood.”52  On the same day, however, Napoleon revealed his hypocrisy as he 
issued a proclamation to the troops exclaiming:  “Soldiers!  It is no longer necessary to defend 
your frontiers; it is necessary to invade enemy States.”53   
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Another issue Napoleon needed to tackle quickly, for his own interests and those of the 
nation, was the religious strife that had plagued France since the early days of the Revolution.  
Implementing the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in summer 1790 changed entirely the 
relationship between France and the Catholic Church, as well as the relationship between citizens 
and their Revolution.  The National Assembly had already nationalized Church lands and 
property in February 1790, one of the earliest steps toward weakening Catholicism’s grip on the 
country.  Fearing that the clergy were more loyal to the pope and Rome than to France, the 
representatives used the Civil Constitution to align religion with the Revolution.  The new 
legislation tasked the State with paying the clergy, increasing the likelihood of support for the 
movement.54  If the Church was no longer responsible for paying them, they would have to back 
the Revolution in order to get their funding.  Many of the low-ranking clergymen, such as 
priests, supported the change in benefactor because the Church had paid them irregularly and 
poorly for many years.  The State was more likely to pay them on a consistent basis, and most 
received pay raises.  The bishops generally saw their salaries slashed, however, giving them even 
less reason to support the legislation.55 
 Although the legislation as a whole was controversial, one of the most offensive changes 
to those who opposed it was the process of appointing bishops and priests.  Prior to the Civil 
Constitution, the pope had sole authority to name and place these clergymen as he saw fit—
though often in consultation with the monarch.  Under the new arrangement, “one will recognize 
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only a single manner of providing to the dioceses and to the parishes, through the process of 
elections.”56  The pope lost not only the power to choose who served as bishops or priests 
throughout France, but also the right to approve the assignments after the fact because the Civil 
Constitution specifically forbade newly elected bishops or priests from seeking his confirmation.  
These new clergymen were, however, instructed by the document to “write to [the pope] as the 
visible leader of the universal Church, as testimony to the unity of faith and of the harmony that 
he must maintain with him.”57  The National Assembly viewed informing the pope of the new 
appointments as good manners, but it did not care to know his opinion on them. 
 The government wanted to be sure of the clergy’s support—and wanted a way to track 
anyone who opposed it.  As such, the Civil Constitution included Section 2, Article 21, which 
required the clergymen to “take, in the presence of municipal officers, of the people and of the 
clergy, the solemn oath to look after with care the faithful of the diocese that was entrusted to 
him, to be loyal to the nation, to the law and to the King, and to maintain with all his power the 
constitution decreed by the National Assembly and accepted by the King.”58  Although the 
National Assembly passed the legislation on 12 July 1790, few clergymen rushed to make the 
pledge of allegiance.  The oath placed them in an uncomfortable situation.  To make the pledge 
risked ostracism from the Church.  On the other hand, not to take the oath, meant estrangement 
from the country.   
 With few oaths sworn, the National Assembly hastened the process.  On 27 November 
1790, the government declared that bishops and priests had eight days to make the pledge.  
Tallies of who took the oath vary, but the majority of low-ranking clergymen, such as local 
                                                 
56 Archives Nationales, AE/II/1185. 
57 Archives Nationales, AE/II/1185. 





priests, swore their allegiance to the nation.  Most of the nation’s bishops declined to accept the 
Civil Constitution of the Clergy.59  Even the ecclesiastical members of the Assembly largely 
declined to take the oath.  Having already written a paper criticizing the legislation, Honoré 
Gabriel Riquetti, the Count of Mirabeau delivered his work as the Ecclesiastical Committee’s 
official response.  The opinion was clear and immediately explained:  “On all sides the civil 
constitution of the clergy, decreed by your representatives, is denounced, as rendering unnatural 
the Divine organization of the Christian Church, and incapable of subsisting with the principles 
consecrated by ecclesiastical antiquity.”60   
In April 1791, Pope Pius VI finally published his thoughts on the Civil Constitution.  
Thoroughly condemning it, he disputed the very idea that any nation had the authority to tamper 
with the organization of the Church.  Just as the National Assembly had done, the pope ordered 
action within a certain deadline.  Any clergyman who failed within forty days to renounce the 
oath he took to France and its government would find his actions viewed “as schismatic, null, 
void, and liable to severe censures.”61  Pius VI also threatened excommunication for anyone who 
persisted in supporting the Revolution’s attack on religion. 
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The adoption of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was the decision that resulted in 
France’s deepest Revolutionary scar.  In addition to the rupture between the Church and its 
clergymen, the legislation caused significant mistrust and resentment among the nation’s 
peasants.  At the time, peasants relied heavily on their local priests not only for information 
about what was happening in the region and country but also for guidance. The Church informed 
the people about what was right and what was wrong.  If the Church thought the Revolution was 
leading the nation down the wrong path, who were the peasants to think differently?  Many of 
them felt that the Church held a higher station than any temporal power and that no one had the 
right to dictate to it.  It was the National Assembly’s insistence on regulating the Church that had 
created a counterrevolutionary tendency among non-nobles, many of whom now supported the 
monarchy, even if they had believed in Republicanism earlier. 
Knowing he needed to heal this wound between the nation and the Church, Napoleon 
sought a truce with the new pope, Pius VII after the implementation of the Consular 
government.62  Although opinions on the First Consul’s motivation differ, it is certain that he did 
not act out of any genuine religious belief.  As with many of his political decisions, he acted in 
his own personal interest.  Napoleon expected to enhance his already strong image among the 
general population by resolving the conflict.  He also believed he could “advance internal 
stability, and subvert royalism” by working to resolve the schism with the Church.63  For this 
own part, Pius VII could hardly reject negotiating with Napoleon “because he feared, after a 
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century of skepticism and a decade of revolution, that the Church in France was on the verge of 
being dissolved.”64 
Papal representatives and Napoleon’s officials devised ten versions of the Concordat 
before all parties involved accepted the agreement.  One of the most contentious points to iron 
out was the status of Catholicism within France.  The papacy wanted it declared the nation’s 
official religion, but Napoleon—and others—strongly rejected the proposal.  Instead, the 
Concordat recognized Catholicism as “the religion of the great majority of French citizens.”65  In 
order to achieve the clause he wanted, Napoleon and the other Consuls had to agree “personally 
to make a ‘private confession’ of Catholicism.”66  The clause caused little discomfort for the 
nation, as the wording purposefully acknowledged the role Catholicism played in the country 
without giving it any more authority than any other religion.  On the other hand, the papacy saw 
its foothold in France strengthened but certainly not restored to its pre-Civil Constitution status.  
  Aware of the divisions caused by the Civil Constitution, Napoleon was unsure of the 
loyalty of the bishops currently serving.  He insisted that each of them “resign and await 
reappointment” because he believed “the émigrés and non-jurors [were] royalists, while the 
Constitutional bishops were suspected of being republicans and liberals.”67  Just as the Civil 
Constitution resulted in refractory clergymen, so too did the Concordat.  Thirty-eight bishops 
refused to resign their positions, disobeying the pope’s order to conform to the new agreement.  
They saw the order to relinquish their posts as a poor reward for their loyal service to the papacy.  
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Already intending his government to walk a narrow line between monarchy and republic, 
Napoleon could reinstate the Catholic Church with a blank slate, ensuring that everyone at the 
head of the bishoprics was suitable to him.   
The First Consul also required the addition of a clause at the end of each religious service 
to strengthen support for himself and his regime.  Because the pope agreed to the Concordat, the 
addition of the new phrase, “Domine, salvam fac Republicam; Domine, salvos fac Consules,” 
(“Lord, save the Republic; Lord, save the Consuls”) implied that the papacy, its bishops and 
priests fully backed the Consular government.68  Given that the masses looked to the religious 
leaders for guidance in all things, anyone who doubted the authority of the latest regime would 
now have his fears put at ease.  Another clause in the Concordat that relieved anxiety among 
France’s general population called for the Church to acknowledge the permanence of the 
nationalization of its lands.69  No longer having to fear the loss of their property or any revenues 
gained by it, the new landowners were free to enjoy their possessions and their religion without 
fearing a conflict of interest. 
The Civil Constitution of 1790 had caused a schism between France and the Catholic 
Church, but Napoleon understood that repairing the relationship would lead to some tensions as 
well.  Revolutionaries who had fought to weaken religion—and even to remove it completely at 
some points—resented its reinstitution.  The hierarchical nature of the Church defied the 
principle of equality and placed France’s citizens on its lowest rung.  Causing even more 
skepticism was the longstanding and close relationship between the Church and monarchical 
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governments, which continued despite France’s new political path.  If the papacy backed 
Europe’s monarchies, which backed the Bourbons, how could it also support France’s republic? 
Revolutionaries were not the only people who dreaded and resented the Concordat.  Papal 
support of the Consular government brought with it a certain level of legitimacy.  Monarchists 
feared that an agreement between the pope and France would cost them one of their strongest 
and most powerful allies.  With the Church constantly reminding its congregations of its support 
for the Consular government, the monarchists would have a harder time convincing the general 
population of France that the Bourbons were, in fact, the rightful rulers of France.   
 Napoleon had plenty of opponents, but the lower classes who tended not to be politically 
inclined adored him.  Events of the Revolution had shown Napoleon the power wielded by the 
lower classes, and he knew it was in his best interest to guide that force.  He correctly understood 
that the stability of his regime depended not solely on the military victories he could earn but 
also on the level of prosperity and comfort of the masses.  Within two months of the Consulate’s 
creation, living conditions had vastly improved over those experienced during the previous 
decade.  Noting the quick progress, Marie-Joseph Paul Yves Roch Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de 
Lafayette remarked, “you know how many beggars there were . . . .  We see no more of them.  
The peasants are richer, the land better tilled, the women better clad.”70  Although the mediocre 
harvest of 1799 had caused the First Consul some alarm, a decrease in bread prices conveniently 
coincided with his victory at the Battle of Marengo in June 1800.  Grateful for such a fantastic 
victory and lowered bread prices, the public openly adored their new leader. 
 Yet poor economic conditions struck France again in spring 1801, threatening that 
adoration.  Given the trouble the masses had caused at various points during the Revolution, 
                                                 





Napoleon once stated, “I fear insurrections based on a lack of bread; I should fear less a battle of 
200,000 men.”71  Concerned that his regime could not withstand widespread bread riots, 
Napoleon ordered the opening of soup kitchens throughout the capital to help feed the poor.  He 
also issued a command to purchase all possible grain from Dutch and English ports for 
immediate shipment to Le Havre.  The promptness with which Napoleon acted successfully 
calmed French fears within three weeks.  Having long since proven his abilities on the 
battlefield, the First Consul now displayed similar talents in economic affairs.  The handling of 
the nation’s finances was “one of the triumphs of Napoleon’s career and an achievement that has 
had a lasting impact.”72 
Despite only 167,000 francs in the coffers on 18 Brumaire, Napoleon managed to balance 
the nation’s budget at 500 million francs by 1802.  One of the benefits of widespread military 
occupation was the ability to extract funds from the conquered territories.  These contributions 
helped offset the cost of the military engagements themselves, which accounted for “half to three 
fourths of the total budget.”73  Wanting to increase the rate at which citizens paid their taxes, 
Napoleon redesigned many of the tax codes to make most citizens unaware of how much of their 
money they were sacrificing to the government.  His efforts were so successful that during his 
reign, Frenchmen “came closer to meeting their obligations than at any earlier time or most later 
times.”74  Although he took some traditional steps to achieve the balance, Napoleon also 
implemented some creative practices as well.  In 1800, he declared a partial bankruptcy in order 
to clear the market of some of the Revolutionary paper money in circulation.  The First Consul 
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also issued a proclamation on 21 March 1801, despite the Tribunate’s veto of it, arbitrarily 
reducing the debt by 73 million francs simply by his fiat.75  Another measure saw the purchases 
made on credit by the military from various contractors spontaneously absolved. 
Balancing the budget was a strong step toward improving the nation’s finances as a 
whole, but doing so did not guarantee long-term financial stability.76  To help achieve it, he 
began repaying government bonds in cash in accordance with a law passed on 11 April 1800, 
thereby immediately improving his popularity among the bourgeoisie.  He also recognized that 
the creation of a national bank would help the nation overcome the recession of the 
Revolutionary era.  French citizens mistrusted paper money after the failure of the Republican 
regimes to use it properly.  To alleviate their concerns, Napoleon established the bank 
independently from the government.  It functioned as a joint-stock company, where those with 
the largest number of shares were responsible for running it.  Although the First Consul and 
many of his family members were stockholders, he did not exercise any direct control over the 
institution until 1806 when he began appointing its highest committee members directly.  The 
creation of the Bank of France on 16 Nivôse VIII (6 January 1800) was one of Napoleon’s most 
beneficial fiscal accomplishments. 
Another lasting financial achievement was his institution of new legal tender on 7 
Germinal XI (27 March 1803).  This law established a clearly defined and standardized currency 
based on a ratio of 15.5 to 1 between gold and silver.77  The Germinal franc was the first tender 
in French history whose face value truly equaled its real value.  Demonstrating the stability of 
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the currency, as well as that of the nation’s finances in general under Napoleon’s leadership, was 
the fact that the value of the Germinal franc held firm from its creation until the eve of World 
War I in 1914. 
 Nearly every decision Napoleon made early in his political career centered on 
strengthening his grasp on control or on solidifying support among the nation’s lower classes.  
Because of his intense focus on the politically apathetic general population, he managed to 
alienate members from both sides of France’s politically active spectrum within the first year of 
holding office.  He had also managed, however, to employ people from both sides in high-
ranking military and political positions.  Hoping to weaken ties to factions and to strengthen faith 
in his own government, Napoleon simultaneously encouraged and disheartened men of all 
ideologies.  He feared having to share power with anyone else, something he considered the 
inevitable outcome of associating himself with any particular group.  The events of the French 
Revolution had proven to him that competing factions undermined whatever regime happened to 
be in power at the time. Wanting to create a government above such elements, Napoleon 
explained to his brother Joseph:  “I have composed my Council of State of ex-members of the 
Constituent Assembly, of moderates, Feuillants, Royalists, Jacobins  I am national:  I like honest 
men of all colours.”78 
 In addition to the negotiation with the Catholic Church, Napoleon also arranged another 
controversial compromise, this time with the nobles who had fled France during the Revolution.  
Thousands of these émigrés had seen their lands confiscated, divided, and even sold as national 
property.  Numerous laws during the Revolution forbade them from returning to their homeland, 
though by no means all of them had actively taken up arms against the Revolution.  After months 
                                                 





of negotiations among Napoleon, the two other Consuls, and the Senate, the Consulate 
announced a general amnesty for émigrés on 26 April 1802.  It permitted an unconditional return 
for all but approximately 1,000 émigrés considered to be active enemies of the Revolution and, 
therefore, of Napoleon.79  Quickly, tens of thousands of these refugees returned to France.  Many 
of them immediately took up positions in the military, government and other institutions, anxious 
to rejoin French society.  Although they recognized that they stood no chance of reestablishing 
their feudal rights, some still hoped for a return to some semblance of their previous luxuries.  
The amnesty seemed, in fact, to offer such a hope, stating that while estates sold during the 
émigrés’ absence would not be returned, estates that had not sold could be returned on a case-by-
case basis.  The wording of this particular clause was so bungled, however, that Napoleon 
ultimately annulled it.  Few, if any émigrés recovered their lost lands, and none received 
reparations for their losses until the Bourbon restoration. 
 The abolition of feudal rights had been one of the greatest accomplishments of the 
Revolution.  Everyone was equal before the law, without regard to title or wealth.  When 
Napoleon proposed allowing the émigrés to return to France, even with the clause offering the 
return of any of their unsold property, the former members of the Third Estate took no issue.  As 
long as the lands they had purchased would not be repossessed and the feudal privileges that had 
oppressed them for so long would not be reinstated, they cared not about the return of the 
refugees.  There were hardly any incidents of hostilities toward the émigrés as they returned to 
the country.   
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 As was generally the case, the lower classes viewed both of Napoleon’s recent 
compromises positively, or at least indifferently.  It was the remaining émigrés, monarchists and 
vehement Republicans who felt slighted—or even betrayed—by them.  Illustrating the military’s 
distaste for the Concordat was the response Napoleon received from General Antoine-Guillaume 
Delmas when asked what he thought of the Easter service.  “It was a beautiful speech,” he 
answered, “all that was missing were the 100,000 men who died to destroy what you have 
revived today.”80  Other generals refused to attend the service at all. 
 Although the Concordat did produce some disillusionment, a majority of the population 
remained more satisfied under Napoleon’s regime than under any government installed since the 
Revolution began.  The ratification of the Peace of Amiens between England and France on 25 
March 1802 added to the First Consul’s level of support.  The British hoped, though in vain, that 
Napoleon would cease his efforts to expand French territory, satisfying himself with the borders 
he had already achieved.  Although their government was reluctant, the British people demanded 
peace.  French citizens too had longed for an end to a decade of nearly non-stop fighting.  With 
his allies out of commission—the Dutch fleet suffered a devastating defeat in April 1801, and 
Russian Czar Paul I was assassinated the following month—Napoleon could not launch an 
invasion of England, an event about which he had fantasized since seizing power.  In addition to 
inaugurating peace between the two countries, the treaty announced the return of prisoners and 
hostages taken by both sides and dictated that the United Kingdom return colonies previously 
belonging to nations involved in the peace—Britain maintained only Trinidad and Ceylon.  
France was to evacuate its positions in Naples and the Roman states, though the nation did gain 
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acknowledgement of its natural boundaries along the Alps and the Rhine River.  For French 
citizens, the treaty also brought as a bonus lower taxes and conscription demands. 
 Although the majority of citizens were content with his reign, Napoleon was not unaware 
of his opponents’ continued machinations designed to remove him from power, whether by 
assassination or otherwise.  He was, however, nonchalant about the situation.  He dedicated little 
of his time or energy to remedying the grievances his political opponents harbored.  Arguably, 
these grievances were impossible to negotiate without relinquishing his position.  Viewed 
simultaneously as having destroyed the republic and having usurped the Bourbon throne, 
Napoleon had no hope of winning politically-minded men to his side without sacrificing his own 
personal goals.  Recognizing that there were no true Bonapartists, he focused his attention on 
those people whose loyalty he could count on, as long as daily conditions were favorable.  He 
hoped to win enough support among the lower classes to ensure the stability of his regime, even 
if one of his political opponents managed to strike a severe blow. 
 Believing that the chaotic course of the Revolution had so inundated the nation with 
various ideologies that it was impossible for citizens to know which path was correct, he sought 
to reform the education system currently in place.  Napoleon explained that as “long as one does 
not learn from childhood whether to be republican or monarchist, Catholic or nonreligious, etc., 
the State will not form a nation; it will rest on a vague and uncertain base; it will be constantly 
exposed to changes and disorders.”81  If no one took the time to explain the just and proper ways 
of society and politics, hostility and confusion would continue to plague the nation.  
 Wanting to establish conformity among the impressionable minds of those young who 
would eventually become his military and government officials, he replaced the Directory’s 
                                                 





secondary schools with his own more centralized ones—lycées—in May 1802.  He exercised 
direct control over the schools’ curriculum until 1808, when members of his Imperial University 
took over the task.  Students studied basic subjects such as reading, history, and Latin until the 
age of twelve, when they separated into two categories:  the elite who would pursue military 
careers and the others destined for civilian positions.  In either case, all students wore uniforms 
and participated in drills and physical training, illustrating the importance of military affairs in 
Napoleonic France.  By 1805, the Emperor had founded 39 lycées and 1,083 secondary schools, 
far surpassing the number established by any previous regime.82  Given his belief in providing 
opportunities based on merit rather than upbringing or heritage, Napoleon created 2,500 
scholarships to assist boys of lesser means obtain the education more readily available to the 
wealthy.  To guarantee a certain level of competency among those who completed their 
education, Napoleon established the baccalaureate examination in 1809, a system still in place 
today.  His education system produced noticeable results, raising literacy from 37 percent to 54 
percent among men and from 27 percent to over 35 percent among women.83   
 With peace among the European nations and social and economic conditions better than 
in previous years, Napoleon recognized that opportunity had presented itself for him to solidify 
his regime even further.  Taking advantage of the Senators’ offer in summer 1802 to extend his 
term as Consul to ten years, he cleverly suggested a plebiscite to ask the nation whether he 
should serve in the position for life.  Although they agreed to the vote, many of the Senators 
were alarmed.  Believing the removal of the term limit to be a step toward revoking the 
involvement of the populace in deciding its leaders, one of the most important achievements of 
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the Revolution, they considered the transition too dramatic and abrupt.  The French people as a 
whole, however, cared little for the memory of the Revolution.  For them, it called up memories 
of uncertainty, fear, and chaos.  Napoleon had brought them financial stability and salvation 
from war and constant political upheaval.  Naming him First Consul for life ensured, in the 
people’s opinion, the continued stability of their daily lives.  It was an added bonus if it brought 
the same for the nation on its larger political scale. 
 While the voting process for the plebiscite was free from direct tampering, voters 
certainly felt pressured to approve the proposed change.  The typical adult male continued to fear 
retaliation for casting the wrong vote, as they were required to sign their names in a register 
before voting.  Leaving no room to question which was the right choice, some military officials 
threatened their men.  One general, gathering his men outside a voting center, stated blatantly:  
“You are free to hold your own opinion; nevertheless, I must warn you that the first man not to 
vote for the Consulate for life will be shot in front of the regiment.”84  The official results of the 
plebiscite tallied 3,568,885 in favor, a mere 8,374 opposed, and the Senate ratified the 
Constitution of the Year X, including Napoleon’s new title, before knowing the outcome.85   
 Although he was not yet ready to unveil his true imperial intentions, Napoleon had 
already succeeded in claiming all real political power while leaving to the other Consuls and 
Senators just enough to maintain the charade of Republicanism.  His ruse did not convince 
everyone.  True Republicans grew more agitated by the Consul’s consolidation of authority, and 
Royalists were determined to see the Bourbons restored to the same throne of France that 
Napoleon seemed anxious to claim for himself. 
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 Napoleon’s hold on power depended greatly on loyalty, a commodity he was willing to 
purchase when needed.  Despite the Revolution’s promise of equality—and the steps it had made 
toward it—Napoleon knew that individuals enjoyed striving to rise above others.  Running the 
risk of criticism for returning to practices of the ancien régime, he created the Legion of Honor 
on 29 Floréal Year X (19 May 1802).86  Admission depended on ability, talent, and service, 
whether military or civilian.  The suggestion faced significant disapproval on the ground that the 
organization would serve no purpose other than distributing useless honorific trinkets and 
promoting inequality.  To such claims, Napoleon retorted, “it is by baubles alone that men are 
led.”87  Pure and complete equality was not something that the Consul believed Frenchmen truly 
wanted.  He saw it as something “they would gladly renounce . . . if everyone could entertain the 
hope of rising to the top.”88  The Legion had five levels, each providing a different amount of 
prestige and reward.89  Although the Legion of Honor was open to civilians, an overwhelming 
majority of its members were military men, a clear sign of its inherent inequality.  Among the 
roughly 4,000 civilians—compared to nearly 32,000 soldiers—welcomed into the fold between 
1802 and 1814, most of them held high-ranking government positions.  Realizing the power 
behind man’s desire for honor and recognition, Napoleon used the Legion not only to reward the 
faithful but to buy the loyalty of the unfaithful.  On 25 Prairial XII (14 June 1804), for example, 
in a blatant effort to purchase a disgruntled general’s devotion to the Consulate, Napoleon 
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nominated Claude-François de Malet to the Legion with the rank of Commander.90  Malet 
promptly responded in a letter humbly acknowledging the distinction and declaring his 
unshakable “love of country and liberty.”91  Bonaparte learned soon enough, however, that he 
had merely succeeded in renting, not buying, the general’s loyalty. 
 Positions in the Legion of Honor were not the only rewards Napoleon used in his efforts 
to purchase the loyalty of discontented citizens.  On occasion, the attempt was even more 
obvious, as the First Consul offered military or political positions and large sums of money.  In 
early 1801, Napoleon granted safe passage for Georges Cadoudal, a known chouan loosely 
associated with the infernal machine plot of 1800, to travel to Paris for a meeting between the 
two men.  Although genuinely tempted by the offer of a generalship in the military, the 
conspirator ultimately declined.  He also refused the offer of a yearly income of 100,000 livres.  
Instead, he held fast to his ideologies, leaving the meeting without changing his allegiances.  He 
returned to England where he continued working with the Bourbons to overthrow the First 
Consul. 
 The severity of the plots against him, coming from both political camps, often prompted 
Napoleon to jump to rash and ill-informed conclusions.  After the infernal machine plot, the First 
Consul used the Republican-based attempt against his life at the Theatre of the Republic and of 
the Arts the previous October as proof of the guilty party.  Even as contradictory evidence 
surfaced, Napoleon held to his initial assumption.  He produced a list containing over 130 names 
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of alleged Republican conspirators, each of whom ultimately found himself deported to the 
Seychelles or Cayenne.92 
 Cadoudal’s plot against Napoleon in 1804 prompted even more serious conclusions in 
Napoleon’s mind.  Alarmed that the royal family itself had supported the effort, the First Consul 
immediately began searching for the prince who would supposedly lead a movement against his 
regime in Paris.  He demanded the seizure of Louis-Antoine-Henri de Bourbon, Duke d’Enghien, 
from Ettenheim, a small German town near the border with France.  The Duke was brought to 
Vincennes château in Paris in March to defend himself before a hastily formed military 
commission that had already determined a verdict of guilty.  The tribunal announced that he 
faced several charges:  bearing arms against the French people, offering his services to the 
English, being an enemy of France, harboring British agents and helping them to spy in France, 
trying to spark rebellions in Strasbourg, leading a corps of émigrés on the French border, and, 
finally, spearheading a plot to overthrow the Consular government.  Admitting to having taken 
up arms against Revolutionary France, he was audacious enough to explain that had he not done 
so, he would not have been able to face himself.  He found the other charges positively ludicrous 
and vehemently denied being involved in any such activities.  The commission found him guilty, 
and sentenced him to an immediate death.  With no means of appealing the decision, he was lost.  
Taken to the courtyard where a firing squad and freshly dug grave were waiting, Enghien, having 
had no ties to Cadoudal or his plot, met with death. 
 Napoleon felt neither guilt nor remorse for his actions.  When asked about the decision to 
execute Enghien, he replied, “Under similar circumstances today, I would do the same thing all 
over again.  After all, am I simply some miserable dog one can kill in the street with impunity, 
                                                 





while my assassins are held sacrosanct?  When they attack my person, I return blow for blow.”93  
While the murder produced no lasting effect on Napoleon himself, the Bourbons and other 
European monarchs considered it especially egregious.  Enghien’s execution marked the 
definitive break between Napoleon and the Bourbons, illustrating clearly that the First Consul 
had no intention of allowing the restoration of the monarchy.  Despite the violence enacted 
against one of their own, the monarchs failed to take any further substantive action against 
Napoleon or his regime.  Cadoudal’s failed attempt marked the last conspiratorial effort in the 
Royalist camp.  By contrast, Revolutionaries drew encouragement from the murder, noting that 
the “likelihood of a compromise between himself [Napoleon] and the ancien régime, between 
himself and the Europe of the kings, was weaker than ever.”94   
Neither the fates of Cadoudal and his accomplices nor the execution of the Duke 
d’Enghien roused the French public against Napoleon or his regime.  Rather than react 
negatively to the recent executions, the French public embraced their leader even more closely.  
Napoleon enjoyed a burst of support in response to news of Cadoudal’s latest attempt against 
him in 1804.  Addressing the Senate about the anger and fear the plot had provoked in the public, 
Napoleon explained that such attempts caused him no personal fear.  His only worry concerned 
“the situation in which this great people would have found itself today had the recent attempt 
succeeded.”95  To resolve the issue, the Senators in May 1804, under obvious pressure, suggested 
that Napoleon take the title of Emperor, rendering the regime hereditary and supposedly more 
stable.  Although the suggestion disheartened some members, only one Senator, Lazare Carnot, 
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actively spoke against the proposal and voted no.  On 18 May, the Senators approved the 
transition.  Wanting to preserve the façade of a Republican government to the last minute, 
Napoleon ordered a plebiscite, stating that he would not accept the position if it were not the will 
of the people.  Six months later, French male citizens voted whether they supported his accession 
to Emperor, a position that would pass, if he had no legitimate children of his own, to a brother, 
Joseph or Louis Bonaparte.96  The result, announced on 6 November 1804, was a victory for 
Napoleon:  3,572,329 to 2,569.97  Such an outcome was—and is—a “virtual statistical 
impossibility,” implying that 99.9993 percent of Frenchmen voted in favor of the proposition.98  
Regardless of apparently distorted numbers, the public supported the change overwhelmingly.  
Anyone of dissimilar political ideology, including the monarchs of other European nations, grew 
enraged at the prospect of a French emperor.  Nevertheless, Napoleon’s coronation took place on 
2 December 1804 at Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris. 
The Bourbons and Europe’s other monarchs had, in fact, never accepted as legitimate any 
of the governments born out of the Revolution.  They considered Napoleon’s latest 
accomplishment an affront to ideological sensibilities, a sentiment illustrated by their absence 
from the coronation ceremony.  No monarch personally attended the event, and most refused 
even to send a representative.  One leader that Napoleon could not afford to have decline his 
invitation was Pope Pius VII.  Napoleon believed that the papacy’s participation in the ceremony 
would give his regime an undeniable legitimacy.  When his requests for the pope’s attendance 
went unanswered, the Emperor resorted to begging and even to threatening the Church.  
                                                 
96 Napoleon had entertained the idea of adopting as his heir the son of his stepdaughter Hortense 
and her husband Louis, but the boy died before his fifth birthday.  Markham, Napoleon, 186. 
97 Bulletin des lois de l’Empire français, Vol. 2:  Contenant les lois rendues depuis le 1er 
Vendémiaire jusqu’au 30 Ventôse an XIII (Paris:  Imprimerie impériale, an XIII), 77. 





Although he eventually agreed to participate, Pius VII did so reluctantly.  After crowning himself 
Emperor and his wife, Josephine, Empress, Napoleon received yet another symbol of his power, 
this time from the pope.  Pius VII explained that the imperial ring was “the sign of the Holy 
Faith, the proof of the strength and solidity of your empire, by means of which, as a result of its 
triumphant power, you will conquer your enemies and destroy heresies, on this imperial throne 
which Jesus the Christ, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords in his eternal kingdom, affirms your 
reign with him.”99   
Both Napoleon and his opponents recognized the legitimacy granted to the imperial 
regime through the Church’s blessing, but their opinions regarding it differed.  Rejoicing in his 
accomplishment, the new Emperor referred to himself as the “crowned representative of the 
Revolution triumphant,” while Royalists and other adversaries lamented the occasion as “the 
Revolution legitimized and even sanctified.”100  For his part, Cadoudal—awaiting his 
execution—complained that he and his collaborators had overreached their goal:  “we have done 
more than we hoped to do; we meant to give France a King, and we have given her an 
Emperor.”101 
The former First Consul had finally removed the thin Republican veil under which he had 
hidden his intentions for so long, revealing a throne with laurel leaves and a golden “N.”  Despite 
decreasing liberties, overturned Revolutionary gains, and nearly constant warfare—peace had 
lasted only fourteen months during the Consulate—the masses continued to support their leader.  
They continued to praise him as the savior of the Revolution, even after his taking the title of 
Emperor.  An imperial official remarked, “they were among his warmest partisans, because he 
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reassured them against the return of tithes, feudal rights, the restitution of property to émigrés, 
and the oppression of the lords.”102  Republicans continuously denounced Napoleon as the 
executioner of Revolutionary gains, but they could not legitimately refute his accomplishments 
concerning the nation’s laws. 
With the passage of the Civil Code (also known as the Code Napoleon) on 21 March 
1804, the roughly 400 law codes of the ancien régime were no more.103  The new code largely 
dismissed the previous laws because of their origin in hereditary privilege and religion.  It 
forbade privilege based on birth, granted freedom of religion, and proclaimed that employment 
should go to the most qualified.  Those responsible for the code’s wording took care to organize 
it rationally (rather than as a hodgepodge of seemingly unrelated laws) and to word it in an easily 
accessible manner.  The Civil Code proclaimed equality before the law but also made clear that 
the husband/father was the head of the household.  Although modern readers will not consider 
such a system representative of true equality, nowhere in Europe in the early 1800s did women 
enjoy the same rights as men.  According to Napoleon’s law code, for example, a man could ask 
for a divorce if his wife committed adultery, but a woman could make the same request only if 
her husband was guilty of the same within the confines of their residence. 
As Napoleon’s popularity continued to increase—even other nations appreciated the 
utility of his new law code—Republicans acknowledged that if they wanted to restore their 
preferred form of government, violence was the only answer.  This recognition aside, the initial 
years of Napoleon’s reign as Emperor saw no significant attempts against his life, allowing him 
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to focus on social aspects of his realm in addition to his ever-present, but successful, military 
endeavors. 
Napoleon’s insistence on being present on the battlefields offered conspirators with their 
best opportunities for action.  His opponents recognized the possibility that the Emperor might 
be injured or even killed during one of the conflicts.  They could take advantage of the prospect, 
as well as the slow rate of communication between the battles and the capital.  The horrible 
outcome of the Battle of Eylau in February 1807 seemed to provide a prime opportunity for 
acting against the Emperor. 
The joint force of Prussia and Russia in the town of Eylau, less than thirty miles south of 
Königsberg, easily outnumbered Napoleon’s own troops.  His infantry was dwarfed 67,000 to 
45,000, and his artillery pieces fell short 260 to 200.  Casualties on the first day of fighting 
totaled roughly 4,000.  The number of wounded quickly became the number of dead as most of 
the injured men, exposed to the excruciatingly cold temperature and heavy snowfall, did not 
survive the night.  The second day of battle saw blinding blizzard conditions that rendered the bit 
of light provided by daybreak virtually useless. 
As the Russians began making inroads on the French lines, Napoleon ordered a corps 
under Marshal Pierre Augereau to contain the Russian left flank.  Delusional with fever and 
barely able to stand, Augereau was a horrendous choice.  Growing increasingly disoriented as he 
crossed the marshy, pond-laden terrain, he unwittingly led his soldiers straight into the center of 
the Russian artillery line.  With no difficulty or hesitation, the Russian gunners obliterated the 
Frenchmen.  Of the nearly 15,000 soldiers who had obediently and confidently followed 





While the annihilation of this corps dealt a devastating blow to French numbers and 
morale, the Russians nearly struck an even more catastrophic one that could have easily 
destroyed any hope for the survival of Napoleon’s Empire.  As the Emperor watched the battle 
unfold from a bell tower within Eylau, nearly 6,000 Russian troops headed straight for him.  His 
own troops were all on the battlefield, leaving him with only his personal escort for protection.  
If the Russians could manage to capture—though they were just as likely to kill—the illustrious 
Napoleon Bonaparte, not only the battle but his reign would be over.  His guards preferred to die 
rather than let that happen.  And die they did.  The Russians mercilessly mowed down the 
French, who literally sacrificed themselves as human shields for their Emperor.  Their heroic 
efforts succeeded in slowing the enemy long enough to allow the arrival of two French battalions 
which repelled the attack completely. 
As blood streamed across the frozen battlefield, Napoleon knew that he faced a desperate 
problem.  The loss of life was devastating, though he could hide that fact easily enough.  Rather 
than reporting the true figure estimated around 25,000, he admitted to the nation suffering fewer 
than 8,000 dead and wounded, a boldfaced lie when considering that Augereau’s corps alone lost 
nearly 13,000.  On the other hand, his troops had experienced the fighting for themselves and 
knew the truth.  Haunted by a battle deemed a victory only because they survived, their morale 
was crashing, further aggravated by rough terrain, bad weather and hostile peasantry in the 
countryside.  They asked themselves whether they would ever see France again. 
Back in Paris, anyone with connections to high-ranking political or military officers 
received more honest reports of the catastrophe suffered at Eylau.  Moved by this information, 
some who opposed the Empire began conspiring against Napoleon.  Led by former Minister of 





Napoleon’s own cabinet started discussions about how best to relieve France of its imperial 
burden.  By the time they agreed on how to proceed and how their provisional government 
would function, news of Napoleon’s resounding victory at the Battle of Friedland (14 June 1807) 
reached the capital.  The group postponed their plot, expecting that a celebrating nation would be 
unlikely to support the overthrow of their victorious leader.  Servan assured his supporters that 
another opportunity would present itself in time.  He was right, but he did not live to see it.  
When he died on 10 May 1808, General Malet assumed control of the group and its conspiracy. 
As Napoleon’s imperial regime continued, thus did his decisions that infuriated 
Republicans.  They had taken issue with the establishment of the Legion of Honor in May 1802, 
decrying its ranking system despite a membership based on talent and merit, rather than wealth 
or heritage.  The honorary titles granted to its members notwithstanding, the Legion did not, in 
fact, constitute a new nobility.  But the opposite was true when, in 1808, Napoleon created an 
imperial aristocracy which, disregarding any titles that had existed prior to the Revolution, 
depended instead on loyalty to the Emperor—or at least the appearance thereof—and financial 
affluence.  Men who hoped to join the new nobility needed a personal fortune of at least 50,000 
francs.104  Over the next six years, Napoleon appointed 3,263 noblemen ranging from chevalier 
to prince.  Although he reestablished an aristocracy, its composition differed greatly from its 
predecessor:  only 22 percent of its members had held titles under the Bourbon monarchy, while 
58 percent were modest bourgeois lawyers, doctors, and industrialists, and 20 percent were from 
lower levels of society.  While Republicans considered the new hierarchy an affront to 
Revolutionary sensibilities, the majority of the nation hardly noticed it.  Because the new 
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imperial nobility did not restore the rights and privileges of the ancien régime, it did not 
contradict the peasants’ conception of Revolutionary accomplishments. 
Several years of ruling without any significant threats against his life and favorable daily 
police reports announcing that “the multitude . . . loves the Emperor” eventually bolstered 
Napoleon’s confidence in the stability of his regime.105  He explained to one of his officials, “we 
have acquired the right to think no man will make an attempt on Our life until Providence so 
wills it.”106  His sureness—or naïveté—began to falter on 12 October 1809.  An eighteen-year-
old Saxon named Frédéric Staaps attended a parade in Schönbrunn with the intention of 
assassinating the Emperor.  Several Imperial Guards thwarted his efforts before Napoleon even 
noticed the would-be assassin’s presence.  Given the man’s age, Napoleon was curious about his 
motive and interrogated him personally.  The young man claimed, “The voice of God told me 
that the death of a single man would pacify everything.”107  Four days later, when informed that 
the continuous cannon fire outside the prison was in celebration of peace between France and 
Austria, he threw his hands in the air and looked to the ceiling, proclaiming, “Oh God, how I 
thank you!  Peace is made, and I am not an assassin!”108  His joy was short lived, however, as he 
faced a firing squad less than two hours later.109 
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It was not only assassination attempts that posed a threat to Napoleon.  His failure to 
consider the precarious position in which he left his nation when on military campaign was 
directly responsible for at least three conspiracies against him.  Although Napoleon gave his 
absence little thought at this point in his reign, to savvy politicians and military officers, the 
dangerous circumstances were clear.  Communication between the Emperor and Paris took 
several days to accomplish when he was on campaign with his troops.  While in Spain in 1808, 
for example, a single message between the army and Paris would have required a minimum of 
four days to arrive.  It was around this precise situation that Malet designed a conspiracy in late 
May 1808.  He and his followers printed and planned to distribute seemingly official government 
documents announcing the death of Napoleon on the battlefield and the creation of a new regime.  
Two anxious members of the group inadvertently thwarted the plan a mere four days before the 
plot’s planned date.  They argued about its details in front of a retired general seeking 
readmission to active military service.  He immediately informed Prefect of Police Dubois of 
what he had overheard.  By mid-July, all of the involved malcontents were under arrest.  On 23 
October, Malet wrote to the Emperor himself to explain why he had dared conspire against his 
regime.  His goal had been, he claimed, to ensure the long-term prosperity of the nation.  He 
asked, “What will happen to us if we lose our Emperor?”110 
The combination of plots centered on falsified reports of his death, and direct attacks on 
his person significantly damaged Napoleon’s confidence in the stability of his regime.  It brought 
to the forefront of his mind a concern that he had held for some years:  there was no hope that his 
marriage to Josephine would produce an heir.  He did not want to see his empire divided among 
his brothers, an event he expected to occur should he die without an heir of his own.  Regardless 
                                                 





of the support he might receive from the French masses, the regime would never be the 
permanent institution he hoped it to be unless he had a son.  When death found Napoleon, his 
nation would once again be catapulted into civil chaos.  Republicans and Royalists would clash, 
rekindling the Revolutionary fire. 
Having addressed the issues of internal strife among his officials, Napoleon turned his 
focus to the unpleasant task of informing Josephine of their impending divorce.  Despite the 
numerous infidelities committed on both sides, the two had truly cared for one another.  After a 
strained and quiet dinner, the Emperor bluntly—if not cruelly—explained his reasoning:  “I need 
a womb.”111  The Empress was not surprised, devastated though she was.  Her fear of such a fate 
had grown alongside Napoleon’s power.  She recognized that he could never achieve his ultimate 
goal of creating a hereditary dynasty as long as their marriage continued.  On 15 December 1809, 
the imperial couple announced their divorce to a room full of courtiers.  The occasion was 
emotional for both.  Having thanked Josephine for their time together, Napoleon sat, in tears, on 
his throne.  Before her own emotions forced her to stop, the Empress declared that she was proud 
of having the opportunity to make such a sacrifice on behalf of France.  Arch-Chancellor Jean 
Jacques Régis de Cambacérès then announced the Senate’s decree that the divorce was complete 
and bestowed upon Josephine a pension of two million francs. 
Now officially divorced, Napoleon turned his attention to finding Josephine’s successor.  
He perceived two especially advantageous candidates:  Czar Alexander I’s sister and Austrian 
Emperor Francis I’s daughter.  He pursued the Russian option first, but Alexander replied that 
his sister, not yet sixteen years old, was simply too young to wed.  Perhaps after a few years had 
passed, the Czar suggested, he might reconsider the proposition.  Napoleon was unwilling to 
                                                 





wait.  Two and a half months after suggesting a marriage alliance with Russia, he proposed the 
same to Austria.  Emperor Francis approved the union but not from any sincere desire to ally 
with France.  As State Minister Klemens von Metternich explained, the marriage was a necessary 
maneuver in order “to avoid all military action and to flatter . . . until the day of deliverance.”112  
Obediently, the nineteen-year-old Marie-Louise traveled to France, becoming Napoleon’s second 
wife on 11 March 1810. 
Although the fact that his new bride was young and healthy enough to bear him children 
satisfied Napoleon, the French people as a whole did not share his sentiment.  For the first time, 
one of his decisions flew in the face of the desires and hopes of the masses.  Less than two 
decades earlier, they had declared their violent hatred and distrust of another Austrian bride by 
beheading Marie-Antoinette.  Now they found her niece as their new empress.  Rumors spread 
after the marriage that anyone who had voted in favor of or otherwise supported the deaths of 
Louis XVI and his queen would face exile.  The divorce also disappointed Revolutionaries 
because Josephine was one of their own, having spent time in prison after petitioning for the 
release of her estranged Jacobin husband.  Napoleon incorrectly believed that the union would 
earn him respect and acceptance among Europe’s other monarchs.  Yet no matter whom he took 
for his wife, the European monarchs vowed never to accept a Bonaparte among their ranks.  The 
Emperor was also under the mistaken impression that with a marriage alliance in place, Austria 
would support his aspirations, allowing him to continue expanding his territory and power.  
Although no one but Napoleon himself truly approved of the union, its value became apparent 
when the couple announced Marie-Louise’s pregnancy a few months later.  The Emperor 
                                                 





rejoiced at the possibility of having a son, but his opponents recognized that their goal of 
overthrowing the Empire would become more difficult once he had an heir.113 
Marie-Louise gave birth to a son, known as the King of Rome, on 20 March 1811.  
Napoleon rejoiced at the news, believing that he had succeeded in making his imperial regime 
permanent through a hereditary succession.  Despite their hatred of the boy’s Austrian mother, 
the masses shared their Emperor’s hope that European monarchs would finally acknowledge the 
regime’s legitimacy.  They were excited at the prospect of peace:  now that the Emperor had a 
son, he would put war aside to supervise the child’s upbringing.  Minister of Police Savary 
wrote, the “people sincerely anticipated a period of profound peace; the idea of war and 
occupations of that sort were no longer entertained as being realistic.”114 
Economic hardships beginning in 1811 reignited anxieties.  The high cost and shortage of 
bread resulting from a mediocre harvest in 1810 became more burdensome after an even less 
successful crop the following year.  By March 1812, bread prices in Paris had reached 18 sous 
per loaf—officials considered 20 sous per loaf a critical situation.  Napoleon recognized that 
prices were more unreasonable in rural areas but focused primarily on keeping food available to 
the capital city for fear that bread riots in Paris could quickly transform into large-scale revolts.  
The situation required immediate attention because “the government is there, and soldiers do not 
like to shoot at women with babies on their backs who come screaming to the bakeries.”115  No 
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significant disturbance occurred within the capital, allowing the Emperor to enact legislation to 
relieve the situation throughout the rest of the nation.  He returned to the idea of soup kitchens 
which had proved effective earlier in his reign.  Serving “Rumsford soup”—a concoction that 
required no flour and was allegedly as nutritious as bread—these establishments provided the 
sole means of survival for nearly one-third of the population in some of the more rural sections 
of France.  With deteriorating conditions at home, it was likely that the masses would begin to 
realize that the Emperor’s attention was not as focused on the French people as it needed to be.  
If they were no longer satisfied with their living conditions, they would come to see that the 
continuation of war was the result of Napoleon’s personal ambition, rather than the effort to 
guarantee and to spread Revolutionary gains. 
Another Napoleonic practice that began to take a toll on the population was the 
conscription needed to support the constant warfare.  While his regime made extensive use of the 
process, forced military service was not one of Napoleon’s own inventions.  A decree issued by 
the National Convention on 24 February 1793 immediately conscripted 300,000 men for military 
service, with each of the nation’s departments required to meet a quota.  On 23 August 1793, the 
government issued a decree to eliminate any doubt that all French citizens were expected to 
serve their country as long as the Revolution continued.  The first article assigned tasks to every 
section of the population:  “From this moment until such a time as its enemies shall have been 
driven from the soil of the Republic, all Frenchmen are in permanent requisition for the services 
of the armies.  The young men shall fight; the married men shall forge arms and transport 





shall turn old lint into linen; the old men shall betake themselves to the public squares in order to 
arouse the courage of the warriors and preach hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic.”116 
The Directory continued the practice of conscription, enacting the Jourdan Law on 19 
Fructidor VI (5 September 1798).  It required all eighteen-year-old males to register for the draft, 
though they would not serve until they reached ages twenty to twenty-five.  Registration did not 
necessarily mean that military service was inevitable.  Men could legally avoid service if they 
were the head of a household, married, or the only son in their family.117  Members of certain 
professions, such as clergymen and doctors, also enjoyed exemption.  A lottery system 
determined which citizens would serve, and those selected underwent physical examinations to 
exclude anyone unfit, including men under five feet tall.  Despite the magnitude of the 
Napoleonic Wars, employment in the military rarely accounted for more than 3 percent of the 
population.118  Between 1800 and 1814, two million Frenchmen—approximately 7 percent of the 
nation’s entire population—found themselves drafted.119  It was not the number of men drafted 
that drained the country’s morale, but the constant need for the process in the first place.  
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Citizens only became truly alarmed when levies began calling for more than one million 
individuals after the catastrophic fiasco in Russia in 1812. 
Although he eventually chose to pursue it, Napoleon had recognized the difficulties 
invading Russia would entail.  His political and military officials consistently advised against 
such action, pointing to the failure of numerous leaders in the past, such as Charles XII of 
Sweden.  He guaranteed his advisors that he understood when and how to embark on an invasion 
of Russia and that the endeavor was not as hopeless or foolhardy as they insisted.  His 
overconfidence was obvious in every statement he made concerning the impending assault.120 
On the night before Napoleon was to lead his Grande Armée into Russia, Prefect of 
Police Pasquier found himself fearing the possibility of the Emperor’s enemies trying again to 
capitalize on his lengthy absence.  If such circumstances arose, there would be no one in Paris 
with sufficient authority to quash the attempt.  Having considered the prefect’s concerns, 
Napoleon paced around the room and replied, “Yes, there is certainly some truth in what you say 
. . . but one must accomplish what has been undertaken.”121  With that, the Emperor dismissed 
the subject and bid Pasquier a goodnight. 
Pasquier’s fears were not without reason, as everyone would soon learn.  Napoleon’s 
lenient treatment of some men who conspired against him in the past, coupled with the lengthy 
period of time he was away during the Russian campaign, worked in favor of General Malet.  
Despite an abortive attempt to overthrow the Empire in spring 1808 and a one-man raucous 
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debacle in June 1809, Malet received no severe punishment for his insubordination.  In fact, in 
August 1809, he had petitioned the minister of police for relocation from Saint-Pélagie prison.122  
His new residence offered little security, as it was really nothing more than a retirement home.  
The minister granted the request, though Malet was to remain under constant surveillance.  This 
leniency backfired on the minister—and almost on the imperial regime as a whole—when the 
general and several accomplices left the rest home in October 1812 and implemented the most 
successful conspiracy in the history of Napoleonic government. 
In October 1812, several weeks passed without any news reaching Paris from the 
Emperor and his Grande Armée.  The lack of information quickly prompted rumors and 
speculations as to what might be happening in Russia.  Already aware that the campaign had not 
gone well, Parisians were increasingly nervous as each day passed.  Thinking the city rife with 
inquietude and disillusionment, Malet saw the latest opportunity for him to strike against 
Napoleon.  With the Emperor in Russia and no imperial bulletins forthcoming, he knew that 
verification of the imperial death would be a slow and difficult undertaking.  Given the recent 
lack of information received from the army, Malet did not expect such an announcement to meet 
much, if any, disbelief, especially if seemingly official government documents seconded the 
claim.  The conspiracy began successfully enough with Malet and his followers gaining control 
of numerous military troops and with numerous political officials finding themselves under 
arrest.  After several hours, however, Malet’s identity as a political prisoner came to light, and 
the conspiracy ended.  Although this plot was the most successful directed against Napoleon or 
his regime, it produced little impact on Parisians or on the nation as a whole.  People in the 
                                                 





capital city discussed it “as a piece of outrageous folly,” if they bothered to speak of it at all.123  
Finally, after years of plotting against Napoleon, General Malet received a death sentence for his 
activities. 
Knowing that additional news of the catastrophic conditions facing the Grande Armée in 
Russia was making its way to Paris, Napoleon worried that public opinion would be even further 
damaged given the recent attempt to overthrow his government.  He feared that other political 
opponents, especially those outside Paris and in conquered territories, would seize the 
opportunity to act against him as well.  Wanting to manage any ramifications caused by either—
or both—situations, he explained to his advisers who had accompanied him on the Russian 
campaign that his presence was required back in his capital city.   
Napoleon returned to Paris during the middle of the night on 18 December 1812.124  Over 
the next several days, he met with the Senate, each member of which was anxious to impress 
upon him his undying loyalty.  They sought to reduce the significance of events, seeking to 
assure the Emperor that his reign enjoyed solid support.  Senator Louis-Philippe, Count of Ségur 
swore allegiance—his own, and that of the Senate as a whole—to Napoleon and the dynasty that 
would follow him:  “In your absence a detestable plot was framed; some madman attempted to 
shake what genius and courage had founded. . . .  We are ready to sacrifice every thing for your 
sacred person, for the perpetuation of your dynasty.  Deign to receive this new oath:  we will 
remain faithful to it till death.”125  Despite verbal promises of loyalty, many of his officials’ 
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actions during dubious times betrayed their true feelings.  Napoleon’s regime had never enjoyed 
the stability that pre-Revolutionary dynasties had. 
In the later years of his regime, Napoleon’s military triumphs lessened, and the nation’s 
enemies drew closer to Paris.  As his hold on popular opinion diminished, he faced increasing 
danger from his officials and the weakness caused by their long-standing and conflicting political 
ideologies.  The very men who had, at least outwardly, sworn allegiance to the imperial 
government forced their sovereign to abdicate on 6 April 1814.  The end of the Napoleonic 
Empire was a long-sought victory for the Bourbon supporters vanquished by the chaos of the 
Revolution.  Having replaced the Emperor with Louis XVIII, monarchists hoped to return France 
to a pre-Revolutionary state, or at the very least to a constitutional monarchy.  Because the 
imperial interlude had not fully subdued the unrest ushered in by the Revolution, the newly 
reestablished Bourbon monarchy was destined to face upheaval. 
What the Bourbons likely did not expect was that Bonaparte himself would be part of that 
upheaval.  He returned to France from his exile on the island of Elba in March 1815 and retook 
political control of the nation.  The past and now present Emperor announced to French citizens 
that his own rule had been deposed through the treachery of some of his military and political 
officials.  His second attempt at ruling the nation would not enjoy long-term success, however, as 
his most vehement opponents—other European leaders—had been meeting at the Congress of 
Vienna since 1 November 1814 to establish a lasting European peace settlement out of the 
disorder caused first by the Revolution and then by Napoleon’s reign.  Assisting the leaders in an 
advisory position was Talleyrand, a man who had, at times, aided the Emperor’s cause while 





1815, Napoleon offered to abdicate in favor of his young son, now just over four years old.  The 







CONSPIRATION DES POIGNARDS 
Joseph Céracchi and François Jean-Baptiste Topino-Lebrun dedicated themselves to art 
and the Republican ideals of the French Revolution.  The two men established connections 
through their artwork among France’s politicians and military officers, such as Dominique 
Demerville and General Joseph Antoine Aréna.  These acquaintances were not enough, however, 
to ensure the artists’ success.  Céracchi and Topino-Lebrun saw their most prized projects 
discouraged or even outright rejected by the Republican governments they thought they could 
count as patrons.  After finding their artistic hopes dashed, the two watched as the Consular 
regime delivered them political disappointment.  They believed Napoleon was reversing 
important gains of the French Revolution and was, therefore, betraying the nation’s Republicans.  
They joined with Aréna and Demerville to discuss a plan for relieving France of its supposedly 
counterrevolutionary leader.  Unfortunately for them, none of the men proved to be capable 
conspirators.  They disastrously mismanaged their plot from its inception and ultimately 
succeeded not in removing Napoleon from power, but in strengthening his grip on it. 
Céracchi was an ill-mannered, hot-tempered, vain, and prideful man.  His talent in 
sculpting earned him some celebrity, but his attitude toward his patrons negated it.  Initially 
trained in his hometown of Rome, he left and sought new mentorship in England.  There, the 
Royal Academy featured his portrait statues and busts in several exhibitions from 1776-1779, but 
when the institution denied him admission to its ranks, he threw a fit, stormed out, and left the 
country.  He accomplished nothing of note until he settled in the United States in 1790.  In 
Philadelphia, Céracchi found the means through which to express simultaneously his disgust 
with England and his love of Republican ideals.  He focused his work on memorializing those 





founding fathers agreed to sit for the artist as he created busts of them, many of which are still on 
display in various galleries throughout the country. 
His skill and the celebrity of his subjects did not bring to Céracchi the influence he felt he 
deserved.  He incorrectly believed that his reputation had earned him the right to complete any 
project at any cost.  In 1783, the American Congress had agreed to fund the creation of an 
equestrian statue of George Washington to commemorate his contributions to the founding of the 
nation.  With the commission still available on 31 October 1791, Céracchi proposed an ambitious 
sculpture in place of the modest statue initially sought.  In his official bid to the Senate and 
House of Representatives, he titled his project the “Monument designed to perpetuate the 
Memory of American Liberty.”  When completed, it would be 60 feet in height, with each of the 
figures involved measuring 15 feet.  According to the description he provided, the sculpture 
would include not only the equestrian statue of Washington, but also figures of several Greek 
and Roman gods, “a Genius, in the form of an infant . . . a female figure, expressive of Policy . . . 
an elderly man . . . trampling on a Crown . . . Benevolent Nature [issuing] from a Cavern . . . 
crowned with thirteen towers, and overhead four Infants, representing the Seasons.”126  On 7 
May 1792, Congress informed Céracchi that it would not fund the project, explaining “at the 
present time it might not be expedient to go into the expenses which the Monument voted by 
Congress . . . would require, especially with the additional ornaments proposed by the artist.”127 
With his lofty memorial to Liberty denied, Céracchi returned to Italy and focused again 
on simple busts.  He completed several pieces, whose original versions had been only clay and 
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plaster, in the finest marble he could find.  He accomplished these pieces without having spoken 
to the models who had posed for them.  When he had finished his work, he sent letters to the 
American models discussing payment.  Most declined to purchase the work, leaving him to 
swallow the cost.  Among those who refused the expensive sculptures was George Washington.  
Incensed, Céracchi sent the President a bill for $1,500, which was promptly ignored.128 
Although he had lost faith in his hero, Céracchi did not turn from his Republican ideals.  
He joined the Jacobin club in Rome and watched as Napoleon fought his way through Italy, 
establishing Republican states in his wake.  Céracchi anxiously awaited the creation of a Roman 
Republic.  Patience was not one of his strongpoints, however, and he decided to take matters into 
his own hands in late December 1797.  After rousing and arming his fellow Jacobins, he led a 
band of them to the home of French ambassador and brother of Napoleon, Joseph Bonaparte.  
Addressing the ambassador himself, he began “screaming out like a madman, that the Romans 
would be free, and that they demanded the support of France.”129  Joseph implored the 
demonstrators to leave before the situation spiraled out of control.  Suddenly, a detachment of 
Papal Guards arrived to investigate the riot.  Intimidated, the Jacobins pushed into the palace, 
which was carelessly unlocked.  When the Papal Guards began to pursue them, Joseph reminded 
them that the embassy was French territory.  The officer in charge then ordered his men to leave. 
Witnessing the Guards’ retreat, Céracchi and his fellow Jacobins took the offensive and 
pursued them to the Porta Settimiana garrison.  Wanting to explain the situation as the mob 
approached, Joseph and General Léonard Mathurin Duphot accompanied the mob.  Their actions 
did not portray a peaceful intention, however, as the two men brandished swords while marching 
                                                 
128 Mastromarino, Papers of George Washington, 9:  132-133. 
129 David Silvagni, La Corte e la Societá Romana nei XVIII e XIX secoli, translated by Fanny 





at the front of the hostile crowd.  As they neared the gates, Duphot took the lead and shouted to 
the Papal Guards to lower their weapons.  Not understanding the directive because it was in 
French, the Guards believed they were under attack and fired upon the mob.  Duphot fell victim 
to the volley, while Céracchi and the other rioters fled. 
Céracchi succeeded, however violently, in his goal of stimulating the creation of a 
Roman Republic.  Outraged at the violence and the danger the Papal Guards had posed to his 
brother specifically, Napoleon used the situation as justification for invading Rome.  By 
February 1798, French troops controlled the city, and on 7 March, they ousted Pope Pius VI as 
temporal leader and proclaimed the creation of the Roman Republic.  With his political mission 
achieved, Céracchi hoped to live a quiet life.  Events in fall 1799, however, reignited his 
ideological passions and drew him to Paris and into another violent undertaking. 
François Jean-Baptiste Topino-Lebrun led a peaceful life, which he dedicated to his 
painting.  He met celebrated French artist Jacques-Louis David and worked with him in Paris for 
several years.  In 1790, Topino-Lebrun returned to Rome and joined the Jacobin club.  Outside 
of the group, however, he faced constant complaints about his support for the Revolution and, 
therefore, was unable to garner support for his Republican-inspired artwork.  He returned to Paris 
in December 1792 and resided with David. 
Known for his evenhanded Republican values, Topino-Lebrun earned a seat on the 
Revolutionary tribunal of Paris in September 1793.  His political steadiness did not last, 
however, after he befriended the radical François-Noël Babeuf, better known as Gracchus 
Babeuf, in autumn 1795.  Disillusioned with the Directorial government from its inception on 2 
November 1795, Babeuf proclaimed in several issues of his Le Tribun du Peuple the need for 





claimed, would destroy “the totality of the starvers, the plunderers, the butchers.”130  Babeuf’s 
plot existed more in theory than in practice and the infiltration of a police spy into the 
conspiratorial network ruined any chances of success it may have had. 
As the government built its case against Babeuf and sixty-four co-defendants, the 
conspirators’ supporters launched several uncoordinated and feeble bids to free them.  The most 
serious attempt took place in September 1796, when a large group attempted to convert the 
soldiers stationed at Grenelle to Babeuf’s cause.  The effort failed, and fifty-one rioters, 
including Topino-Lebrun, found themselves under arrest.  Of those arrested, thirty-three faced 
varying degrees of punishment, while Topino-Lebrun and seventeen others were acquitted.  Once 
Babeuf’s own trial finished on 26 May, he and one other defendant received the death penalty.  
Upon hearing the verdict, each of the men stabbed themselves with hidden, makeshift knives.  
Their attempts at suicide failed, and they met with the guillotine the next day. 
 Topino-Lebrun had escaped punishment for any wrongdoing related to Babeuf’s 
conspiracy at large, but his reputation as a politician was ruined.  He focused again on his 
artwork, completing La Mort de Caius Gracchus (The Death of Caius Gracchus), an allusion to 
his friend’s suicide effort, in 1798.  He then proposed to the Citizen Friends of the Arts a massive 
work entitled Le Siège de Lacédémone par Pyrrhus (The Siege of Sparta by Pyrrhus).  After 
informing the group that he intended to realize the project on a canvas thirty feet across and 
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twenty-three feet tall, he asked for 6,000 livres and about two years to complete it.131  Soon after 
the society commissioned his work, Topino-Lebrun wrote to the Ministry of the Interior asking 
permission to use the Panthéon as a studio, given the massive proportions of the piece.132  It is 
unclear whether the government approved his request.  After the events of 18 Brumaire that 
instituted Napoleon’s Consular government, however, his workplace failed to matter as he 
simply lost his motivation.  Writing to an unnamed friend, Topino-Lebrun explained the 
wretchedness he felt as the witnessed Revolutionary achievements undone.  He lamented the 
return to celebrating Sundays, rather than the décade that had replaced them and decried the 
increased tolerance of religion in general.  He had not given up hope, however, of seeing a stable 
and functional Republican government installed in France.  Ominously, he concluded his letter 
by sharing his intention “to finish some business that will allow me to pick up my brushes once 
more.”133 
 A conspiracy concocted at the home of Dominique Demerville provided Topino-Lebrun 
the opportunity to revitalize his motivation.  Demerville, a fervent Revolutionary who had been 
secretary to several Republican officials, disapproved of the continued efforts of the government 
to negotiate the official reintroduction of Catholicism into the country.  He had commented to 
Lucien Bonaparte, Napoleon’s brother, in early 1799 that he believed priests were leading the 
Directorial government.  “If we had your brother,” he suggested, “we would be much 
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happier.”134  When Napoleon did, in fact, take political control of the country in November 1799, 
the new regime did nothing to settle Demerville’s discontent.  His fervent Jacobinism flared.  He 
distrusted the amount of political control the First Consul held and expected him to continue 
gathering even more.  Ultimately, he believed that Napoleon wanted either to take the throne of 
France for himself or to institute a Bourbon restoration.  By summer 1800, Demerville found 
himself seriously ill, hampering his ability to champion the cause against the First Consul.  
Unable to play any active role in removing Napoleon from power, he gathered in his home 
friends who would support such a project. 
 Céracchi frequently visited after learning that his friend was sick.  He had befriended 
Demerville while fashioning a bust of former National Convention deputy Bertrand Barère de 
Vieuzac, for whom Demerville had served as secretary.  Since the institution of the Consular 
regime, they frequently discussed their shared animosity toward Napoleon.  Bonaparte’s 
declaration of the Roman Republic in 1798 had won him Céracchi’s support, but his actions—or 
lack thereof—on the Italian peninsula ever since distressed him.  According to the sculptor, 
Bonaparte “took no interest in the success of the [Italian] Republic” after its creation.135  He 
mourned for the Italian Republicans who were losing the battle for their homeland as it returned 
to papal control.  Knowing the shared disappointment they felt with Napoleon and his new 
regime, Céracchi introduced another friend, former General Joseph Antoine Aréna, to 
Demerville. 
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 Unlike his fellow conspirators, Aréna had personally met Napoleon.  They fought 
together at the siege of Toulon, where Aréna, like Bonaparte, served with distinction.  Any 
amicability between them as a result of their military experiences was not enough to overcome 
their political differences.  Aréna served as a member of the Directory’s Council of Five 
Hundred.  On the day following Napoleon’s seizure of power and, thereby, the destruction of the 
Directory, he resigned his military commission in opposition to the new regime and its leader.  
Unemployed, he focused his attention on finding others who shared his disapproval. 
 In late summer 1800, Aréna revealed to Céracchi his hopes of assassinating Napoleon.  
Enthusiastic and wanting to ensure as much support as possible for the plot, Céracchi introduced 
Aréna to Demerville.  When the three men met, Aréna explained that he was not prepared to 
share specific details but told his associates that a plot was coming together with the backing of 
numerous other generals who wished to remain anonymous for the time.  In fact, Aréna did not 
share details because there were no details to share.  This very discussion marked the inception 
of the conspiracy.  There were no generals waiting to launch an attack.  No one was ironing out 
any plans.  Aréna had seized on the idea of finding willing participants in the First Consul’s 
murder and simply fabricated a tale to entice them even more.  According to Aréna, the plans 
were solidifying, but the men designated to strike the actual blow against Napoleon’s person 
needed additional protection during the attack.  He charged his two co-conspirators to find the 
extra security and provided them with funds for arming and paying the guards. 
 Being personally unable to complete the tasks assigned by Aréna, Demerville found 
someone who could:  Captain Jacques Harel.  The two had previously served together in the 
military.  Due to a reorganization of some Italian-based regiments in August 1799, however, 





his friend felt at no longer serving:  “You see that the former soldiers, the patriots, are without 
work.  There is absolutely only one thing to do.”136  He advised that a plan was underway, with 
substantial—but unnamed—military support, to remove Bonaparte from power through 
assassination.  Harel seconded his disgust for the Consular regime before taking his leave from 
the residence and going immediately to the home of Commissioner of War Jean-Philippe 
Lefebvre. 
 Even if Harel did resent the Consular government, he was not interested in participating 
in any effort aimed at assassinating its leader.  He informed Lefebvre of everything he knew, 
which was little at the time.  Promising him that he would be safe from prosecution, the 
commissioner convinced Harel to learn as much as possible about the plot.137  Over the next 
weeks, the informant pressed his friend for more information, including, most important, who 
was leading it.  Demerville provided dozens of names of high-ranking military officials but did 
not identify any of them, including Aréna, as the principal player.  Even Minister of Police 
Joseph Fouché counted himself among the collaborators, Demerville bragged.  Unconvinced, 
Harel asked for proof of Fouché’s complicity.  Demerville explained that the police had recently 
arrested one of their associates, a citizen Rossignol but “as soon as the minister of police learned 
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that he was part of our complot, he had him placed at liberty, him and his friends.”138  Just as 
Aréna had fabricated the list of generals who were willing to support their scheme, Demerville 
now exaggerated Rossignol’s situation to the point of falsehood.  Rossignol never had anything 
to do with their plot.  That the police had arrested a man and then released him after his 
interrogation was not unusual.  It certainly did not implicate Fouché—or anyone else—in any 
conspiratorial actions. 
 Demerville assured Harel that everything was progressing nicely, and that there were few 
details left to arrange.  Reminding his friend that he was unable to leave his home for long 
periods of time due to his illness, Demerville asked Harel to complete the remaining tasks.  They 
had little time to act, he advised, as the attack was to take place in only a few days, on 10 
October, at the opening performance at the opera of Antonio Salieri’s Les Horaces.  He directed 
Harel to find “four fully determined men” to serve as extra security for the assassins and to buy 
pistols and blunderbusses.139  Wasting no time, Harel made the necessary purchases on the 
following day.  He also received from the Ministry of Police several men who feigned support 
for the plot and agreed to act as guards.  In the meantime, Céracchi had met several times with 
Topino-Lebrun, who gave him twelve daggers fashioned specifically for the assassination.  
Céracchi passed them all to Demerville, who convinced the sculptor to keep three for himself.  
Six others went to Harel, who was to supply them to the four-man security team he had hired. 
 On the morning of the attack, Céracchi met with the man designated as the assassin of 
Bonaparte, Joseph Diana, and gave to him one of the daggers.  Finding himself with two other 
blades that he had no need of, Céracchi simply “tossed them in the river above the Tuileries.”140  
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Harel assembled his police-manned security team and gave each a dagger.  He kept one of the 
weapons for himself to maintain his cover as a willing conspirator but delivered the sixth to 
Lefebvre.  Demerville remained at his home as his cohorts finalized preparations for the plot.  
That afternoon, he received an unexpected visit from his friend and former employer, Barère.  
Upon entering the home, Barère noticed that his friend had changed from his usual bedclothes 
into garments suitable for a social gathering or travel.  “You are well dressed,” Barère 
commented, “what are your plans?”141  Demerville answered that he was preparing to “go to the 
countryside to accelerate my recuperation.”142  During the brief visit, Demerville flitted about his 
room anxiously and stammered through his conversation.  Barère took up his hat and prepared to 
leave, explaining that he had plans for the day, culminating in his attendance at the opening 
performance of Les Horaces.  Demerville stopped suddenly and turned to his friend to verify 
what he had said.  Receiving confirmation that Barère did, in fact, have tickets to the show, 
Demerville advised:  “I encourage you not to go, I advise it; I heard it said that there may be 
trouble, restlessness, and that it might surround the performance.”143  Barère replied that he was 
sure everything would be fine and left. 
 As the time of the performance neared, everyone took their positions.  Not having a role 
in the actual attack, Demerville spent the evening at a café between his home and the Tuileries 
palace.  Topino-Lebrun ventured to the home of a fellow painter.  Here, he intended to meet with 
several friends before heading to the opera.  When he arrived, he found only his friend’s wife, 
who explained that the group had already left and that they had given his ticket to someone 
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else.144  With his plans for the evening spoiled, he returned home.  Harel and his four-man 
security team met briefly with Céracchi before taking their places near the First Consul’s box.  
Céracchi also met with Diana to designate the sign for launching the assassination.  Diana then 
entered the seating area to find a spot from where he could await the signal. 
 Diana was not the only man keeping a close eye on Céracchi.  Officers disguised as 
theatre-goers had taken positions surrounding the opera house and at various points inside.  The 
conspirators took no action during the first act of the performance.  During the second, Aréna left 
the building and returned home, having made no contact with his associates in the theatre.  
Shortly after the general’s departure, Céracchi walked the corridors toward Napoleon’s box to 
ensure that everything was ready for the attack.  As he approached the entrance to the box, he 
found the four-man security team in place.  Suddenly, one of the men, Jean-Augustin Laborde, 
broke formation, grabbing Céracchi and placing him under arrest.  With one man detained, the 
police moved throughout the theatre to remove any other threats.  Officials found Diana at his 
seat, staring at the First Consul’s box, still waiting for a sign from Céracchi.   
 Waiting for the conspirator to return, officers had taken positions in front of and around 
Demerville’s home.  The suspect noticed the commotion as he approached the building.  
Avoiding it, he made his way to a friend’s home on the rue d’Argenteuil.145  On the following 
morning, he wrote a letter inquiring about the trouble and sent it immediately to Minister of 
Police Fouché.  He received a prompt response.  Fouché explained that he was “strongly 
accused” and that he should come to his home the next morning.146  When Demerville arrived, 
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the minister informed him that he “was accused of wanting to make a conspiracy.”147  As such, 
Fouché had one of his officers escort the accused to the Prefecture of Police, where he faced 
interrogation before finding himself under arrest. 
 Two other conspirators had also evaded police on the night of the performance.  Aréna 
had left the show by the end of the second act, before Céracchi attempted to set the plot into 
motion.  He remained at his home for two days, unaffected by the arrests of Céracchi, Diana, and 
Demerville.  On 12 October, however, a police inspector arrived to place him under arrest as 
well.  He willingly accompanied the officer to the Prefecture of Police and found himself 
confined to the Temple prison after his interrogation.  Topino-Lebrun also spent two days 
carrying out his daily routine as usual.  As he went to lunch on 12 October, the attendant at his 
building told him to be careful because the authorities were looking to arrest him.  Learning that 
the police had already detained several other people related to the conspiracy, he sought safety at 
a friend’s home on the rue de Tournon.  It was at this location that police found and arrested him, 
the last of the group, on 14 October.148 
 Although the alleged conspirators were all in custody by 14 October, their trial did not 
begin until 7 January 1801.  The delay prompted discussions among some officials about 
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whether an assassination plot against Napoleon had existed at all.  One of Napoleon’s personal 
secretaries, Louis Antoine Fauvelet de Bourrienne, believed that the “plot itself was a mere 
shadow.”149  He argued that without the interference of the Commissioner of War and the 
Ministry of Police, Aréna and his accomplices would never have managed to take even the 
slightest action.  It was only the encouragement offered by Harel, the police informant, that 
prompted the men to arm themselves.  Bourrienne acknowledged that the group was considering 
a plot, but concluded that it would not have come to fruition without the government’s 
involvement.  Minister of Police Fouché seconded Bourrienne’s opinion of the conspiracy.  In 
his memoirs, he stated that the scheme was mere figment until Napoleon decided to use the 
situation to his own advantage.  According to Fouché, had Harel not infiltrated the group and had 
he not had the financial support of the authorities, the conspiracy might have remained a 
pipedream that existed only in Demerville’s residence.150  The argument is convincing, but only 
to an extent.  The plot discussed in Demerville’s home might not have come to fruition in 
October 1800 without Harel’s involvement, but the men would likely have found encouragement 
and funding from another source at some point.  Given the sparse nature of the plot itself—a 
handful of men armed with daggers—not a great deal of money was necessary. 
 Bourrienne and Fouché agreed that the plot was insubstantial prior to the government’s 
involvement, but their opinions differ on the impact the scheme had on Napoleon.  Bourrienne 
included in his memoirs a statement attributed to Napoleon—though the author admitted that he 
doubted the leader actually said it—while exiled at Saint Helena, which described the 
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conspiration des poignards as one of “the two attempts which placed me in the greatest 
danger.”151  On the other hand, Fouché contended that the First Consul had not, in fact, felt any 
genuine anxiety about the conspiracy.  The danger resulted solely from Napoleon’s own 
interpretation of the event.  The minister explained that it was the First Consul’s “wish to have it 
believed that he had incurred great danger.”152  Given later conspiracies enacted against him, it is 
doubtful that Napoleon attributed as much importance to Céracchi’s attempt as the comment 
from Saint Helena implied.  The very next plot missed killing him only by a few seconds.  The 
capture and replacement of several high-ranking political officials while Napoleon was away in 
Russia in 1812 did not pose an immediate physical threat to Napoleon, but it was the most 
successful attempt at destroying his regime.  Another reason for Napoleon not to have been 
concerned about Céracchi’s plot was the simple fact that officials had informed him of it prior to 
his departure for the performance.  Aware of when and how the conspirators planned to bring 
about his death and also aware that the police had taken appropriate steps to ensure his safety, 
Napoleon had no reason to fear the would-be assassins. 
 The conspirators had languished in prison for just over two months when a new plot, the 
“infernal machine,” detonated on Christmas Eve.  The First Consul narrowly missed the 
explosion.  Napoleon launched into a furious rage.  Police could easily stop a poorly organized 
group of malcontents armed with daggers, but a massive explosion in the streets was more 
difficult to discover.  The Jacobins, Napoleon believed, were becoming increasingly daring, and, 
therefore, increasingly dangerous.  Because of the nearly successful assassination attempt, 
Napoleon demanded the courts begin the trial of Céracchi and his cohorts.  The First Consul 
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adamantly insisted that the Jacobins were behind the latest plot as well:  “It is scarce three 
months since my life was attempted by Céracchi, Aréna, Topino-Lebrun, and Demerville.  They 
all belong to one gang!”153  Napoleon wanted to make an example of those who dared to threaten 
him and of those who shared the same ideologies.  Céracchi and his co-conspirators happened 
already to be in custody.  They would serve to set an immediate example while the investigation 
into the infernal machine progressed.  In early January 1801, the First Consul also ordered 
Minister of Police Joseph Fouché to compile a list of 130 of the conspirators’ fellow Jacobins 
whom he then sentenced to immediate banishment.  There was no trial, no evidence of 
wrongdoing against any of them, except the deeds of Céracchi and his associates. 
 Céracchi and his co-defendants stood accused “of a plot intending the murder of the First 
Consul, of troubling the State with civil war by arming citizens, one against the other, of having 
amassed and distributed weapons, and of having taken them, last 18 Vendémiaire, to the Theatre 
of the Republic and of the Arts where the First Consul was in attendance.”154  Even without 
Harel’s testimony, the information provided by each of the conspirators during their initial 
interrogations was sufficient proof of their guilt.  Each man admitted to any number of details:  
meeting with the other defendants, arming themselves, being disappointed with the Consular 
regime’s policies, and even hating Napoleon on a personal level.   
The defense Demerville attempted to provide for himself illustrated not innocence but 
incompetence.  He acknowledged that his associates had met frequently in his home and that he 
had overheard their seditious conversations.  Because he had been “in [his] bed, sick, terribly 
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sick . . . not in a state to be able to speak,” however, he believed himself guiltless.155  Initially, 
Demerville confessed to passing money to Harel and to giving him daggers for the security team 
to use during the attack.  During the trial itself, however, he said that the money was for Harel to 
purchase weapons for Céracchi.156  Whether the money bought daggers for the plot or guns for 
one of the individual conspirators was inconsequential. 
Céracchi confessed to everything:  to knowing his co-defendants personally, to having 
met with them at Demerville’s residence to form a plot, to distributing money and weapons, and 
to hating Napoleon.  It is clear in several of his responses that he had made a clear distinction 
between Napoleon as a person and Napoleon as a political leader:  “I did not plot against the life 
of the First Consul, but against that of Bonaparte.”157  His actions were not, he argued, political 
but personal.  He had no intention of taking control of the government for himself and no interest 
in who might take the reins after the death of the First Consul.  Harkening back to the recent 
collapse of the Roman Republic, he explained that he wanted to murder Napoleon “because he 
caused the ruin of my family and of my country.”158   
Unlike Demerville and Céracchi, Aréna attempted to maintain his innocence throughout 
his interrogations and during the trial.  Contradictions and flawed logic rendered his arguments 
ineffective.  He acknowledged attending the theatre on the night of the conspiracy but had left 
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early, unable to find a suitable seat.  Because he was at his home by 7:00 p.m., he explained, he 
“could not have been at the theatre at the time of the First Consul’s arrival.”159  In his very next 
comment, however, he described seeing “in the rue de la Loi . . . the car of the First Consul, with 
his secretary, and a small cabriolet that followed, in which one found the youngest brother of 
Bonaparte, Jérôme, in military uniform.”160  Clearly, he was, in fact, at the theatre at the same 
time as Napoleon.  Perhaps Aréna meant that he had not been inside the theatre as the politician 
arrived and not, therefore, in position to make any strike against him.  Aréna then absurdly 
defended himself by admitting his involvement in numerous conspiratorial discussions.  He had 
even documented them in a letter to the First Consul on 13 October, the day after his arrest.  He 
would not provide specific details, he explained, but he could discuss the plots in the most 
general manner:  “People have conspired for a year; all the parties are working together; 
everyone is talking about it in the streets and in the salons.”161 
Topino-Lebrun also declared his innocence throughout the entire ordeal.  He complained 
that there was no physical evidence to implicate him in the plot and that the testimony against 
him, which came only from Céracchi, was so vague as to render a defense against it impossible.  
An officer had asked Céracchi, “In which place did Topino give you the daggers?”162  The 
simple answer, “in the street,” was unsatisfactory, therefore the officer followed up:  “In which 
street and at what time?”163  Céracchi shared three locations for the meetings but never provided 
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a date or a time.  Topino-Lebrun contended that he could not sufficiently establish his alibi 
without knowing the dates that these supposed meetings took place.164  When Céracchi failed to 
provide the necessary information, no further discussion took place.   
Of the five conspirators, Diana offered the most convincing defense.  When asked to 
respond to the fact that Céracchi had designated him by name as Napoleon’s intended assassin, 
Diana responded that he could not refute the point.  He may have said it, but saying so did not 
make it true.  The strongest evidence of his innocence came from the testimony of Laborde, the 
officer who had arrested the two conspirators at the theatre.  According to Céracchi, he had given 
Diana a dagger to use against Napoleon on the morning of the attack.  When Laborde arrested 
Diana, however, “he did not have a single weapon.”165 
The trial ended on 9 January 1801.  Believing that Céracchi and Aréna had gone to the 
Theatre of the Republic and of the Arts on 10 October specifically to enact the plot in question, 
the jury found both men guilty.  They also convicted Demerville and Topino-Lebrun, though 
neither had been present at the opera.  As for Diana, the jurors acknowledged that he had 
attended the threatre when the conspiracy was to take place, but they felt he had gone there for 
legitimate and lawful reasons.  The jury foreman announced comforting news for Diana:  “you 
are acquitted of the charges against you, and you will be immediately set free.”166  The four men 
found guilty were sentenced to death.  Crushed by the announcement of his impending death, 
Demerville decided to make an emotional appeal.  He began by reminding the court of the 
suffering he had endured during his life, namely of his “incredibly terrible illness.”167  When 
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advised by the President of the court that he did not have the right to speak at the current time, 
Demerville went straight to the point:  “I ask that the tribunal, in order to end the anxieties that I 
have felt, have me shot immediately.”168 
On 31 January 1801, the Prefect of Police met with the conspirators to ask if they had 
anything to declare before facing execution.  Demerville, who had been so anxious to end his life 
at the end of the trial, now proved desperate to save it by proposing an ultimatum.  Claiming to 
speak on behalf of his fellow defendants as well, he offered to share information with the officer 
“if he had the guarantee of the First Consul, that the penalty to which he was condemned would 
be commuted to a simple deportation.”169  The official encouraged him to share at that moment 
“any revelations that might concern the security of the First Consul and that of the State, 
promising him to put it, at that very instant, under the eyes of the Government, and that, until 
[the Government] learned of the information, he would receive a stay of execution.”170  Given 
that the officer’s attempt at compromise suggested a reprieve only “until [the Government] 
learned of the information,” Demerville did not find the offer agreeable and remained silent.  He 
had hoped to save his life, and those of his cohorts, not simply to postpone the execution.  Aréna, 
Céracchi, and Topino-Lebrun categorically refused to make any statement whatsoever to 
officials.  With the trial concluded and offers—however half-hearted—of leniency declined, the 
four condemned men faced the firing squad. 
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INFERNAL MACHINE PLOT 
When the Revolution began in 1789, citizens in the Morbihan supported the abolition of 
feudalism.  The idea of standing on the same footing as the nation’s other regions was appealing.  
For generations prior, the Morbihan had held a unique position in feudal France.  Unlike most 
regions, which paid dues and services in exchange for a lord’s protection, the inhabitants of the 
Morbihan were direct subjects of the monarchy.  While such distant guardianship relieved the 
stress of financial dues and military obligation, it added the stress of complete self-sufficiency.  
The region’s people understood that they could count only on themselves for survival because 
the king was unlikely to send substantive help to remedy any trouble.  Generally, if a region 
suffered a bad harvest, for example, its lord could appeal to the king for help, which was granted 
because of the services the lord provided to the monarchy.  The monarchy was also anxious to 
placate the nobles when possible to prevent an uprising against the absolutist government in 
place since the reign of Louis XIV.  With no one of note to deliver their plea, the people of the 
Morbihan seemed to pose no serious threat to the monarchy and were not, therefore, deemed 
worthy of the assistance.   
Although the population of the Morbihan enthusiastically supported the Revolution in its 
earliest stages, within a year, the relationship faced an insurmountable challenge.  The 
implementation of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy violated the religious sensibilities of the 
region.  Viewed as an unlawful and immoral attack on the Church, the legislation “was the true, 
the first, if not the only cause” of the counterrevolutionary activity that erupted throughout 
Brittany.171  The entirety of the region’s episcopate refused to obey, declining to swear the oath 
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requiring it “to be loyal to the nation, to the law and to the King, and to maintain with all [its] 
power the constitution decreed by the National Assembly and accepted by King.”172  Any 
religious institution whose clergy rejected the Civil Constitution faced immediate closure.  
Among those churches and schools victimized by the Revolutionary secularization was the 
College of Vannes, where twenty-year-old Georges Cadoudal was on the verge of completing his 
studies. 
The closing of churches and the termination of religion-based education prompted many 
in the Morbihan to consider taking up arms against the nation.  For his own part, Cadoudal 
rejected “the freedom that one offered in exchange for his faith.”173  Whatever political or social 
advantages the Revolution promised were not sufficient to warrant the risk of eternal damnation.  
The announcement of the immediate conscription of 300,000 men into the Republican armies on 
24 February 1793, coupled with the religious tensions that had festered for three years, was the 
deciding factor that sparked violent counterrevolutionary activity in the region.  In a 
“spontaneous explosion of popular furor” the following month, 3,000 peasant insurgents attacked 
the nearby town of Auray.174  Aiming to capture the town and its two cannons and to persuade its 
300 soldiers to join the fight against the Revolution, the rebels rushed to action shouting “Vive le 
Roi!”175  Their enthusiasm was commendable, but it could not overcome the training of the 
town’s soldiers.  The peasants’ headlong run at the garrison, the first armed insurrection in the 
region, failed entirely in its mission. 
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Cadoudal counted himself among the participants of the revolt.  From this early point, he 
earned a reputation as the “soul of insurrection in the Morbihan.”176  His notoriety worked 
against him, however, as authorities immediately began searching for him.  Unsuccessful, but 
aware of his loyalty to his family, local representatives of the government arrested his uncle 
Denis in his stead.  Georges soon informed his family that he intended to surrender and to take 
his rightful place in the prison of Auray:  “I do not want anyone to suffer for me.”177  Everyone, 
including his uncle, tried in vain to dissuade him.  Reporting to the prison in person, Cadoudal 
found himself under arrest and his uncle’s freedom restored.   
None of the insurgents remained in prison long.  Most, including Cadoudal, regained 
their liberty within a matter of days.  At the time, local political representatives were more 
willing to make excuses for the revolt and its participants than they were to acknowledge the 
seriousness of the region’s disillusionment.  Rather than reporting that the government’s 
religious policies and conscription practices had prompted the violence, the authorities 
communicated to Paris that local aristocrats had orchestrated the recent event.  The peasants 
were, they explained, witless dupes of the nobles, tricked into acting against the government and 
their own interests.  As such, there was no need to punish anyone severely.  The failure to take 
significant action against the insurgents allowed violence in the region to continue throughout 
the Revolution and into the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte. 
The counterrevolutionary activity present in Brittany is frequently referred to as 
chouannerie.  Despite its lengthy threat to Republican and Napoleonic government in France, the 
movement never amounted to “more than a series of sporadic, isolated guerrilla actions, which 
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often degenerated into pillage.”178  Disheartened by the ineffectiveness of the Breton revolt at 
Auray, Cadoudal joined the opposition movement in the Vendée.  Here, he gained experience 
both on the battlefield and through interaction with trained military leaders. 
In November 1793, the Vendéeans joined with some chouans to fight Republican troops 
while on the way to meet with the British fleet.  The opposition force of approximately 30,000 
easily defeated the much smaller Republican forces in several skirmishes.  Despite some 
victories, the campaign ultimately failed.  Difficult communication prevented the British and 
French forces from agreeing upon a meeting point.  The counterrevolutionaries initially intended 
to make contact with the fleet at Saint-Malo, but headed in a more northern direction after their 
victory at Mayenne.  They decided upon Granville, which was less fortified than their initial 
destination.  The town resisted the attack more strongly than expected.  Running low on 
ammunition and food, the counterrevolutionaries turned their focus to the surrounding areas 
outside Granville itself, hoping to resupply.  Their findings were inadequate, and when a fire 
broke out in the community, the forces fled.  The Republican troops pursued their opponents, 
inflicting thousands of casualties in the process.  Although the campaign was a failure, Cadoudal 
distinguished himself during some of the battles and by helping to organize the otherwise chaotic 
retreat.  He received the rank of captain in recognition of his service. 
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 Vendéean losses after the failure at Granville prompted Cadoudal to return to the 
Morbihan.  Continuing to foment opposition, he and his forces accomplished nothing toward 
restoring Bourbon rule and little toward creating a unified fighting force for the cause.  The 
guerrilla bands did, however, prove a constant annoyance to garrisons of Republican troops in 
the region.  During the night of 30 June 1794, a group of sixty armed men raided Cadoudal’s 
parents’ house where he was living.179  Finding weapons and munitions in the home, the men 
arrested everyone at the residence:  Georges, his father, his pregnant mother, his uncle Denis, his 
sixteen-year-old brother, Julien, and a friend.  By now, the government had adopted a harsh 
stance against counterrevolutionary activity in the provinces, and it resulted in a lengthy prison 
sentence for Cadoudal and his family, unlike his first imprisonment the previous year.  None of 
the captives received any semblance of a trial.  They expected to languish in their cells until 
someone saw fit to execute them. 
 On 27 Fructidor II (13 September 1794), authorities transferred Denis from the prison to 
a hospital due to an illness he had contracted.  Believing his uncle had a better chance of 
recovery and survival if he did not return to the prison and distraught over being the cause of his 
family’s current misfortune in the first place, Cadoudal sought to obtain his family’s freedom.  
On 7 Vendémiaire III (28 September 1794), he wrote to Bernard Thomas Tréhouart de Beaulieu, 
the National Convention’s deputy at Brest.  He declared, “I alone am guilty,” explaining that his 
family members had played no part in his counterrevolutionary activities.180  Concerned about 
his uncle’s health, Cadoudal mentioned him specifically:  “For some time, he has been in the 
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hospital where, perhaps, he has already finished his unhappy days.”181  He had no way of 
knowing that Denis had, in fact, died ten days earlier.  Despite the admission of personal guilt 
and the doleful supplication on behalf of his family, Cadoudal received no response to the letter. 
 With his mother nearly nine months pregnant, Cadoudal attempted again to contact 
Tréhouart on 12 Vendémiaire III (3 October 1794).  He reiterated his family’s innocence, 
claiming that they “did not have even the slightest knowledge” of his activities, or even of the 
fact that he possessed weapons in his room.182  Tréhouart again declined to respond.  At this 
point, Cadoudal adopted a new approach:  he and the friend authorities had arrested with him 
escaped.183  He had to know that his flight would do nothing to aid his family members, but he 
may have believed he could help them better from outside the prison.184  After all, his efforts to 
work within legal means had failed.   
 With his freedom regained, Cadoudal continued leading sporadic attacks on local 
government strongholds.  The hope of restoring the monarchy in France suffered a setback in 
February 1795, however, when the Vendéeans removed themselves from the fight.  The Treaty 
of La Jaunais, signed between the National Convention and the Vendéean leaders, left the 
chouans as the only organized band of Royalist forces in the country.  In exchange for their 
                                                 
181 “Documents sur la famille,” 79. 
182 “Documents sur la famille,” 79. 
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complications from the pregnancy and died on 2 November.  Cadoudal’s father and brother did 





official recognition of the Republican government’s legitimacy, the Vendéeans received several 
dispensations.  The government agreed to the demand that it establish no local offices and post 
no local representatives in the region.  Catholic services took place without hindrance—an 
arrangement that soon spread to other regions in the country.  Approximately 2,000 of the 
fighters organized themselves into a militia under their current leadership, all in the pay of the 
republic.  Vendéean youth received an exemption from serving in any force other than the local 
militia.  The highest ranked of the opposition leaders received significant payments.  The region 
also received nearly two million francs in remuneration for the costs they had accumulated 
during their oppositional efforts. 
  With the Vendéeans pacified, and their own efforts producing little effect, some of the 
chouan leaders began to lose faith in their cause.  When approached by some of the chiefs about 
the possibility of peace, the National Convention leapt at the opportunity.  The government asked 
General Louis Lazare Hoche, who had helped negotiate the recent treaty with the Vendéeans, to 
serve as one of its representatives at the peace talks.  Recognizing that fewer than 20 percent of 
the opposition’s leaders were interested in the treaty, Hoche complained that negotiations with so 
few people were pointless.  Believing there was no sense in wasting time with “a simple truce, 
which could not last in the long run,” Hoche refused to play any role in the process.185   
 The general was not the only person with misgivings about peace talks.  The majority of 
chouan leaders found the idea of giving up the fight unacceptable.  The Catholic Church and its 
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followers still faced persecution for their beliefs.  The Bourbon family was living as exiles in 
England.  The leaders did not want to abandon their position so arbitrarily.  They had lost many 
of their supporters on the battlefield and did not want their deaths to be in vain.  Cadoudal was 
vocal in his disapproval of peace with the government.  Other leaders shared his desire to 
continue the fight against Revolutionary France but also understood that their men needed a 
break and that morale needed a boost.  One of the most successful chiefs, Jean-Nicolas Stofflet, 
explained to his fellow chouans that he would only sign a treaty with the government “with the 
goal of giving several months of repose to his country.”186  Some leaders focused more on their 
own personal gains when considering the treaty.  The Vendéeans had received a substantial 
amount of money, not only to cover their military costs, but also for personal use.  The 
possibility of an individual leader receiving 150,000 francs was sufficient reason for some of 
them to sign peace agreements.187 
 Despite Hoche’s refusal to involve himself and despite lackluster support among 
chouans, the National Convention and twenty-two chouan leaders reached an agreement on 21 
April 1795. 188  The Treaty of La Mabilais granted the same concessions to its participants as the 
Treaty of La Jaunais had given the Vendéeans.  Although many people on both sides of the 
agreement expected it to fail, they likely did not expect it so quickly.  Within a week and a half, 
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Pacifications de l’Ouest, 1794-1801, Vol. 1:  La Jaunaye, La Mabilais, Saint-Florent, Quiberon 





two of the chouan signatories were assassinated.  Perhaps believing that the peace extended to 
them despite not having signed it, other chouan leaders found themselves under arrest for actions 
they had taken against the republic.  Angered by the government’s failure to uphold the treaty, 
though not surprised by it, Cadoudal wrote to Joseph-Geneviève de Puisaye, a chouan living in 
London, complaining about the violence.  Puisaye was in close communication with Louis, 
Count of Provence and Charles, Count of Artois, the brothers of Louis XVI, who were next in 
line for the Bourbon throne.189  With the blessing of his royal contacts, Puisaye responded, 
denouncing those who had signed the treaty in the first place and disclosing to Cadoudal, now 
his most trusted contact in France, that a landing in the Morbihan was pending. 
 The Count of Artois had long hoped to land in France backed by émigré soldiers.  The 
English supported the idea, hoping to quash once and for all the dangerous wave of 
Republicanism in France.  Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger appointed Puisaye to 
develop the plan of attack.  The two had become friends during Puisaye’s stay in London, and 
Pitt believed he was more likely to take orders from British overseers than anyone else the Count 
of Artois might appoint.  Unwilling to allow the future of his family to rest in the hands of 
someone he did not know or trust, the Count of Artois appointed Louis Charles d’Hervilly to 
supervise the planning and even the expedition itself.190  So began the troubles for the Quiberon 
expedition.   
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 Puisaye and d’Hervilly were diametrically opposed in most things, including political 
ideology and ideas about the best way to organize a landing in France.  Puisaye had served in 
both the Estates-General and the National Constituent Assembly during the earliest days of the 
Revolution.  He turned against the Revolution only when the possibility of maintaining a 
constitutional monarchy dissolved.  On the other hand, d’Hervilly preferred a return to the 
standards of the ancien régime, hoping for a Bourbon restoration and the complete nullification 
of all Revolutionary policies.  During the planning of the Royalist invasion of France, the two 
men butted heads constantly.  Puisaye proposed a surprise landing, after which his troops would 
meet up with Royalist supporters in the region and work to seize as many towns as quickly as 
possible.  D’Hervilly favored a more systematic approach.  The best plan of attack, he argued, 
was to land and solidify support for the invasion at a single point.  Once supplied and organized, 
the forces could attack and seize towns in the region, continuing to gather more support as they 
did so.  The two leaders bickered for several days.  Eventually, d’Hervilly submitted to Puisaye’s 
leadership. 
 The English had promised their support for the invasion, but it was less substantive than 
the French expected.  Anticipating supplies, money, and manpower, Puisaye was disappointed to 
receive only ships and weapons.  The government failed to assign any English troops to the 
expedition.  Puisaye attempted to rally the émigrés in England but raised only 3,500 men.  He 
pushed forward with the attack, however, landing his troops on mainland France on 28 June.  As 
he had hoped, approximately 2,500 chouan fighters joined his forces upon the debarkation.  
Keeping with the plan, the group attacked and seized as many coastal towns as quickly as 
possible.  The goal was to create a large enough stronghold in the region to allow the Count of 





garrisoned in the assailed region, had no trouble quashing the Royalist forces.  In just over a 
week, the Republicans regained control of each of the captured towns.  On 17 July, nearly 2,000 
émigré reinforcements, led by General Charles Eugène Gabriel de Sombreuil, arrived at 
Quiberon from England.  They captured the fort in the town but enjoyed no further success.  
When General Hoche ordered an attack on the fort, British ships in the harbor opened fire, killing 
everyone in the vicinity.  As Royalists, Republicans, and civilians alike succumbed to the 
barrage, Puisaye ordered his men to escape to the British ships.191 
 Although many of Puisaye’s men reached the harbor, their retreat stranded Sombreuil and 
his forces in the fort.  Along with the abandoned soldiers were several thousand local citizens 
and family members of the émigrés who had invaded from England.192  Recognizing the 
hopelessness of the situation, Sombreuil arranged to talk with Hoche about the possibility of 
saving the lives of those in his care.  In the hope of preventing any further bloodshed, Sombreuil 
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Vauban, if he was unable to save the mission itself, “he might as well at least save his 
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him.”  Jacques Anne Joseph Le Prestre, Count of Vauban, Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire de 
la guerre de la Vendée (Paris:  La Maison de Commission en Librairie, 1806), 131.  Louis 
George de Cadoudal, Georges Cadoudal, 124. 
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chouans, etc.”  Théodore-Gaston-Joseph Chasle de la Touche provides the highest count at 
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Général Hoche à Quiberon (Paris:  Dupont, 1897), 144.  Chasle de la Touche, Relation du 
désastre de Quiberon en 1795 et refutation des souvenirs historiques de M. Rouget de l’Isle sur 





informed Hoche, “The men that I command are determined to die in the fort, their weapons in 
their hands:  let them board the ships, you will save French blood.”193  Understandably, Hoche 
declined the proposition.  He could not allow an invasion force from England to go unpunished.  
He did, however, promise to spare the lives of the women, children, and elderly in the fort.  As 
for the soldiers, Hoche allegedly promised to treat them as prisoners of war who had capitulated 
during the fighting.194  On 21 July, Sombreuil accepted Hoche’s terms and surrendered the fort.  
On the same day, Republican guards marched the non-combatants from the fort to Plouharnel, 
where they regained their freedom.  Troops led Sombreuil and his men to the prison at Auray.  
On the following day, fully expecting to receive food and medical treatment under the terms of 
their surrender, 400 soldiers who had fallen behind the rest of the group because of various 
injuries arrived “voluntarily and without escort” at the prison.195 
 The stragglers would have fared better if they had maintained their freedom.  The lenient 
treatment Sombreuil had promised them was not forthcoming.  According to a letter allegedly 
written by Sombreuil on the day of his execution, he only surrendered his troops because of his 
belief that the government would spare their lives.196  He trusted “that those who were émigrés 
would be prisoners of war, and spared like the others:  I alone was excepted.”197  During his trial, 
he implored some of the soldiers who had been present at Quiberon to attest that he had 
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surrendered his men as prisoners of war.  No one responded to support his claim.198  If General 
Hoche had, in fact, promised to spare the lives of Sombreuil’s men, he had done so without 
authority and without legal grounds.  The Republican government considered the émigrés 
outlaws, not subject to any of the rights or privileges of French citizens or to those of captured 
soldiers.  If Hoche had offered the status of prisoner of war to the émigrés, his actions were 
illegal, however moral they may have been.  Upholding the laws of the National Convention, a 
military commission sentenced Sombreuil and his closest associates to death on 28 July 1795. 
 The expedition to Quiberon had been a failure from its inception.  The inability to form a 
lasting stronghold, coupled with the capture of Sombreuil’s troops, prompted the Count of Artois 
to decline landing personally in France.  He remained in England, much to the chagrin of his 
supporters on the continent.  Cadoudal, who fought at Quiberon, distinguished himself by saving 
“from a grisly massacre thousands of women, elderly and children who had come from all parts 
of the Morbihan” to show their Royalist support.199  With Sombreuil executed and Puisaye 
shamed for his seemingly selfish and treasonous retreat, Cadoudal found himself at the very head 
of chouan leadership.  He continued to serve the Royalist cause through military actions in the 
Morbihan and through diplomacy in England when in the country.  Tense periods of ceasefire 
between the chouans and Republicans occurred occasionally, but even signed treaties were not 
sufficient to end the fighting entirely. 
 There were only two significant pauses in Cadoudal’s active fight against the Republican 
government.  The first came with the announcement of the Consular government’s creation in 
November 1799.  Witnessing the centralization of political power in the hands of three Directors, 
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but aware that only Bonaparte truly held any political authority, Royalists hoped the new regime 
would serve as a stepping stone toward the reinstitution of the Bourbon monarchy.  With hopes 
high, the Count of Provence ordered his supporters to remain peaceful, yet vigilant, while he 
communicated with the First Consul about the political future of the nation.  On 20 February 
1800, the hopeful royal wrote to Bonaparte, acknowledging his services to France and assuring 
him that he would not be forgotten:  “Save France from her own madness, and you will have 
fulfilled the first wish of my heart; restore to that country her king, and future generations shall 
bless your memory.  You will always be too necessary to the state that I should deem important 
appointments sufficient requital of my grandfather’s obligation and my own.”200  The writing 
implied a sense of confidence that Napoleon’s plan had been to restore the monarchy all along.  
In his response, the First Consul turned history’s memory around on the would-be monarch:  if 
he were willing to sacrifice his own personal interests for those of France, history would 
remember him.  The same act would spare the loss of 100,000 lives that would be lost, Napoleon 
explained, if the Count of Provence attempted to regain control of the country.201 
 Painfully aware that the Consular government was not going to pave the way for his 
return to power, the Count of Provence made arrangements for Cadoudal to renew his actions.  
On 3 June 1800, Cadoudal landed at Calais with 30,000 British troops.  British Prime Minister 
Pitt promised the chouan leader an additional 30,000 soldiers if he were able to raise his own 
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force of 60,000.  While Cadoudal gathered and organized his fighting force, Napoleon’s victory 
at the Battle of Marengo on 14 June 1800 prompted the second pause in the effort against the 
Republican government.  Napoleon proved that luck had not abandoned him on the battlefield, 
and he was the first general to strike a major blow against the forces of the Second Coalition.202  
With the nation’s military opponents frustrated, Frenchmen overwhelmingly supported their 
leader and his Consular regime.  Discouraged by the setback and unconvinced that military 
efforts could, in fact, defeat Bonaparte, Cadoudal turned to other means of ridding France of its 
allegedly illegitimate authority. 
 In London, Cadoudal organized a meeting with several of his most trusted chouan 
officers currently living in England.  He proposed that they travel to Paris to lay the groundwork 
for a conspiracy, funded by the British, to restore the Bourbons to power, but shared no specific 
details about how to accomplish the goal.  Citing the fact that he was older than his cohorts, 
Pierre Robinault, most commonly known as Saint-Réjant, insisted on being in charge once the 
group arrived in Paris.  Over the course of November and into the first days of December 1800, 
five conspirators entered the French capital, renting apartments or taking up with close friends 
and family members.203   
On 5 December 1800, Saint-Réjant received a letter from Cadoudal in England, which he 
interpreted as a call to action.  In the writing, Cadoudal lauded the chouan fighters responsible 
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for the recent murder of regicide Yves-Marie Audrein, the Bishop of Quimper.204  He 
encouraged his cohorts in Paris to look to the assassins as role-models, praising their dedication 
to the Bourbons and their “coolness and audacity.”205  The letter also explained that someone 
would meet with Saint-Réjant soon, bringing additional funds to support the “execution of the 
great plan.”206  With people to imitate and more money on the way, Saint-Réjant believed the 
time was now to take action against the First Consul.   
Without further orders, Saint-Réjant concocted a violent plan to end Napoleon’s rule.  He 
looked to the recent machinations of Chevalier and Veycer, two Jacobin dissidents.207  Police had 
arrested the two men and a handful of their accomplices on 8 November 1800.  Chevalier had 
designed a machine that he intended to detonate, thus assassinating the First Consul, and 
providing the opportunity to restore the government to its 1793 form.  Given their differing 
political ideologies, it is unlikely that Saint-Réjant communicated personally with the bomb-
maker.  He did not possess the plans for the exact machine, but the existence of such a weapon 
was inspiration enough.  He authorized François-Jean Carbon to purchase items necessary to 
create their own explosive device and to ensure that they were not conspicuous while preparing 
it.  Carbon obtained several blue uniforms similar to those worn by the city’s water carriers.  On 
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17-18 December, he found and purchased a cart and a black horse.208  Saint-Réjant believed he 
had determined the best opportunity for action.  The First Consul planned to attend the opening 
performance of Joseph Haydn’s La Création at the Théâtre des Arts on Christmas Eve.  The 
conspirator passed the afternoon of 22 December walking the streets between the theatre and the 
Tuileries palace searching for the perfect location at which to launch the attack. 
On the fated day, Saint-Réjant positioned the group’s horse-drawn cart carrying a barrel 
in the rue Saint Nicaise.  When parked, the cart and its contents drew no one’s attention.  
Looking like “an old bucket, such as are borne by the water carriers,” the barrel was like any that 
could be seen on the streets in Paris.209  He stood by the cart, waiting for the signal from “a 
person,” which was to inform him that the First Consul had left the Tuileries palace.210  The 
indication never came.  Concerned over the delay, Saint-Réjant decided to investigate, but did 
not want to leave the cart unattended.  Promising to be quick, he employed fourteen-year-old 
Marianne Peusol to hold the horse’s reigns until he returned.211 
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In the meantime, at the Tuileries palace, Napoleon prepared to leave for the theatre with 
his family and some close friends and advisors.212  As everyone piled into the carriages, 
Napoleon’s aide de camp, Jean Rapp, “who was not usually so observant of the perfect 
agreement of colours in a lady’s dress,” commented to Josephine that her shawl did not 
complement the rest of her ensemble.213  Known for her attentiveness to such matters, she took 
several minutes to correct the oversight.  The procession of carriages departed later than planned, 
around 8:15 p.m., and with a larger gap than normal between Napoleon’s coach and that of his 
wife. 
Still with no signal from his missing cohort, Saint-Réjant perceived for himself that the 
First Consul was approaching.  He quickly rushed back to the cart.  Ahead of Napoleon’s 
carriage was a detachment of grenadiers in charge of the First Consul’s security.  Nicolas 
Durand, a grenadier at the head of the patrol, noticed a cart “blocking about half the passage.”214  
He pushed by it to clear the street, prompting the horse to shift its weight and to take several 
steps.215  Saint-Réjant did not notice the disruption in the barrel’s position and lit its fuse before 
running for cover.  Several seconds passed before the detonation rocked the quarter. 
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The explosion launched people and debris into the air or threw them against buildings.  
Windows of the surrounding houses shattered, showering everyone inside and out with glass.  
Tiles and chunks off dozens of buildings assaulted the bystanders below.  In addition to the 
physical damage, the explosion severely wounded fifty persons and killed approximately thirty.  
Among them was Marianne, who, still holding the reigns of Saint-Réjant’s horse, had met with 
an instant and violent death.216  The force of the explosion tossed Napoleon’s carriage into the 
air, though no one inside it came to any harm.  Unsure of the condition of his wife and other 
attendants, he nevertheless ordered his driver to hasten toward the theatre without stopping.  The 
shock almost caused Josephine to faint, but she was unharmed.  Hortense, Napoleon’s step-
daughter, had received a cut on her arm from the glass of the carriage’s windows.  The women’s 
carriage, too, continued on its way to the theatre.   
Nearly suffocated under a pile of rubble, Saint-Réjant regained consciousness after 
several minutes.  He had not fled far enough away to escape the blast.  Upon waking, he learned 
immediately that his efforts had failed.  Bonaparte had survived the explosion.  As 
inconspicuously as possible, the would-be assassin made his way to the home of the Leguilloux 
family on rue des Prouvaires, where he had rented a room.  Safely inside, he implored them to 
find a doctor who could help with his wounds.  They obtained the services of Doctor Basile-
Jacques-Louis Collin, who had treated Saint-Réjant previously for a pulmonary catarrh.217  When 
the doctor arrived, his patient was “spitting blood, leaking it from his nostrils, breathing with 
pain, a concentrated pulse, without any kind of bruise or blow to the outside, and suffering from 
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severe abdominal pain, sore eyes and deafness in his left ear.”218  Saint-Réjant took to his bed for 
several days to heal from his injuries and to remain off the streets where the police were actively 
investigating the scene and looking for witnesses and suspects. 
Within the theatre, the audience had heard only “thirty bars of the oratorio” when the 
explosion briefly interrupted the music.219  Surprised by the sound, the audience speculated as to 
its cause and meaning.  Some believed it was celebratory cannon fire, as was common when 
France’s military won an important battle or captured a key city.  Others, assuming the worst, 
believed it was some kind of attack.  Several minutes passed before the First Consul arrived at 
the theatre and took his seat.  Seeming as calm and composed as ever, he eased the crowd’s 
fears.  Only when Josephine and Hortense arrived in their emotional and frazzled state did 
rumors resume.220  When the audience learned that an attack on the First Consul had, in fact, 
caused the disruption, “women were seen choking with sobs, men trembling with rage; all united 
heart and hand to prove that in such circumstances no political differences can create a difference 
in the code of honour.”221  Napoleon bore the applause and adulations of the audience gracefully 
before seating himself to enjoy the performance.  After only approximately fifteen minutes, 
however, he called for Minister of Police Joseph Fouché and returned to the Tuileries palace. 
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Officials had yet to collect any evidence with which to identify the perpetrators of the 
attack, as less than an hour had passed.  The First Consul did not need—or want—evidence to 
convince himself who had authorized the attempt on his life.  In his mind, he had identified and 
convicted the guilty men already:  “This is the work of the Jacobins! . . . Neither nobles, nor 
priests, nor Chouans are implicated here.  Since we cannot chain, we must crush them.  France 
must be purged of such disgusting filth.  No pity for miscreants!”222  As rash as his conclusion 
was, it was not without reason.  The general consensus among the population and government 
officials was that the Royalists would not deign to murder the First Consul in the manner 
employed on the rue Saint Nicaise.  Overtly violent, the attack did not allow any possibility for 
Napoleon to defend himself.  Parisians believed that any assassination attempts undertaken by 
the Royalists would utilize more honorable means.  Likewise, the Jacobins had previously 
proven themselves willing to plot the assassination of the First Consul.  Joseph Céracchi and his 
Republican cohorts had planned to murder Napoleon on 10 October 1800.  Because the plan had 
failed, the public assumed that the most recent attack was simply a second attempt by the same 
group.  The fact that both plots centered on the opening performance of an opera further 
bolstered the belief. 
For the first week of the investigation, evidence against the Republicans continued to 
mount.  One of the most convincing indications of Royalist innocence, and, therefore, of Jacobin 
guilt, was information gleaned from the interrogation of known chouan leader Louis Auguste 
Victor, Count of Ghaisnes de Bourmont, at the Ministry of Police.  A week after the explosion, 
Fouché ordered Bourmont’s arrest.  When questioned about the plot, the Count emphatically 
denied knowing anything about it, proclaiming not only his own innocence but also that of any 
                                                 





and all chouans and Royalists.  His group, he explained, “had no interest in disposing of the First 
Consul, his death would not profit the group in any manner.”223  On the day following Fouché’s 
interrogation of Bourmont, Napoleon spoke with the chouan personally.  The Count continued to 
swear that the Royalists were not responsible for the attack and that he did not, in fact, know of 
any conspiracy in the works.  Convinced, the First Consul ordered Bourmont’s release. 
Fouché and his deputy, Pierre François Réal, believed from the outset that the Royalists 
were responsible for the plot.  They never found evidence linking Bourmont personally to the 
conspiracy, but they believed he communicated frequently with the conspirators and other 
suspects, warning them when the police were on their track.  To support his conclusion of 
Royalist guilt and Bourmont’s complicity in the matter, Fouché pointed to the disappearance of 
Carbon, Saint-Réjant, Joseph-Pierre Picot-Limoelan, and a handful of other chouan activists, 
whom the police had placed under surveillance prior to the explosion.  He argued with his critics:  
“Only tell me where Monsieur de Limoelan and Monsieur Saint-Réjant are.  If the attack is 
Jacobin, why have they hidden themselves so carefully since that day?”224 
Few believed Fouché’s claim that the police had watched the men before the attack.  The 
minister’s personal opponents condemned him, arguing “the life of the First Consul would no 
longer be safe in his hands.”225  They believed that he had ignored the plot until it blew up in his 
face because of his own connections to the Jacobins.  The argument is illogical.  There was no 
                                                 
223 Germain Sarrut and B. Saint-Edme, Notice pour servir à la biographie de M. le Maréchal 
Comte de Bourmont (Paris:  Imprimerie de P. Baudouin, 1842), 33. 
224 Pierre-Marie Desmarest, Témoignages historiques, de quinze ans de haute police sous 
Napoléon (Paris:  Alphonse Levavasseur, 1833), 43. 
225 Adolphe Thiers, Histoire du Consulat et de l’Empire, faisant suite à l’histoire de la 
Révolution française (Paris:  Jouvet, 1884), translated by D. Forbes Campbell as History of the 
Consulate and the Empire of France under Napoleon (London:  Chatto & Windus, 1893-1894), 





reason to deny the warning signs of a Royalist attack if Fouché wanted to protect his Jacobin 
friends.  One would expect him to pay even more attention to Royalist actions if he were 
attempting to save his own contacts in the Jacobin party.  The popular opinion among Parisians 
echoed that of Fouché’s foes.226  They feared a return to political uncertainty and instability if 
dissidents destroyed the Consulate or murdered the First Consul.  If officials were aware that a 
group of people—regardless of the identity—intended to murder the First Consul through such 
violent means, why had they not taken action before the bomb exploded?  The question is a valid 
one. 
In a report to the three Consuls dated 31 January 1801, Fouché explained all he knew 
about the conspiracy prior to the explosion on the rue Saint Nicaise.  He was aware that 
Cadoudal had sent several agents to Paris.  He believed, however, that they arrived “without a set 
plan, but with the goal and intention of availing themselves of any favorable circumstances in 
order to rekindle the fire of royalist insurrection.”227  From the very moment that Saint-Réjant 
and Limoelan settled in the capital city, they were under police surveillance.  Police also watched 
Carbon’s activities as soon as he began associating with Cadoudal’s agents.  Despite his claims 
that “the police, whose invisible hands surrounded the criminals, heard all their conversations, 
followed all their steps,” Fouché neglected to arrest the men before they could enact their violent 
plan.228  He justified his inaction by arguing that he had wanted to catch the men with physical 
evidence of their plan, rather than to act solely on hearsay and speculation.229  His reasoning was 
sound but dangerous.  In an age when mere suspicion of a crime could land someone in prison, 
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the safe move would have been to arrest the chouans as soon as he recognized that a plot was 
afoot.  His decision to wait for concrete proof of a specific plan cost the lives of dozens of 
Parisian citizens and nearly that of the First Consul. 
Determined to take quick action, even as the police still worked to locate the perpetrators, 
Napoleon rejected the creation of a special tribunal to try the criminals after their discovery.  
Instead, he launched a seemingly unlawful attack against the Jacobins.  He covered his actions 
with a thin veil of legality, however, by using a senatus-consulte, dated 4 January 1801, to order 
the persecution.  The resolution allowed the government to deport, without trial, anyone 
suspected of threatening the nation’s laws or freedom.  Implementing the new law, Napoleon 
ordered Fouché to draw up a list of Jacobins to face immediate and severe punishment for their 
role in the most recent attempt on his life.   
It is at this point that the argument of Fouché’s opponents becomes valid.  Not wanting 
his closest associates caught in the web of unwarranted punishment, he worked to keep their 
names off the list.  He included the names of only the most vocal and notorious remaining 
Jacobins.  “All these men,” the minister argued, “have not taken up the dagger, but all are 
universally known to be capable of pointing it, and of using it.”230  When completed, the list 
condemned 130 supposed enemies of the state to exile in Cayenne and the Seychelles without 
trial or any opportunity to clear their names.231 
Some sources have argued that Napoleon’s banishment of the innocent men marked the 
“first time that he had acted in defiance of the law [through] an act of vengeful spite against 
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those who had dared to challenge his authority.”232  Although Napoleon did not use the standard 
process for enacting laws to exile the Jacobins, he had not acted illegally.  According to the 
Constitution of the Year VIII, he was within his right to make such an order via a senatus-
consulte, which did not require approval of the legislative assemblies.  It was not an illegal 
move, but it was certainly a step toward consolidating political power in himself, with no 
concern for the assemblies or his two fellow Consuls.   
The action against the Jacobins was arbitrary not in terms of legality but because it 
attacked innocent citizens.  In his outburst to the Council of State on the day after the attempted 
assassination, Napoleon acknowledged his desire to purge France of his enemies.  The First 
Consul simply wanted to rid himself of anyone who might speak against him or his regime.  He 
had exiled the men not for their involvement in the attack on Christmas Eve but because of their 
supposedly inherent conspiratorial nature.  The document ordering their punishment expressed 
this idea clearly.  The men included on the list “had not ceased to conspire against the state since 
the moment they lost the power that they had usurped.”233  Charged with no individual act of 
criminality, the men faced punishment solely for political ideologies that conflicted with those of 
the First Consul.   
When Fouché presented indisputable proof that the chouans had orchestrated the attack 
on 3 Nivôse, he asked Napoleon to repeal the banishment of the 130 Republicans.  Bonaparte 
declined.  He argued that innocence in the infernal machine plot did not equate to innocence in 
all things.  The men deserved their punishment “for all that they have done, for all that they 
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might yet do.”234  Feeling no remorse over his decision, Napoleon admitted that he was “pleased 
. . . to be rid of the Jacobin staff.”235  The First Consul was willing to acknowledge, however, 
that his initial suspicions concerning the guilty party had been incorrect.  Although the two men 
butted heads throughout his rule, Napoleon openly praised the minister’s intuition and detective 
work.  To the chagrin of Fouché’s detractors, the First Consul admitted that he had been the only 
one to understand the situation immediately.  “He was right,” Napoleon announced, “his opinion 
was better than that of the others.”236 
The physical evidence at the scene of the crime was significant.  Police collected dozens 
of pieces of the cart and various parts of the horse’s corpse.  Within a week, numerous witnesses, 
including the people who sold the property, identified the remnants.  Based on the testimony, 
Fouché deduced that the man responsible for the purchases was Carbon.  He sent for the widow 
Catherine-Jean Vallon, Carbon’s sister, and her two teenage daughters, with whom the suspect 
had recently lived.  During her initial interrogation, Catherine explained that her brother had left 
Paris nearly a month earlier and that he had left her two barrels full of peas and lentils.  
Investigators searched the Vallon home while its residents answered questions about their 
relative.  The officers found four blue shirts identical to those the witnesses claimed the 
conspirators had worn.  They also discovered not the barrels of legumes Catherine had described, 
but “a barrel containing six kilograms (twelve pounds) of very fine powder, a packet of powder, 
[and] some cartridges.”237  When questioned about the shirts, Catherine lied, telling the police 
that they belonged to her late husband.  As more information came to light, she ultimately 
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confessed that they did, in fact, belong to her brother and his friends.  She had tried to protect her 
brother because she believed he had been tricked by his cohorts into participating in the plot. 
Carbon’s two nieces, Joséphine and Madeleine, were more cooperative.  They described 
numerous meetings between their uncle and his accomplices.  The Vallons frequently laundered 
the men’s clothes for them, giving them a legitimate reason to come to the house.  During these 
visits, the girls overheard conversations among the men, despite their efforts to speak quietly.  
The two teenagers also explained seeing correspondence from some of the suspects addressed to 
their uncle.  Even more useful, the two provided Carbon’s current address. 
On the morning of 18 January 1801, police arrested Carbon.  Throughout the day, 
officers interrogated him about the plot and his involvement.  He denied everything.  When 
confronted, however, with the evidence police had collected from the rue Saint Nicaise and the 
news that at least fifteen witnesses had identified him specifically, he changed his story.  He 
confessed to buying the cart, horse, and barrel.  He did not purchase the gunpowder, but, as 
evidenced from the findings at his sister’s home, he had stored it.  Carbon also pointed police in 
the right direction in order to find Saint-Réjant.   
Officers arrived at the home of the widow Jourdan, where Saint-Réjant supposedly lived, 
on the morning of 19 January.  She told them that she had had a tenant named Soyer but that he 
had left suddenly the previous evening.  Later that evening, a man named Saint-Victor arrived to 
inform Soyer that le Petit-François was in police custody.238  When officers searched the 
apartment Soyer had rented on the third floor, they found his clothes and other belongings strewn 
about, indicating a hasty evacuation.  They interrogated the widow’s daughter, Marie-Antoinette, 
                                                 





who identified numerous associates of Soyer, including Carbon, Saint-Victor and Limoelan.239  
She also advised them that she delivered letters to the Leguilloux residence for Soyer during the 
previous month.  On the following morning, the widow Jourdan saw the police approaching to 
continue their investigation.  She threw herself out of the third-story window onto the street 
below.  The sudden and violent action killed her, prompting immediate speculation that she had 
been privy to the conspiracy.   
The next residence visited by investigators was that of the Leguilloux family.  Its 
members made no effort to hide the activities of their recent tenant, whom they knew as Soyer.  
He had joined them approximately a week before the explosion and had taken his leave a day or 
two afterwards.  They described and named as many of his associates as they could remember, 
including Doctor Collin.  Within the home, police found Saint-Réjant’s clothing and two letters, 
one addressed to him and one with no names.  Even as the family faced questions at the Ministry 
of Police, Saint-Réjant returned to their home.  Aware that police were closing in on him, he 
hoped to gather his belongings before finding safer refuge.  As he left the home on 28 January, 
police arrested him.   
Carbon and Saint-Réjant, two of most intimately involved conspirators, were now in 
police custody.  Their accomplice, Limoelan, had disappeared, much as he had done on 
Christmas Eve when he failed to signal that the First Consul had left the Tuileries palace.  
Without a doubt, it was these men who had purchased the materials for the explosive device, 
who had designed, built and detonated it.  The identity of the plot’s actual author, however, is not 
so clear.  Sources present five possibilities:  the English government, Secretary of State for War 
and the Colonies William Windham specifically, Georges Cadoudal, Limoelan, and Saint-Réjant. 
                                                 





Englishmen had a more positive reaction to news of the attack on the First Consul than 
the citizens of France.  Although the means through which the conspirators had acted shocked 
many Englishmen, some had no issue with the violence.  As an illegitimate ruler who had 
usurped political control through underhanded means, Napoleon deserved whatever came his 
way.  William Cobbett’s Porcupine contained an article on 31 December 1800 discussing the 
morality of the attack, so long as it was Frenchmen who had undertaken the project:  “We are not 
prepared to give a decided opinion as to the morality of killing Bonaparte.  That no foreigner 
would be justified in committing such an act we are certain; but whether Frenchmen would or 
not, is with us a matter of doubt.”240   
 Whereas the contemporary article characterized an assassination attempt launched by 
non-Frenchmen as immoral, some sources do implicate the English government in the attack.  
The idea that the English funded the conspiracy is entirely feasible.  They had, after all, financed 
numerous previous efforts of Cadoudal against Republican France.  Other sources blame the 
British for concocting the conspiracy itself, not just for financing it.  Charles François Marchand 
de Breuil concluded that it was the English who ordered the attack in the first place, implying 
that Cadoudal acted only at their behest.241  Seconding the involvement of his own government 
was Samuel Romilly, a well-respected English lawyer and legal reformer.  In his memoirs, he 
recorded that the plot of Christmas Eve 1800 “was suggested and paid for in England.”242  He 
focused his accusations even further, explaining in his journal entry for 27 September 1802 that 
Secretary Windham “is universally considered as the principal machinator.”243  Without 
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question, the English provided the money that Cadoudal used in his conspiratorial plotting.  The 
likelihood that any individual within the English government concocted the idea to blow up 
Napoleon, however, is slim.244  Henrietta Ponsonby, Countess of Bessborough, recorded an 
exchange between Napoleon and former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Charles James 
Fox, during which the First Consul accused the English of plotting against his life.  Fox assured 
him on his own life that he was mistaken, explaining “Mr. Pitt Windham, like every other 
Englishman, would shrink with horror from the Idea of secret assassination.”245 
 Even Cadoudal found the idea of a “secret assassination” improper, though sources most 
often identify him as the mastermind behind the explosion.  He was plotting against the First 
Consul but did not intend to utilize any means that would cause the death or injury of dozens of 
innocent bystanders.  He considered the excessively violent attack implemented on Christmas 
Eve 1800 deplorable.  When news of the explosion reached him, he was livid.  Jean Rohu, a 
close associate, recorded that the leader “burst into a violent fit of anger and said to us:  ‘I could 
wager that this is some hair-brained doing of that blockhead Saint-Réjant.’”246  Cadoudal’s own 
plans, derailed by the explosion, had centered on actions “more worthy of a soldier,” which he 
believed included kidnapping and face-to-face assassination.247   
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Although Cadoudal had sent the group of conspirators to Paris, he had no further 
responsibility for the assassination attempt.  There is no physical evidence linking him to the 
actual bomb or its design.  Under Saint-Réjant’s bed at the Leguilloux residence, police officials 
found a letter written from Gédéon to Soyer, dated 29 December 1800.  They claimed the 
document linked Cadoudal to Saint-Réjant and, therefore, to the infernal machine.  Officials 
knew that Cadoudal often signed his private correspondence, especially when it discussed 
clandestine activities, as Gédéon.  During the trial, Saint-Réjant denied that he was the recipient 
of the letter.  When confronted with the fact that officials had found the letter under his bed at the 
Leguilloux residence, he answered that it had been “a month since I set foot in that room.”248  
Because officials could not apprehend Cadoudal, two handwriting experts testified that the 
chouan leader was, in fact, Gédéon, the author of the letter in question.  Jean-François Legros 
and Augustin Oudart mentioned numerous similarities between the letter by Gédéon and a letter 
known to be from Cadoudal, addressed to General Henri Clarke.  In both documents, the writing 
had “the same feel, the same position of the pen, the same configuration of letters.”249  The most 
compelling evidence, according to the two experts, was the similarity between the upper-case G 
in Gédéon and Georges.250  There was no doubt that Cadoudal was Gédéon. 
Numerous secondary sources have listed the letter from Gédéon to Soyer as proof of 
Cadoudal’s involvement in the attack on the rue Saint Nicaise.  The argument is unconvincing, 
however, as the letter contained no information about any conspiracy.  Instead, it assured the 
recipient of its author’s trust and faith:  “in you alone is our confidence and all of our hope.”251  
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Had Saint-Réjant received the letter before detonating the bomb, one could argue that he took the 
message as a sign of Cadoudal’s permission to act in whatever manner he saw fit.  Because 
Cadoudal did not write the letter until 29 December, he intended it as nothing more than moral 
encouragement to stand strong and not to lose faith in the Royalist cause.  With no details of any 
particular conspiracy and no call to action whatsoever, the letter does not implicate Cadoudal in 
the bomb plot but does prove an ongoing rapport with Saint-Réjant. 
More evidence supporting the idea that Cadoudal did not, in fact, devise the infernal 
machine plot is testimony given by Carbon and Saint-Réjant during their trial.  Defendants often 
do not want to implicate their accomplices, but this reserve did not stop either man from naming 
his partners during their interrogations.  At trial, the prosecutor asked both defendants if 
Cadoudal was their leader.  Carbon responded in the negative, explaining that he had never 
interacted with the chouan leader at all.  He had served only under the Count of Puisaye and the 
Count of Bourmont.252  Because Cadoudal focused his actions in a different region of France, he 
and Carbon had never met.  Although the lack of communication between the two does not 
exempt Cadoudal as a possible author of the plot, Carbon’s insistence that Cadoudal played no 
part is convincing.  Carbon named his fellow conspirators willingly and constantly throughout 
his interrogations and depositions at trial.  He had no reason to exclude Cadoudal while naming 
others.   
Saint-Réjant also denied Cadoudal’s involvement, though not as convincingly as Carbon.  
He declared that he had not corresponded with Cadoudal for nearly a year because the two had 
argued over the cessation of hostility between the chouans and the French republic.253  Several 
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pieces of information contradict the conspirator’s testimony.  As early as August 1800, Fouché 
had known that Cadoudal planned to send emissaries to Paris.254  The arrival of Saint-Réjant and 
his associates in November and December of the same year came as no surprise.  Even more 
damaging for the defendant was the letter from Gédéon to Soyer:  Cadoudal had written it and 
Saint-Réjant was clearly its recipient.  Correspondence had obviously continued between the two 
men, despite the defendant’s testimony to the contrary. 
Given Cadoudal’s hostile reaction to news of the explosion and the lack of physical 
evidence tying him to the bomb, the chouan leader was not, in fact, the mastermind behind the 
violent attack.  His only culpability was in sending Saint-Réjant and four others to Paris in late 
fall 1800 to lay the groundwork for an as-yet-undeveloped conspiracy.  Cadoudal had explicitly 
instructed the group not to take action against Napoleon or his government until his arrival.  The 
leader only authorized them to purchase horses, weapons and various items of clothing after 
settling in the city.  To be clear, Cadoudal certainly was responsible for the plotters’ presence in 
Paris in December 1800, and he was, in fact, developing plans for an attack on the First Consul.  
He did not, however, intend the conspiracy to take the form utilized on Christmas Eve. 
A handful of sources discuss the possibility that Limoelan devised the attack.  One such 
work justifies the opinion by explaining that the conspirator had wanted to design the bomb 
differently from the final—and unsuccessful—product.  He had not wanted to use any tinder or 
fuse, but instead to set fire directly to the powder, which would have resulted in an almost 
immediate explosion.  Had Limoelan won the argument over design, the bomb would likely have 
detonated precisely as Napoleon’s coach passed.  The chouans might then have accomplished 
their fatal mission.  The fact that Limoelan advocated a different approach for detonating the 
                                                 





bomb does not prove that he was the author of the plot as a whole.  In fact, one could argue that 
because the final product did not utilize his approach, he was clearly not the head of the 
conspiracy. 
Although the argument receives comparatively little attention in source material, the most 
likely author of the infernal machine plot was Saint-Réjant.  The explosion surprised Cadoudal, 
who complained that his agent had acted without authorization.  Minister Fouché’s investigation 
of the chouan conspirators led him to conclude that they had arrived in Paris without a specific 
plan.  He believed that the “thought of a conspiracy against the life of the First Consul and, in 
particular, to cause his death by an explosion of a barrel of powder, WAS BORN ONLY AFTER 
THEIR ARRIVAL” in the city.255  The most convincing evidence that Saint-Réjant orchestrated 
the attack was a second letter found by police under the conspirator’s bed at the Leguilloux 
residence.  With no signature and addressed simply to “a friend,” it was initially difficult to 
identify either the author or the intended recipient.256  During his testimony, handwriting expert 
Oudart explained that someone had forged the letter, hoping to make Limoelan appear to be its 
author.  There were similarities between the anonymous letter and Limoelan’s known 
handwriting, but there was even more evidence to suggest that he was not the author.257  Given 
the location where officials found the letter and Oudart’s testimony about its author, one can 
deduce that Saint-Réjant wrote the document.  Expert witness Legros argued against this 
conclusion.  He testified that Saint-Réjant “is not the author of the context of the anonymous 
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missive.”258  He did not, however, offer any suggestion about who he thought had written the 
document. 
The content of the letter, especially when coupled with its discovery under the 
conspirator’s bed, is evidence enough that Saint-Réjant was its author.  He used vague 
terminology when discussing the identity of the actors but included specific details that only 
someone personally and directly involved in the plot could have known at the time.259  He 
explained to his anonymous friend the miscommunication among the conspirators:  “a person 
had promised to warn the wrongdoer of the moment of the departure of the First Consul; the 
person did not do it.”260  Another detail, known only by someone present at the time of the 
detonation, was the fact that a grenadier had pushed the cart, dislodging its content.  These two 
circumstances contributed to the bomb’s failure, but neither was the ultimate cause, according to 
the letter’s author.  He concluded the letter by explaining that the lack of success was “the fault 
of the powder, and not of the wrongdoer.”261 
Saint-Réjant is the only possible author of the letter for a variety of reasons.  The letter 
was not a simple account of events but included specific and minute details.  A person outside of 
the conspiracy’s core group could not have known that one cohort planned to signal another.  
Another detail known only to someone present on the rue Saint-Nicaise shortly before the 
detonation was that Durand had moved the cart out of the way.  On the day of the attack, 
Limoelan and Carbon had taken positions close to the Tuileries palace that allowed them to 
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signal Saint-Réjant of the First Consul’s departure.  They were not, therefore, present to witness 
Durand’s actions.  The conclusion of the anonymous letter also eliminates Limoelan and Carbon 
as possible authors.  Maintaining his personal innocence in the plot’s failure, the author would 
not have confessed to neglecting to signal the First Consul’s departure.  These details leave 
Saint-Réjant as the only possible author of the letter.  
Although only Saint-Réjant, Carbon, and Limoelan played active roles in the events on 
the rue Saint Nicaise, twenty additional people faced charges alongside them.  Limoelan and six 
other suspects managed to evade police and to avoid going to trial.262  With financial backing 
from his fiancée, Limoelan escaped to the United States via England.263  The defendants included 
several people, such as the Leguilloux couple, who had housed the conspirators.  The most 
surprising individual charged with participating in the plot was Carbon’s young niece, 
Madeleine, who was only seventeen at the time of the trial.  Police understood that the citizens 
who provided shelter to the known chouans had not played roles in the conspiracy itself, but 
each of the defendants faced the same charges nonetheless.  The indictment read that they “were 
charged with forming, with collaborating in, a plot aiming for the murder of the First Consul of 
the Republic; with troubling the Republic through a civil war by arming citizens one against 
                                                 
262 Bourgeois, Saint-Victor, Layhaye and Joyau escaped from Paris and sought refuge in England 
or in the Vendée or chouan territory.  Sources provide no information about how Ambroise-
Marie Songé and Geneviève Berthonet avoided the trial. 
263 Limoelan led a successful and comfortable life after his escape to the United States.  He 
attended seminary in Baltimore in 1808, becoming an ordained priest in August 1812.  He served 
as vicar in Charleston, South Carolina before transferring to Georgetown.  Upon learning of the 
Bourbon restoration in 1815, he celebrated a Te Deum at his church.  He died of natural causes 
on 29 September 1826.  Some sources have claimed that he chose to dedicate himself to religion 
because of the guilt he felt over the violent death of Marianne Peusol, whom Saint-Réjant 
employed to watch the cart on 3 Nivôse.  It seems more likely that his long-standing faith, his 
uncle’s career as a priest, and his fiancée’s decision to join the Church herself served as his 
motivation.  François René de Chateaubriand, Oeuvres Complètes de Chateaubriand:  Mémoires 





another, and against the exercise of legitimate authority; of having, to serve the execution of the 
plot, amassed weapons and munitions; with having prepared and placed an infernal machine; 
with having carried out an attack designed to kill the First Consul by lighting the aforesaid 
infernal machine; with having done so premeditatedly; and with having, by the effect of the 
explosion, caused the death of several people.”264 
Throughout the trial, the defendants who rented rooms to Carbon or Saint-Réjant 
recounted everything they knew about the two men and their conspiracy.  Marie-Antoinette 
Jourdan testified that Limoelan, Saint-Hilaire and Doctor Collin visited Saint-Réjant at her 
mother’s house the day after the explosion.  She described a discussion she overheard during 
which Saint-Réjant declared, “the First Consul escaped it twice, but he will not escape it a 
third.”265  She explained to the jury that she had delivered letters and packages to Saint-Réjant at 
the Leguilloux residence after he had moved from her mother’s home.  The prosecutor asked the 
Leguilloux couple to explain why they had allowed Saint-Réjant, who lacked the appropriate 
paperwork to reside in Paris, to live in their home.  The couple’s attorney explained that the 
tenant had provided legal paperwork, but under the name Soyer.266  They had no reason to 
suspect that it was not his legal name.  When asked about the living arrangements within their 
home, Louise Mainguet Leguilloux admitted that she had sent one of their daughters to a friend’s 
house to give Saint-Réjant a bed for himself.  The prosecutor reproached her for having done so, 
finding it ridiculous that a mother would send her child away in order to make space for a total 
stranger.  She agreed, but justified the odd actions because of the money it brought to the family:  
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“I experienced a lot of hardships; it was in order to have a little something, to help a bit with 
rent.”267 
Doctor Collin was as cooperative as possible during his interrogations and testimonies.  
He admitted to knowing two of his co-defendants, in addition to Saint-Réjant.  Bourgeois had 
sought his help for a fever nearly three and a half years earlier.268  Saint-Hilaire had been born 
near the property of Doctor Collin’s father.  To explain his relationship to Saint-Réjant, the 
doctor advised the jury that he had treated him prior to Christmas Eve 1800 for a pulmonary 
catarrh.  He saw his co-defendant only for professional reasons and only for a handful of minutes 
on any given visit.  On the evening of Christmas Eve, his patient summoned him again to his 
room at the Leguilloux residence.  When he arrived, Saint-Réjant’s condition was terrible:  he 
was bleeding, breathing with difficulty, and complained of sore eyes and deafness in one ear.  He 
claimed his injuries resulted from a fall.  The doctor treated him and promised to come back soon 
to check on him.269  During the trial, the prosecutor brought to light for the jury Article 12 of a 
regulation dated 8 November 1780.  The legislation required “master surgeons, and all others 
practicing surgery in Paris; to write the names, family names, quarters and homes of the people 
who are injured, night or day, and who have been taken into their homes in order to be treated or 
who have been treated elsewhere, and to inform the commissioner of the quarter of the quality 
and circumstances of their injuries, under pain of a 300 franc fine, a loss of the right to practice, 
and even corporal punishment.”270  Doctor Collin did not report Saint-Réjant’s information after 
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diagnosing the pulmonary catarrh because it was not the result of an injury.  He also neglected, 
however, to report his patient’s condition once examining him on either occasion after the 
detonation on the rue Saint Nicaise.  Even if one accepts Saint-Réjant’s explanation to the doctor 
that the injuries resulted from a fall, the situation still required him to report the patient’s 
information to the local commissioner. 
The defendants who had housed or cared for the conspirators provided convincing 
information and seemed genuinely innocent of any actual treason.  Carbon and Saint-Réjant were 
not so persuasive in arguing their innocence.  During his interrogations at the Ministry of Police 
and his testimony during the trial, Carbon admitted to making purchases for Saint-Réjant and 
Limoelan and to interacting with them on a regular basis.  Despite this involvement, he 
continually proclaimed his innocence, explaining that he was unaware of his two associates’ 
intentions.271  To support his claim, he explained that Limoelan had promised him the cart and 
horse after he had finished with them.  When asked why he had left his sister’s house to seek 
shelter elsewhere, Carbon replied that Limoelan had told him the location was no longer safe.  
“The affair may fall on the royalists,” his friend told him, “and people might bother us.”272  The 
prosecutor then questioned why, because Limoelan had told him he was not safe because a 
conspiracy might fall on them, did he not suspect his friend’s involvement in the crime.  Carbon 
replied simply that it did not occur to him.  He did not think of his friend’s involvement—or his 
own—until the police arrived to arrest him. 
Carbon’s argument of unwitting complicity is entirely unconvincing.  Given the number 
of people who testified to hearing him speak with his accomplices, it is unlikely that he was not 
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privy to the plot’s details.  Likewise, he frequently used the aliases le Petit François or Constant.  
Innocent actions do not necessitate aliases.  The form in which he gave his responses during the 
trial also reinforced his guilt.  One might expect conflicts between the initial interrogation and 
information provided later during the trial, but these issues were not the only ones present.  
Carbon frequently contradicted himself from one minute to the next. 
Saint-Réjant presented his case in a more orderly fashion than his co-defendant had done.  
He offered explanations for any details that he did not outright deny.  When asked whether 
Cadoudal had arranged for him to come to Paris, he answered negatively.  He had come on his 
own volition, seeking medical care for an illness.273  He admitted to having met with Carbon and 
Limoelan at various points during his stay in the city but denied seeing them on Christmas Eve 
1800.  The prosecutor questioned why Saint-Victor informed him of Carbon’s arrest if he had no 
role in the conspiracy.  Saint-Réjant replied, “I do not know his motives for doing so.”274  The 
official then wanted to know why the defendant had left the widow Jourdan’s home upon 
learning of his associate’s arrest.  At this point, Saint-Réjant admitted to an illegal act, but not 
anything concerning the conspiracy.  His paperwork for residing in Paris was not in order, he 
confessed, and he feared that the police would arrest him. 
More calmly and rationally presented, Saint-Réjant’s testimony was unconvincing 
nevertheless.  None of his explanations surmounted the physical evidence and depositions 
against him.  Marie-Antoinette Jourdan’s testimony that she delivered correspondence for him to 
the Leguilloux residence weakens his claim that the letters found there by police did not belong 
to him.  The specific details concerning the plot’s failure in the anonymous letter illustrate not 
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only his guilt in the plot but also identify him as the letter’s author.  His lack of proper 
paperwork allowing him to reside within Paris implies unlawful intentions.  If he had accepted 
his illegal status in the city but wanted to stay there anyway, he would have kept as low a profile 
as possible, avoiding other known chouans and Royalists.   
When the trial concluded, the defendants found themselves divided into four groups, 
depending on the punishment doled out to them.  The jury acquitted eight, including Carbon’s 
teenage nieces.275  Five defendants received sentences of three months in prison for housing 
people who did not possess proper paperwork to reside in Paris.  This group included Carbon’s 
sister and the Leguilloux couple.276  The court sentenced Doctor Collin to three months in prison 
and a 300-franc fine for his failure to report Saint-Réjant’s injuries as required.  As the only two 
at trial who actively participated in the plot, Carbon and Saint-Réjant both received the death 
penalty.  Upon hearing the verdict and sentence, Saint-Réjant implored, “I ask to be executed 
within twenty-four hours.”277  He did not receive his final wish.  The trial ended on 6 April 1801, 
but the two conspirators were not executed until 20 April 1801. 
The infernal machine plot destroyed Napoleon’s confidence in his understanding of the 
political situation he had inherited on 18 Brumaire.  The conspiracy launched by Céracchi and 
his associates in October 1800 had not surprised the First Consul.  He had expected violent 
opposition from the Jacobins, who felt that the events of 18 Brumaire established an illegal 
government.  The Jacobins feared Napoleon from the first days of his regime.  Many believed he 
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wanted to consolidate power for himself or, perhaps worse yet, to set the groundwork for a 
Bourbon restoration.  The First Consul had also expected resistance from the Royalists but did 
not believe it would take a violent form. 
Napoleon’s initial belief that the Jacobins were responsible for the detonation on the rue 
Saint Nicaise prompted a swift and harsh response from the government. The new law allowing 
the government to deport the government’s enemies without trial was one such response, which 
resulted in the banishment of 130 innocent Republicans.  Another rash decision by the First 
Consul may have occasioned the execution of four men.  Céracchi, Joseph Aréna, Dominique 
Demerville, and François Jean-Baptiste Topino-Lebrun had spent approximately two months in 
prison before the explosion on Christmas Eve 1800.  Some historians argue that the government 
delayed their trial because the evidence presented against them was insufficient to warrant a 
guilty verdict.278  The delay between the arrest and the prosecution of the four conspirators was 
uncharacteristic, but it was not due to a lack of evidence.  The testimony of Jacques Harel, who 
had infiltrated the group, sufficed to prove that a conspiracy was underway.  Whether the group 
would have taken action without the encouragement and funding from Harel was open to debate, 
but it is clear that the members had discussed a plan of action against the First Consul.  Even 
before the attack on 3 Nivôse, the justice system prescribed the death penalty for conspiratorial 
actions or intentions.  When the four men faced the firing squad on 31 January 1801, the 
punishment was just, regardless of the actions taken by Saint-Réjant and Carbon. 
A more reasoned reaction to the two recent conspiracies launched against him was 
Napoleon’s support and acceptance of a law on 7 February 1801 that changed the organization of 
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the criminal system.  The new regulation established special criminal courts in thirty-two of the 
nation’s departments.  The members of these tribunals consisted of two judges from the regular 
court system, three military judges and two more civilian officials.  Napoleon himself held the 
power to appoint these men.  The law granted the authority “to pronounce final judgment without 
appeal, on vagrants and habitual criminals, ratione personae [by reason of his person], and on a 
great number of crimes pertaining to brigandage:  burglary, highway robbery, murder, arson, 
counterfeiting, seditious assembly and illegal possession of weapons.”279  Napoleon’s detractors 
viewed the special criminal courts as offensive and even tyrannical because they allowed the 
First Consul to impinge upon the judicial system, which was previously supposed to remain 
separate from the executive branch. 
Now aware that the Republicans were not his only opponents, Napoleon sought to 
undermine the Royalists’ influence in France.  The chouan threat had dwindled continually over 
the years of the Revolution.  Greater acceptance among Frenchmen of the Catholic Church and 
of religion in general prompted many fighters to return to their homes, even though the goal of 
restoring the Bourbons to power remained unattained.  The republic’s repeated ability to defeat 
the chouans on the battlefield demoralized them.  Many of their leaders had already signed peace 
treaties with the government, accepting wealth in exchange for their loyalty—or at least their 
silence.  One of the strongest motivations for the chouan fighters to pick up their weapons in the 
first place had been the persecution of the Catholic Church during the Revolution.  Recognizing 
that he could win the support of these people and deal a devastating blow to the Royalists as a 
whole, Napoleon sought peace with the papacy in Rome in 1801.  By reestablishing the legal 
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status of the Catholic Church in France, the First Consul removed the Royalists’ most powerful 
ally, the pope. 
The Royalists continued to plot against Napoleon and would, in fact, launch another 
attack in 1804.  At this point, Cadoudal reappeared on the scene but played a more active role in 
the conspiracy.  Given the failure of a purely Republican plot in October 1800—that of Céracchi 
and his accomplices—and of a Royalist one on Christmas Eve 1800, the chouan leader and his 
colleagues sought to combine both groups.  Their efforts would fail yet again but would continue 








CADOUDAL, PICHEGRU, AND MOREAU 
 Although the hotheaded actions of Pierre Robinault, known as Saint-Réjant shattered his 
hopes of overthrowing the Consular government in December 1800, Georges Cadoudal did not 
lose sight of his goal.  His discussions of ridding France of Napoleon continued to focus on 
violence.  Royalists in England with whom he conversed believed that since “he talks only of 
combat and uprisings; he is a man who is impossible to make listen to reason.”280  He worked 
hard to overcome the impression born from Saint-Réjant’s infernal machine that the chouans 
were too impetuous to be useful to the Royalist cause.  He believed violence would prove 
necessary, but not the kind of viciousness his former agent had employed.  Over the three years 
following the explosion on the rue Saint-Nicaise, Cadoudal fought an uphill battle to convince 
the French princes that he was the right person to command the Bourbon restoration.  Eventually, 
they consented to allow him to take action again on their behalf.  They insisted, however, that he 
employ more levelheaded partners than he had in the past, wanting him to rely on men they knew 
and respected.  Disappointed that he was not in full control of the situation but willing to push 
forward in order to destroy Republicanism in France, Cadoudal bided his time while the princes 
secured additional support for the cause. 
 Jean-Charles Pichegru, the son of a farmer, had latched onto Republican ideals from their 
earliest inception.  When the colonists in America began their fight for independence from 
England, he took up arms and traveled to North America to join their cause.  When the 
opportunity to institute similar political reform in his own nation presented itself in 1789, he 
continued the fight.  By 1791, he was the leader of the Jacobin Club of Besançon and two years 
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later earned a promotion to general and received command of the Army of the Rhine.  His 
numerous and impressive accomplishments on the battlefield and his devotion to the Republican 
cause made him one of the most respected and popular generals of the French Republic.   
In April 1795, the National Convention in Paris bestowed upon him command of the 
Army of the Rhine-et-Moselle.  The post was an important one, but he was not enthusiastic about 
it.  He had hoped for a break in the fighting that would allow him to enjoy the popularity and 
fortune he had accumulated during his last campaign.  When Pichegru arrived at his new 
headquarters in Altkirch, the situation he found did nothing to improve his mood.  His troops 
were “discouraged, demoralized by their suffering.”281  They lacked basic supplies such as 
proper clothing.  They did not have sufficient artillery to fortify their position adequately, and 
their numbers were insufficient to enact the orders they received from Paris—when the 
government deigned to send them directives at all.  Pichegru had arrived on the front without 
orders of attack and without even a plan for maintaining the current position.  After more than 
two months, he finally received instructions from Paris.  Dejected and disgusted, he took no 
action and finally responded to the National Convention a month later.  He explained that he did 
not have sufficient troops to carry out the proposed attack, noting that he had not even horses 
with which to reposition the artillery.  He presented a counterplan, but the government rejected 
it.  The resulting stagnation crushed morale even more and increased Pichegru’s aggravation 
with both the military and political situation in France. 
 After several months wallowing alongside the troops of the Army of the Rhine-et-
Moselle, Pichegru had made it known to some Swiss border guards that he resented his post and 
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had also lost faith in France’s ability to sustain a Republican regime.  The “perpetual variations 
in popular government” resulted in an ineffective and unstable regime.282  The country’s best 
hope for reestablishing stability, he admitted, was through the restoration of the Bourbon 
monarchy.  One of the confidants relayed Pichegru’s sentiments to the British ambassador in 
Switzerland, William Wickham.  By fall 1795, the general was participating in open talks with 
agents of the exiled royals.  He informed them of troop movements and of the numbers of 
soldiers stationed at various points along the Rhine.  “Pichegru has left only 4,000 now in all of 
F[ranche] Comté.  He could not with decency leave less,” Wickham related to British 
authorities.283  With such an illustrious and capable French general in his pocket, Louis Joseph 
de Bourbon, the Prince of Condé, began considering a restoration of his family’s monarchy 
through a plan with Pichegru at its heart.284 
 Condé had one of his agents, Louis Fauche-Borel, deliver a letter to Pichegru 
investigating the possibility of his leading the effort to restore the royal family to power.  The 
prince proposed a two-fold and simple strategy.  To start, he wanted Pichegru simply to proclaim 
his personal loyalty to the king and to display the white flag of the Bourbon family among his 
troops.  Next, he wanted the general to deliver into his hands the town of Huningue, from which 
further military operations could launch.  In return for his loyal service, Pichegru stood to collect 
a plethora of rewards.  The royal family planned to rename Pichegru’s hometown after him and 
to exempt its citizens from paying taxes for fifteen years.  Likewise, any city that opened its 
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doors to the Royalist forces would also be exempt from taxes and its citizens would receive full 
and unreserved amnesty for any actions they might have taken during the Revolution to date.  
The king would confirm in his rank any soldier under Pichegru’s command and would promote 
without question anyone the general recommended.  As for Pichegru’s personal rewards, the 
Bourbons intended to name him a marshal of France, as well as the governor of Alsace.  He 
would gain admission to the ranks of the Order of Saint-Louis.  He would also receive “the 
château of Chambord and its lands, and twelve pieces of cannon taken from the Austrians; one 
million cash, an annual salary of 200,000 livres, a home in Paris.”285  Upon Pichegru’s death, his 
wife would continue receiving half his annual salary, with each of his children receiving 50,000 
livres “in perpetuity, until the extinction of his line.”286 
 Despite the impressive rewards Condé offered him, Pichegru found his proposal 
simplistic to the point of incompletion.  He mentioned in his response to the prince the efforts in 
1793 of Charles-François du Périer Dumouriez, who had failed to overthrow the Republican 
regime in Paris partly because of his hastily conceived and uncertain tactics.287  Pichegru 
proposed another course of action.  He offered to join with nearby Austrian troops and to march 
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as a combined force to Paris itself.  Wanting “to have for himself alone the glory of making the 
counterrevolution,” the Prince de Condé utterly rejected the general’s proposal.288 
 Having reached an impasse with the Royalists, Pichegru found nothing but aggravation in 
all political realms.  In November 1795, a new constitution replaced the National Convention 
with the Directory in Paris.  The continuance in power of two-thirds of the deputies that Pichegru 
and others viewed as corrupt further weakened the general’s faith in Republican forms of 
government.289  By 10 January 1796, “the deplorable state of his army, the demands of a greedy 
mistress and the pleasures of high living for himself” prompted Pichegru to cut ties with the 
French military.290  After tendering his resignation seven times, the general finally saw his offer 
accepted.  Director Lazare Nicolas Marguerite Carnot reported that he accepted Pichegru’s 
departure because his “conduct gave birth to doubts in my mind, relative to the firmness of his 
principles.”291   
 His sudden unemployment concerned the Royalists.  They questioned what use he could 
be to them if he no longer commanded any troops.  Fauche-Borel met with the former general to 
discuss the concerns.  Pichegru assured him that everything was under control.  He advised the 
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agent to trust him and his decisions, explaining “that he was resolved to support the Royal 
against the Republican cause—but that the manner of doing it must be left to himself.”292   
Pichegru took no action until May 1797, when dozens of openly-monarchist candidates, 
including himself, earned seats in the Directory’s Council of 500.  The election of so many 
Royalist supporters caused panic among its Republican representatives.  In early September, an 
anonymous notice greeted the government’s assemblies and enflamed the already tense situation.  
It claimed that those most recently elected “were nothing more than brazen royalists, chouan 
leaders, émigrés, assassins, conspirators.”293  Hostile debates erupted as deputies denounced each 
other as enemies of the state.  On the night of 3 September, by order of the government, soldiers 
arrested numerous supposed schemers.294  The following morning, Parisians learned of the 
existence—and routing—of a Royalist plot to destroy the republic.  The announcement attributed 
the safety of the nation and the thwarting of the conspirators to “the vigilance of the government, 
and the heads of the armed forces, [who] nullified their criminal efforts.”295 
 On the same day, the Directory sentenced 65 men to deportation based on nothing more 
than allegations of conspiracy and with no proof of any particular person’s involvement in such 
actions.296  Among them was Pichegru, whom the government named as the mastermind behind 
the Royalist plot to overthrow the Directory.  Over the next week, the remaining deputies learned 
of several packets of documents proving Pichegru’s frequent contact with the Bourbon princes.  
Napoleon Bonaparte had obtained in Venice some papers of Louis-Alexandre de Launay, Count 
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of Antraigues, for example, which contained accounts of the conversations Pichegru had had 
with various Royalists.  The papers included Antraigues’ rehashing of a conversation he had with 
fellow secret agent Jean Gabriel Maurice Rocques, Count of Montgaillard, about Condé’s plan 
for Pichegru and the rewards he might receive for his services.  Additional condemnation came 
in the form of a letter written by General Jean-Victor Marie Moreau to Director François-Marie 
Barthélemy.  Like Bonaparte, he had discovered private correspondence that proved Pichegru’s 
involvement with the Royalists.  Moreau explained that the former deputy “was prudent enough 
not to have written anything,” but that the documents he seized from Austrian General Johann 
Freiherr Klinglin frequently mentioned him and his treasonous dealings.297 
 On 22 September, Pichegru and other condemned deputies boarded a vessel bound for 
Cayenne in French Guiana.  Upon their arrival, the prison-ship captain exaggerated their crimes 
to the governor, describing the group as “villains . . . [who] had already lighted up a civil war in 
France, where they massacred the republicans with impunity.”298  The governor sent them to 
lodgings infested with insects and snakes, many of which were poisonous.  Several of the men 
fell victim to disease, which their dirty living conditions, lack of nutritious food, and unbearable 
heat rendered fatal.  The survivors, including Pichegru, took advantage of an opportunity to 
escape in June 1798 and arrived in England three months later.   
 Safely installed in London, Pichegru met frequently with Cadoudal and other Bourbon 
supporters to devise a new plan of action against the regime in France—now the Consular 
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government.  Cadoudal had opposed Saint-Réjant’s explosive assault against Napoleon on 24 
December 1800, finding the approach unbefitting of the Royalist cause.  He insisted that the 
most appropriate project involved a face-to-face ambush against the First Consul in Paris.  
Attacking him elsewhere would be fruitless because the Royalists would then have to fight their 
way to the capital.  If they could defeat the First Consul within the city itself, their subsequent 
actions would be much easier to accomplish.  Cadoudal and Pichegru devised a plan in which the 
chouan leader would lead 100 men in an ambush of Napoleon and his guards as they traveled 
between Malmaison and Paris.  Such an approach, Cadoudal believed, “would not be considered 
assassination, but a battle,” where fate would decide what kind of government France 
deserved.299  Once the Royalists emerged victorious, Pichegru would receive temporary political 
power while Louis, Count of Provence, the brother of Louis XVI and current heir to the throne, 
made his way to the capital.  Cadoudal would continue to lead his band of fighters.  The 
Bourbons behind the plot wanted a third participant to convince the military to fight for their 
cause.  They needed someone whose name and reputation could compete with those of 
Napoleon. 
Jean-Victor-Marie Moreau enjoyed a level of “celebrity which few officers, even in 
advanced life, have the good fortune to attain.”300  He had experienced, like many military and 
political officials, some stumbling blocks during his career, but he had always managed to 
overcome them.  Several of his personal connections had caused suspicions of his loyalty to the 
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Republic.  He had, after all, served under both Dumouriez and Pichegru, two known traitors.  
The delay of nearly five months between his finding physical evidence of Pichegru’s duplicity in 
April 1797 and his relating it to the Directory in September had so taxed the government’s belief 
in his devotion that he was asked to resign his command.  He had done so, but rejoined the 
military the following September.  He served loyally even as he was growing disillusioned with 
the Directory’s leadership.   
 In summer 1799, abbé Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, the most prominent executive member 
of the Directory, sought an audience with Moreau.  The Director worried over the political 
situation in France, explaining that he feared the Revolution was lost “if a more energetic 
government was not devised.”301  When Moreau agreed, Sieyès informed him of his plans for 
constructing a new Republican regime, the Consulate.  However intrigued by the possibility, 
Moreau would not commit to participating in the plot.  Ultimately, he concluded that it was not 
his station in life to play a political role in his nation’s history, that his place was among the 
soldiers.  Sieyès had another candidate in mind, and when Napoleon returned from the Egyptian 
campaign in October 1799, he approached him about spearheading the creation of the Consular 
regime.  Hungry for power and prestige—more so than Sieyès had expected or desired—
Bonaparte agreed, forever surpassing Moreau in the annals of French history. 
 Moreau almost immediately regretted his decision not to act alongside Sieyès.  He had 
always envied Napoleon’s reputation, and the recent addition of political champion to his rival’s 
repertoire did nothing to soothe his jealousy.  Moreau believed the First Consul lacked the 
character to lead the nation down its proper political path.  He considered himself “the 
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accomplished general, the modest and virtuous citizen, whereas Bonaparte was the impulsive and 
lucky usurper without aptitude.”302 
 Lucky may be an appropriate characterization of Napoleon in general terms, but not when 
it originates from Moreau.  Napoleon was lucky that Sieyès considered him for the plot of 18 
Brumaire, but the opportunity presented itself to him only after Moreau declined it.  To suggest 
that luck was on the First Consul’s side on the battlefield implies that he was the only 
Revolutionary general to accomplish impressive victories.  It also does not take into 
consideration his attempt at increasing the already formidable military reputation of Moreau.  He 
offered the general a daring plan of action in summer 1800, the success of which would surely 
boost the reputation of its commander.  Again, Moreau chose not to take advantage of an 
opportunity presented to him.  According to one of his friends, his was a “slow and cautious 
genius” that prevented him from undertaking bold actions upon which the First Consul 
thrived.303  As such, his reputation was respected but lacked the flair of Napoleon’s.  Arguably, 
Moreau’s victory at the Battle of Hohenlinden in December 1800 was just as responsible, if not 
more so, than the First Consul’s victory at Marengo in June for ending the War of the Second 
Coalition.  That historical sources discuss Marengo more than Hohenlinden is not a sign of 
Napoleon’s luck but of his manipulation of the press.  Had he chosen to accept a more active role 
on 18 Brumaire, Moreau would have become master of the press himself, allowing him to record 
events as he saw fit.  Napoleon was not lucky, at least when compared to Moreau.  He simply 
possessed “an unrivaled genius for seeing opportunities where others did not and for seizing 
them unhesitatingly, boldly, calculating the risks and taking them.”304   
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After his victory at Hohenlinden in December 1800, Moreau retired from military service 
and settled into civilian life with his new wife, a woman afflicted by even more jealousy than her 
husband.  Whereas Moreau envied Napoleon because of the opportunities for greatness that he 
missed, Madame Moreau envied the First Consul’s wife, Josephine.  Her family, the Hullots, 
were affluent, but had, over recent years lost the majority of its wealth “on account of the 
difficulties attending a process at law.”305  She resented not having comparable money and 
prestige, which she felt her family deserved every bit as much as the Bonapartes.  Although he 
recognized jealousy in both people, Napoleon concluded it was Madame Moreau’s that resulted 
in her husband’s downfall:  “If he had made a different marriage, he would have been marshal, 
duke, would have made campaigns with the Grande Armée, would have acquired a new 
glory.”306 
 The Moreau residence became a hotbed of anti-Bonapartism.  Citizens who mourned the 
centralized nature of the Consular government and who worried over Napoleon’s ambition 
visited frequently.  The disgruntled couple also called upon the homes of other disillusioned 
subjects.  In each residence, discussions often took place about the possibility of overthrowing 
the government, though they included no specific details such as participants or plans of action.  
During one such conversation, a friend suggested to Moreau that he should spearhead a 
movement against the government and that, because of his reputation throughout France, he 
would likely succeed.  While he agreed that Napoleon was harmful to the nation, Moreau 
declined to take action against him:  “He said that he felt the danger to liberty, but dreaded civil 
war; that he was ready if wanted—his friends would always find him ready; they might act, he 
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would not stand back, but he thought this was premature; he even could not agree that he was so 
important a man.”307  Yet again, Moreau found himself with the opportunity to enhance his 
prestige and to take the reins of France’s political future.  And yet again, he proved unwilling to 
accept the risks that inevitably accompany any chance at greatness. 
 Whereas the opportunity presented to Moreau in the conversation at his friend’s home 
was hypothetical, the one Pichegru and Cadoudal were busy concocting was not.  Aware of 
Moreau’s disillusionment with the Consular regime and with Napoleon personally, Pichegru 
decided to explore the possibility of his participating in a plot to overthrow the government.  In 
late June 1803, he sent Frédéric Lajolais to inquire about it.308  Moreau initially declined to 
converse with the man, whom he had implicated, along with Pichegru, in treasonous activities in 
September 1797.  He had singled the officer out by name in his denunciation to Director 
Barthélemy:  “I suspect that the Lajolais family is part of this intrigue.”309  Only after the agent 
arrived with a letter from Pichegru himself did any discussion begin in earnest.  Moreau spoke 
cautiously to his guest but also “with tenderness [toward] General Pichegru, whose great talents 
and energetic virtues he admired, and whose lamentable end he incessantly deplored.”310  
Excited by the positive tone toward Pichegru, Lajolais reported to him that Moreau “was very 
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resolved in his favor, for his particular interests.”311  Over the previous years, he had grown 
“discontent with the government of the First Consul, [and] desired and wanted, with all his 
power, to overthrow it.”312  Upon learning of Moreau’s willingness to participate in the plot, the 
Count of Artois, brother of the heir to the French throne, believed Royalist success was a 
foregone conclusion. 
Not everything went as planned.  Cadoudal’s efforts to gather the hundred-man force that 
would attack Napoleon as he traveled between Malmaison and Paris, for example, fell pitifully 
short of his goal.  He managed to collect only thirty men.  The group continued their preparations 
despite the lackluster turnout, and Lajolais informed the dissidents in London that the time was 
ripe for action.  He reported that Frenchmen had tired of Napoleon’s voracious appetite for 
military glory and wanted to see him removed from power.  He explained that bands of Royalists 
gathered frequently and openly in the capital city, plotting against the Consular government.  
Optimistic about the chance of success, Cadoudal and seven others arranged to head to France in 
August 1803.313 
 Cadoudal and his travel companions did not enjoy a smooth journey to France.  The 
hotheadedness that Cadoudal had hoped the chouans could overcome showed itself in Hastings, 
where three of the conspirators quarreled with an Englishman and found themselves placed 
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under arrest.314  When their leader arrived, he spoke with police officers and earned for his 
cohorts their freedom.  Another misfortune, this time Cadoudal’s, delayed the group yet again.  
On the morning they intended to leave, he awoke with an agonizing toothache.  Although he 
feared having a tooth pulled, he insisted on seeing a dentist, who arrived and removed the tooth 
on the first attempt.  Cadoudal was so pleased with his services that he “wanted to pay him 
royally.”315  The sum proposed by the chouan leader was five times what his companions 
considered appropriate.  With the dentist’s services rewarded—though not as handsomely as 
Cadoudal had wanted—the group of eight finally left England and sailed for Biville on the 
English cutter Vencego, captained by John Wesley Wright.  A second group of men, seven in 
number, traveled from England to France, landing on 10 December 1803.316  Lajolais traveled 
often between Paris and London, assuring his cohorts that everything was going according to 
plan:  “the time and the circumstances were favorable . . . we must not waste time.”317  In early 
January 1804, Pichegru himself sailed, with Lajolais and four others, to France.318 
 Over the months prior to Pichegru’s voyage to France, he had sent secret letters to 
Moreau “relating to the possibility of a plot for the overthrow of Bonaparte, and the restoration 
of the Bourbons, and the chances of its success.”319  Pichegru’s proposal designated three people, 
including himself, as leaders.  Cadoudal was in charge of the physical attack against Napoleon in 
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the outskirts of Paris.  After the First Consul’s removal, Pichegru would meet with politicians in 
the capital to convince them that France’s best hope for long-term peace and prosperity was 
under Bourbon leadership.  With the First Consul nullified and the politicians considering the 
benefits of monarchical government, Moreau was to announce the restoration to the military and 
then lead a portion of them to Paris to maintain order while the Count of Provence reclaimed his 
throne.  Moreau had never responded, finding “all of it so ridiculous” that the correspondence 
did not warrant consideration or an answer.320   
 If the Royalists believed that all they needed to achieve their goal was the death of 
Napoleon, a disgraced politician, and a former general, they were hopelessly naïve.  Napoleon 
was the First Consul and held the majority of power in his hands, but there were, at least 
technically, two other Consuls who would continue to rule in the case of his death.  At best, his 
death would result in a period of political instability and competition among those who hoped to 
replace him.  The destruction of the entire Consular regime upon Napoleon’s demise was 
unlikely.  Pichegru stood no chance of convincing the politicians that France’s best hope for 
peace and prosperity was a return to Bourbon control.  His status as an outlaw, not only for his 
treasonous rapports and activities but for his escape from captivity, guaranteed that officials were 
more likely to arrest him on the spot than they were to be a captive audience for his political 
entreaties.  As for Moreau, his chances of transforming the Republican-minded military into a 
monarchical defender were remote.  He had not commanded troops personally for several years.  
His reputation remained respectable and solid, but it had as its foundation his devotion to the 
Republic.  Despite the irrationality of their thinking, the Royalists had convinced themselves that 
the time was right to act against Napoleon, and they had placed all their hopes in Moreau. 
                                                 





 As soon as Pichegru and Moreau met in person, the Royalists’ hopes were dashed.  
Despite Lajolais’ reports to the contrary, Moreau still found the prospect of a Bourbon 
restoration ludicrous.  He did not, however, oppose the replacement of the Consular government.  
The new regime, whatever its form, would need to have the people’s support.  Arbitrarily 
returning to monarchical governance without the consent of the nation was unacceptable.  
Moreau offered a counter plan:  Cadoudal should act against the First Consul as planned, but 
afterwards, Moreau would place himself “at the head of the government, under the title of 
dictator.”321  Having passed on the opportunity to rule via the events of 18 Brumaire, he was 
determined not to miss another chance.  Moreau proposed to inform the Senate of Napoleon’s 
death.  He believed that he had strong support among its members.  “I will be given authority,” 
he explained to Pichegru, “[and] I will use it to ensure your safety [that of the Royalists], and we 
will see then what opinion dictates.”322 
 For the conspirators, the unexpected rejection of their plan, which they believed everyone 
had already accepted, resulted in “dissention and the almost total loss of the royalist party.”323  
Moreau’s sudden expression of personal ambition disgusted Cadoudal, who wanted no part in 
any plot that did not return the Bourbons to power.  “Usurper for usurper,” he exclaimed to 
Pichegru, “I prefer Bonaparte to this Moreau!  This one who has neither heart nor brain!”324  
Without the general and, therefore, the French military on their side, the conspirators were not 
willing to take further action.  A fourth group of supporters from England, including a person of 
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great importance,” cancelled their crossing upon learning of Moreau’s betrayal.325  The men who 
had come to France on the three previous voyages, however, now found themselves without an 
escape plan.   
 Since January 1801, when a suspect first mentioned Cadoudal, whose “very presence in 
Paris is proof of a conspiracy,” according to officials, Napoleon had ordered the gates of Paris 
closed and had all comings and goings closely monitored.326  Within the first two weeks of 
February 1804, the police arrested at least seventeen of the conspirators, including three key 
figures:  Picot, Bouvet de Lozier, and Lajolais.  The testimony of these men thoroughly 
implicated Moreau, whose respected friends in the government and military insisted was not a 
conspirator.  Picot portrayed Moreau as a key participant, but one whose involvement had caused 
controversy from the outset.  It was not, according to the defendant’s testimony, Cadoudal or 
even Pichegru who had thought of including Moreau in the plot.  Instead, it was the royal 
brothers themselves who insisted that the group bring the general into the fold.  His participation 
would, they believed, ensure the participation of the French military at large.  According to 
Picot, “the chiefs frequently repeated, in front of him, that they were angry that the princes had 
brought Moreau into the affair.”327  The general’s sudden rejection of the Royalists and their plot 
surely angered them even more. 
 Lajolais’ testimony proved the communications and face-to-face meetings between 
Moreau and Pichegru.  According to him, however, the interactions were not conspiratorial.  
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Pichegru simply wanted to learn whether Moreau would support his return to France.  Moreau 
favored his friend’s homecoming and promised not to act against his efforts to gain reentry.  
Given Pichegru’s criminal status, reuniting the friends required clandestine means.  His presence 
in Paris—or in France in general—was illegal, which no one disputed.  But it did not, Lajolais 
claimed, equate to a conspiracy against the government.  His co-defendants testified almost 
unanimously against the innocence of the interactions.  It was Lajolais, one declared, who “had 
said in England that Moreau was prepared to serve the princes.”328  There is a significant 
difference between reporting that Moreau approved of Pichegru’s return to France and reporting 
that he would support and assist with the restoration of Bourbon leadership.  If the defendants 
knew that Pichegru was planning a conspiracy, they could have assumed that Lajolais’ message 
of Moreau’s friendship was a sign that he shared their Royalist ideology.  The assumption is 
tenuous, at best. 
 The confessions of Bouvet de Lozier was the most condemning of Moreau.   The 
Bourbons had known that they needed the support of the French military if they hoped to regain 
control of the nation.  Believing they had found a strong proponent in Moreau, they launched 
into action.  The general’s sudden change of opinion resulted in complete disaster for the men 
involved and for the cause as a whole.329  Disgusted with his situation and depressed over the 
Royalists’ failed efforts, Bouvet de Lozier had attempted to kill himself in his cell at the Temple 
prison.  Unfortunately for him, a guard found him on the brink of death and saved his life.  While 
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“surrounded by doctors, still purple, his traits altered by the strangulation,” he began spouting 
vehement assertions against Moreau.330  He exclaimed, in a fit of rage:  “We have been betrayed 
. . . .  How many brave men will die because of this traitor Moreau who double-crossed us!  He 
told us that the army was his; he had Pichegru and so many of our other best men come from 
London, and, once arrived, he abandons us and we will die his victims.”331  The furious tirade of 
a man who had just attempted to kill himself might not be entirely convincing.  Even during his 
official and orderly depositions, however, Bouvet de Lozier maintained his stance that Moreau 
had been one of the chief conspirators and that it was his betrayal that condemned everyone else. 
 Moreau was popular among the French public as well as among the French military.  His 
previous service to the nation and his solid reputation necessitated caution and conclusive proof 
of his involvement before police could take action against him.  When an officer proposed to 
Napoleon that Bouvet de Lozier’s testimony was sufficient for Moreau’s arrest, the First Consul 
disagreed.  He wanted more evidence.  “Prove to me,” Napoleon answered, “that Pichegru is 
here and I will sign the arrest warrant for Moreau.”332  Minister of Justice Claude Ambroise 
Régnier ordered the interrogation of Pichegru’s brother, a former monk, at his home.  Not 
wanting to get himself caught in any legal trouble, he immediately confessed to police that he 
had, in fact, “seen his brother three times over the last ten days and that he had criticized him for 
coming and for exposing himself to an ignominious death, like a criminal.”333  Napoleon ordered 
Moreau’s arrest. 
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 On 17 February 1804, Moreau was making his way back to Paris from his estate at 
Grosbois when his driver suddenly stopped about halfway through the trip.  Moreau alighted 
from the carriage to find a police colonel with orders to arrest him and to take him to the Temple 
prison in Paris.  Bursting out laughing, Moreau agreed to follow him back to the capital.  Once 
he arrived, he demanded to see the arrest warrant for himself.  His mood immediately changed:  
“as soon as he read the names of Georges and Pichegru, he turned pale and seemed confused, 
whereas he had previously seemed relaxed.”334   
 During Moreau’s first interrogation, which took place on the night of his arrest, he denied 
ever having any personal or direct relationship with Cadoudal, explaining that he knew him by 
reputation only.  Moreau stated that he had not communicated with Pichegru since the events of 
18 Fructidor.  He had, however, recently spoken with Lajolais, a former officer of his, on several 
occasions, who had visited Moreau at his home “to ask for letters of recommendation in order to 
be employed.”335  In a second interrogation, Moreau admitted that a former secretary of his had 
asked him, in only the most general terms, about his thoughts on overthrowing the Consular 
government in favor of a Bourbon restoration.  Moreau replied that such a plan “would be of the 
utmost folly.”336   
After a month and a half in prison, Moreau realized that his co-conspirators had shared 
specific details and had implicated them all.  On 30 March, he learned of the testimonies of 
Henri-Odille-Pierre-Jean Roland, whom officers had arrested on 14 February.  Understanding 
that his fellow suspects were not maintaining their silence, Moreau had no choice but to reveal 
the truth about his interactions with them.  He admitted to the truthfulness of Roland’s 
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deposition.  He explained that Roland had told him that Pichegru was in Paris and that he wanted 
to meet.  Skeptical about the intentions behind the meeting, Moreau sent his secretary to speak 
with Pichegru.  Before he could return, however, Pichegru arrived unannounced and unexpected 
at Moreau’s residence.  The two spoke for a while about their personal lives before Pichegru 
suggested to Moreau the idea of replacing the Consular regime with the Bourbon monarchy.  
Moreau retorted that the monarchy had no friends in France and “that the government was so 
consolidated that wanting to attack it was the utmost folly.”337  His rejection of the proposal 
ended the meeting.  On the following day, Roland returned to Moreau’s home, upset that he had 
not agreed to support the Royalists.  Angrily, Roland asked whether he had his own “ambitions 
of authority.”338  Moreau answered that such aspirations “would be yet another folly.”339  It was a 
folly that Moreau expounded upon:  “in order for me to have such aspirations, it would be 
necessary to eradicate the Bonaparte family, the Consulate, the governor of Paris, the Consuls’ 
guard, etc.”340 
 Arrested on 27 February and transported to the Temple prison, Pichegru insisted 
throughout his interrogations on his innocence in and ignorance of any plot against Napoleon or 
his government.  During his first interview, he denied knowing or interacting with any of his 
supposed associates in London or Paris.  He admitted to knowing Lajolais, but explained that he 
had not seen him in two years.  When officials brought Bouvet de Lozier and Picot into the 
interrogation room to confront Pichegru, both men identified him by name and without 
hesitation.  For his part, however, Pichegru denied knowing them.341  When Prefect of Police 
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Louis-Nicolas-Pierre-Joseph Dubois asked him why he had come back to France, the suspect’s 
answer was simple:  “Because I am tired of being in a foreign country.”342 
 While Moreau and Pichegru disavowed any knowledge of a conspiracy, Georges 
Cadoudal reveled in it.  On 9 March, police arrested him, but only after he fatally shot one 
officer and seriously wounded another.  Pichegru proclaimed that he had returned to France as if 
from boredom; Cadoudal proudly announced his treacherous intentions.  When asked what 
brought him to Paris, he answered:  “I came to attack the First Consul.”343  Attempting to take 
full responsibility for the scheme, he told police that he was the only person actually involved at 
the time.  He specifically denied knowing of Pichegru’s involvement and claimed never to have 
seen or known Moreau.344  The force he needed to attack Napoleon, he believed, would come 
from “all of France” when the time came.345  Although he admitted to planning an attack on the 
First Consul, Cadoudal made it clear that he did not intend to cause the death of Napoleon.  He 
had once explained to a fellow conspirator that he was looking forward to being responsible for 
the First Consul’s captivity:  “The First Consul had me put in the tower of the Temple; if I can 
abduct him, I will have him put in the Tower of London.”346 
 Several other defendants agreed that they had not planned to murder Napoleon.  Two of 
the conspirators told police that the group planned to abduct the First Consul and then to deliver 
him to England.347  An account of Cadoudal’s life, written by his nephew, brings Prime Minister 
William Pitt the Younger into the discussion.  Pitt hoped the conspirators could “avoid at all 
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costs mortally wounding Bonaparte.”348  He wanted the First Consul delivered to England, from 
where the English government would imprison or exile him.349 
 The conspirators had differing understandings of the scheme.  During the testimonies, the 
defendants divided almost equally over the issue of whether the First Consul’s death was their 
goal.  One explained that the best hope for restoring the Bourbons to power “was to destroy the 
little Corporal.”350  According to Lajolais’ testimony, it was not only the First Consul who would 
lose his life if the conspiracy succeeded.  He recounted for police a conversation he had with 
Cadoudal in which the chouan leader described his desire “to kill all those who showed 
opposition” to the Royalists.351  The idea that Cadoudal was willing to kill anyone who opposed 
his progress but was not willing to murder Napoleon is curious.  The most likely explanation is 
that he was willing to do whatever he deemed necessary to achieve a Bourbon restoration, 
regardless of the death count.  Picot supported the argument that the conspirators would do what 
the moment necessitated, explaining to police that they “wanted to abduct Napoleon . . . or to 
assassinate him.”352 
 Even more disconcerting for Napoleon than the plot itself was the admission of multiple 
conspirators that “a prince of royal blood” was on his way to France to head the Bourbon 
restoration.353  Having first learned of the unnamed prince’s involvement in January 1801, the 
First Consul immediately ordered police to investigate who this dangerous guest might be.  
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Depositions by the conspirators in February and March did not shed much light on the subject.  
Cadoudal explained the obvious when he expressed his desire to see the restoration of “Charles-
Xavier Stanislas, formerly Monsieur, recognized by us as Louis XVIII.”354  It was not this 
prince, however, that would lead the attack on Napoleon.  Only after the Royalists calmed the 
military situation would Louis XVIII return to his country.  In his next response, Cadoudal 
mentioned another prince, without naming him specifically, who would assist with the 
conspiracy from Paris. 
 Napoleon’s police began gathering information about the whereabouts and activities of 
the Bourbon heirs.  The process revealed that the most likely candidate to participate in 
Cadoudal’s plot was Louis-Antoine-Henri de Bourbon, the Duke d’Enghien.  He lived at 
Ettenheim in Baden, from where he could easily travel into France.  In their effort to tamp down 
Royalist efforts at regaining political power, the Revolutionary governments had passed laws 
decreeing that any émigré “who had taken up arms against France would be arrested, whether in 
France, in an enemy or conquered country, [and] would be judged within twenty-four hours.”355  
Despite the laws, the Duke d’Enghien had traveled frequently to Strasbourg to watch theatre 
performances.  Anne-Jean-Marie-René Savary, who was in charge of Napoleon’s personal 
guards, argued in favor of Enghien’s involvement with Cadoudal:  “if he exposed himself to such 
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danger for a gratification of that kind, he would not be deterred by perils when a higher interest 
was at stake.”356 
 Concerned by the Duke d’Enghien’s daring nature and his close proximity to France, 
Napoleon ordered an officer to travel to Ettenheim to investigate the royal.  Having heard 
conversations about his target being the prime suspect, the officer wanted to satisfy the 
government with his reports.  He learned that Enghien was an avid hunter who often disappeared 
for days at a time on expeditions.  He also verified Enghien’s travels to Strasbourg, where his 
mistress lived.  Residents of Ettenheim described to the officer the relatively quiet life enjoyed 
by the Duke.  He often hosted dinner parties for his friends, many of whom were émigrés like 
himself.  The Duke received money from England on a monthly basis, but only enough to cover 
living expenses.  Nothing that the officer learned pointed to conspiratorial activities.  Not 
wanting to disappoint, however, he reported to his superiors “that the Duke d’Enghien led a 
mysterious life; that he was frequently visited by emigrants; that he supported them; and that he 
was frequently absent eight, ten, or twelve days, without anyone knowing whither he went.”357  
The officer believed he had another, more dangerous, discovery to share.  Among the émigrés 
who frequented Enghien’s home was General Dumouriez.  This bit of information was also 
incorrect, but through no intentional misrepresentation by the officer.  He had simply 
misunderstood the Germans he spoke with when they referred to the Marquis of Thumery.358 
 With the alarming information in mind, Napoleon ordered the arrest of the Duke 
d’Enghien.  According to Enghien, “approximately two hundred men total” violated the 
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sovereign state of Baden and arrived at his residence to place him under arrest on 15 March.359  
Within the week, he arrived at the château of Vincennes on the outskirts of Paris. It was here that 
a military commission had assembled to judge his crimes.  They announced to the Duke that the 
Consular government “suspected him of having taken up arms against the republic; of having 
been and of still being in the pay of England; of being part of the conspiracies hatched by 
England against the interior and exterior security of the republic.”360  The tribunal questioned 
him about his relationship with various conspirators back in Paris.  He explained that he had 
never met Pichegru, though he “knows that he wanted to see me.”361  He denied having any 
rapport with General Dumouriez whatsoever.  He admitted to receiving money England, but 
described it as a stipend for daily expenses, not as payment for any kind of services rendered.  
The military commission also questioned him about his interaction with fellow Bourbons.  He 
acknowledged being in communication with his relatives, which he considered a common 
practice for anyone.   
The line of questioning then turned to the conspiracy itself.  Enghien denied knowing 
about any kind of plot.  The Royalists were not scheming, he contended, and “if it were true, his 
father and grandfather would have made him acquainted with it.”362  During the testimony, 
General Pierre-Augustin Hulin felt that the Duke was not taking the trial seriously.  He found his 
answers flippant and condescending, when the defendant bothered to respond at all.  He implored 
him to reconsider his approach given the seriousness of the allegations.  Enghien replied to 
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Hulin’s appeal and to the final question concerning his orders from England.  In so doing, he 
concluded the trial:  “I perfectly comprehend you; it was not my intention to remain indifferent 
to them:  I had applied to England for an appointment in her armies; and she had returned for 
answer that she had none to give me, but that I was to remain upon the Rhine, where I should 
soon have a part to act, and for that I was waiting.”363 
Enghien’s testimony about waiting for word from England before launching into action 
did not settle the judges’ minds.  He did not seem aware of a specific conspiracy underway but 
was clearly expecting one at some point.  His willingness to accept instructions from a foreign 
nation and to bear arms against his country sealed his fate.  The seven members of the military 
commission deliberated for no more than two hours.  They voted unanimously that he was guilty 
on all charges and sentenced him to death.  When told to kneel for the firing squad only a few 
hours after receiving his verdict, Enghien retorted, “a Bourbon . . . does not bend the knee except 
before God.”364 
 Debates have taken place since the execution over the motivations behind it.  One of 
Napoleon’s former private secretaries, Louis Antoine Fauvelet de Bourrienne, recorded in his 
memoirs that the First Consul believed the death of Enghien was “indispensable to his accession 
to the crown of France.”365  Bourrienne did not believe that Enghien was part of Cadoudal’s 
conspiracy or that he had done anything illegal otherwise.366  He described a scenario in which 
an unnamed person had previously attempted to convince Enghien to participate in a plot to 
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assassinate Napoleon.  Despite his support of his relatives’ claim to the throne, Enghien had 
declined the murderous opportunity.  With no more detail—a date, a name—the claim is not 
entirely convincing.  The secretary argued that Napoleon trumped up the treasonous charges in 
order “to strike a blow which would terrify his enemies.”367  He also claimed that the execution 
was the First Consul’s method for upholding his part of a bargain he made with the Jacobins.  In 
order to gain their support for his ascension to the throne, “Bonaparte consented to sacrifice a 
victim of the blood royal.”368  That Napoleon would broker such a deal with the Jacobins—or 
with anyone—is unlikely.  He had only recently exiled dozens of the Republicans after the 
explosion on the rue Saint Nicaise in December 1800.  He also understood that there was a 
chance for the royal families of Europe to react violently to Enghien’s execution.  Napoleon 
would not lightly risk making additional enemies or inciting neutralized ones to renewed 
hostilities if it was not necessary. 
 Other contemporaries disagreed with Bourrienne’s conclusions concerning Napoleon’s 
motivations.  Laure Junot, Duchess of Abrantès, contended that Enghien’s death was not 
necessary for the First Consul to transition the government to its imperial form:  “the Imperial 
crown, placed by the unanimous wish of France on the head of Napoleon, would have been no 
less solid and legitimate . . . had the Duc d’Enghien never stirred from Ettenheim.”369  Savary 
also argued against Bourrienne’s conclusions concerning Napoleon’s motivations.  Enghien’s 
execution resulted not from the First Consul’s selfish ambition but from misinformation and 
overly zealous officials.  According to the head of the Consular Guard, no one was to act against 
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Enghien after his capture until Counselor of State Pierre-François Réal interrogated him.  The 
plan was to confront him with two of the conspirators from Paris.  Only after they identified him 
would he face trial.370  News that the trial and execution had already taken place surprised Réal, 
who had the unfortunate task of reporting it to Napoleon.  When the First Consul learned what 
had taken place, he “became thoughtful and . . . expressed by an exclamation of sorrow the regret 
which he felt at having consented to the seizure of the Duke d’Enghien.”371  According to 
historian Frank McLynn, the First Consul “was singularly ill-served on this occasion by all his 
henchmen.”372  There was no mention of Enghien during any of the proceedings concerning 
Cadoudal or his cohorts.  Napoleon would have had no reason to arrest him if the officer who 
traveled to Ettenheim had returned with an accurate report.   
 Among Frenchmen at the time, news of Enghien’s death produced little effect.  They 
viewed it as the necessary and appropriate fate of someone who dared conspire against the First 
Consul.  Savary reported that Parisians believed the Duke “had made himself the chief of the 
corps of emigrants, and that all of the conspiracies against the life of the First Consul had been 
hatched for his sole benefit.”373  The royal families across Europe had a more raucous reaction to 
Enghien’s execution, though none took serious action against Napoleon or his regime.  Russian 
Czar Alexander I had the most profound reaction.  He responded by “breaking off all diplomatic 
relations with France, ordering the Russian court into official mourning, sending a strong note of 
protest to Paris, and abruptly demanding that French troops be withdrawn from Hanover and 
Neapolitan ports.”374  Other rulers wrote letters to the First Consul denouncing the execution, but 
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nothing more came of it.  All in all, Enghien’s execution had only positive consequences for 
Napoleon.  It did not damage his reputation among his citizens, and it effectively ended the threat 
of Royalist conspiracies for the remainder of his rule. 
 There was someone whom the execution of Enghien gravely effected:  Pichegru.  On the 
morning of 6 April 1804, guards at the Temple prison reported to Counselor of State Réal and 
Consular Guard Savary that they had found Pichegru dead in his cell.  Upon arriving, the two 
superior officers discovered the prisoner strangled by “a black silk handkerchief and the bar from 
a chair which tightened the cloth.”375  The police and medical officers concluded that the 
prisoner had committed suicide.  According to some accounts, Pichegru was “the most unhappy 
and the most pitiable of the accused; he had not a single supporter in France.”376  He faced the 
same charges as his fellow defendants but also had to cope with the memories of his previous 
treasons and his banishment from France.  Some sources have concluded that his depression, 
coupled with the news of Enghien’s execution, pushed him beyond his breaking point.377   
 Some contemporaries argued at the time that Pichegru had not, in fact, committed suicide 
but that Napoleon had ordered his murder.  Bourrienne contended that Napoleon had his police 
officials harass Pichegru during his internment at the Temple.  He claimed that the prisoner 
endured ten interrogations, many more than his fellow conspirators.  Réal, who was present at 
each of the interviews, recalled only four.378  Whatever the number of sessions, Pichegru refused 
to provide any valuable information.  He was careful not to implicate himself or his co-
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defendants in any illegal undertakings.  He did, however, imply that he would happily reveal all 
once the actual trial was underway.  Bourrienne postulated that Napoleon feared the information 
Pichegru might divulge during the proceedings.  He does not speculate on what the information 
might have been but argued that the First Consul did not want it made public.  Bourrienne did 
not argue his case convincingly enough.  If Napoleon had wanted Pichegru murdered, he could 
have had it done during his arrest, which would have appeared less suspicious.  Likewise, given 
Pichegru’s previous treason against the French government, it is unlikely that the judges would 
have believed any allegations he levied against the First Consul.  Regardless of his participation 
in the current conspiracy, his previous actions in 1797 rendered his reputation and his word 
worthless.  If Pichegru did not simply commit suicide—which is, in fact, the most likely 
explanation—the most probable murderer was one of his co-defendants.  If, as Bourrienne 
contended, all of Pichegru’s “declarations . . . gave reason to believe that he would speak out, 
and that too in a lofty and energetic manner during the progress of the trial,” his associates might 
have wanted to silence him.379  There is no evidence to support that the suspect’s death was 
anything more than a suicide. 
Pichegru did not live to experience the trial.  The forty-five people other suspects arrested 
on charges of conspiracy against the state and against the life of Napoleon did.  During the trial, 
each of the witnesses continued recounting the information they had given during their previous 
depositions.  No new revelations came from the latest testimonies.  With everyone naming names 
and pointing fingers, evidence of guilt was rampant.  They had not managed to take any action 
against the First Consul but they had concocted a loose plan for doing so.  In terms of the law, 
plotting an assassination carried the same weight as executing it.  On 10 June 1804, the judges 
                                                 





ultimately found twenty of the conspirators, including Cadoudal, guilty on all counts and 
sentenced them to death.380  The court found five others guilty but contended that they did not 
play as large as role in the plot.  Their lesser roles, coupled with services previously rendered to 
the State, earned them more lenient sentences.  The court sentenced these five men, including 
Moreau, to two years in prison.381  The remaining twenty-one suspects found themselves 
acquitted of all charges concerning conspiracy.382  Five of them did not earn their immediate 
freedom, however, as they had housed some of the conspirators without declaring it to police, as 
required by law.383 
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On the morning of 25 June 1804, as the twenty condemned men prepared to travel to the 
Place de Grêve to face the firing squad, Napoleon intervened on behalf of eight of the prisoners.  
In his letter, the Emperor wrote that he favored leniency for some of the criminals and 
transmuted their death penalties to deportation.  Bouvet de Lozier received clemency because of 
the detailed nature of his testimony.  Some contemporaries implied that it was his willingness to 
denounce Moreau that earned him a lighter punishment.384  In his memoirs, Bourrienne argued 
that Lajolais had made a deal with authorities prior to the trial in order to avoid the death 
penalty.385  Petitions from relatives, politicians and military officials spared the lives of the other 
six men.  The firing squad executed the remaining twelve conspirators at 11:00 a.m. 
Between the time of the conspirators’ arrest and their execution, Napoleon had taken 
advantage of the situation their plot provided and had ascended the throne of France as Emperor 
of the French.  In May 1804, likely at his own prompting, the Senate had proposed that he take 
the imperial title.  Napoleon accepted, with the justification that such an action would “shelter 
the French people from the plots of our enemies and the unrest that would arise from rival 
ambitions.”386  The thinking was sound, but it implies that the Consular regime would crumble 
automatically upon the First Consul’s death.  The immediate destruction of a Republican 
government upon the death of its leader might have been unlikely, though given the chaos of the 
Revolution and its numerous regimes, the paranoia of Frenchmen concerning such a matter is 
forgivable.  The Senate ratified the political promotion in the same month, and Napoleon began 
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actively using his new title.  Upon hearing of the nation’s new regime, Cadoudal is said to have 
lamented:  “We have done more than we hoped to do; we meant to give France a King, and we 
have given her an Emperor.”387 
Before the nation received the opportunity to vote on the creation of the French Empire, 
pamphlets ensured everyone was of the same opinion.  They explained that the Revolution had 
not overthrown the Bourbon monarchy because the institution was undesirable but because the 
dynasty was no longer worthy of leading.  The argument was, therefore, that reinstituting a 
monarchy under Bonaparte’s leadership was preferable to the uncertainty of representative 
government.  The Emperor did not intend to remove the citizens’ voices from government 
completely, and thus a plebiscite took place on 6 November 1804.  The results followed suit with 
what the government expected.  The nation approved of the transition to the French Empire 
rather than the French Republic overwhelmingly:  3,572,329 to 2,569.388  The new imperial title 
brought Napoleon more prestige and a lengthy—but not permanent—reprieve from 
conspiratorial plots. 
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GENERAL MALET, 1812 
 A Chinese proverb advises to “keep your friends close, but your enemies closer.”  One 
enemy Napoleon never managed to hold close enough was General Claude-François de Malet.  
In 1808, Malet found himself under arrest for having organized an attempt to overthrow the 
imperial government.  Even after this failure, he was not ready to silence his dissatisfaction with 
the regime.  Nevertheless, despite his frequent prison breaks and constant denunciations of both 
Napoleon and his government, few people looked upon Malet as a serious threat.  Opinion would 
change after the night of 22 October 1812.  On this occasion, Malet not only escaped his 
confines but also managed to arrest several key political figures.  The event, simply known as the 
Malet Conspiracy (or the Malet Affair), was the single most successful coup attempted against 
the Napoleonic regime. 
 It is necessary to evaluate various portrayals of General Malet and to discern his true 
character and motive for attempting to overthrow the Empire.  Many secondary sources that 
mention the conspiracy only in a sentence or two, as is generally the case in more recent works, 
do not provide any information or background on who the general was or why he had plotted 
against Napoleon.  Accounts of the conspiracy written during the mid to late nineteenth-century 
typically portray Malet either as an ingenious political dissident or as a madman.  More recent 
accounts opt for an objective view, depicting him as a frustrated anti-Bonapartist, rarely calling 
his mental health into question. 
 As one of the few books that deals exclusively with Malet’s conspiracy, Max Billard’s La 
Conspiration de Malet (1907) is invaluable.  Billard’s narrow focus allows for a more detailed 
account of the events of 22 October 1812 than other authors provide.  For example, in discussing 





describes the building but also gives specific information on its location.  He also paints an 
interestingly eccentric portrait of General Malet, a man he clearly finds psychologically 
disturbed. 
 Émile Marco de Saint-Hilaire depicts the general, instead, as an enterprising political 
dissident set on overthrowing what he considered to be an oppressive regime in order to restore 
the true meaning of the Revolution’s ideals to France.  In the version of Malet’s conspiracy 
provided in his book Histoire des conspirations et attentats contre le gouvernement et la 
personne de Napoléon (1847), Saint-Hilaire argues that the general wanted to rid France of 
Napoleon from the moment he seized power as First Consul.389 
 Specific details can vary, even among those authors who consider Malet an ardent, 
though sane, supporter of Republican-styled government.  In their memoirs, several people 
portray Malet as a man who did not care on whom he stepped in his pursuit to overthrow 
Napoleon.  The depictions of Malet’s alleged accomplices by such authors often exude a sense of 
sympathy, describing them as innocent fools tricked into participating in the plot.  During his 
attempt to overthrow the imperial regime, Malet successfully deceived several high-ranking 
military officials, prompting them to place their troops under his control.  The willingness of the 
common National Guardsman to follow the orders issued by their superiors is not surprising.  
The readiness with which their superiors, even among those Napoleon considered his most 
trustworthy devotees, followed Malet’s orders without question, however, speaks to the fragility 
of the Empire.   
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In Napoleon:  A Biography (1997), Frank McLynn argues that Malet’s conspiracy was 
not a serious threat to the empire.  He seems unfamiliar with the plot as a whole, however, 
arguing that it lacked a clear goal.  He describes the conspirators as a group of men, consisting of 
Republicans and Monarchists alike, who would decide what form the new government should 
take only after removing Napoleon from power.390  Based on the primary source documents, 
however, it is clear that Malet had every intention of creating some sort of Republic with himself 
at its head, at least in the provisional stages. 
 Memoirs of Bonaparte’s supporters who witnessed, unwittingly participated in, or lived 
through Malet’s plot often insinuate that the general suffered from psychological deficiencies.  
This claim is largely unconvincing.  While some of Malet’s actions certainly could indicate a 
degree of instability, they were more likely honest attempts against the Napoleonic government, 
though badly timed, and even more poorly executed, by a passionate Republican.  
 Many historians may deem the 1812 conspiracy insignificant, yet accounts contemporary 
to the events assert otherwise.  Fearing that his Empire was on the verge of collapse, Napoleon 
chose to hasten his return to Paris from Russia after hearing of the events set into motion by 
Malet on 22 October.  Conversations between Napoleon and the officials with him in Russia 
clearly show that the Emperor was deeply distraught over the level of success that the general’s 
plot managed.  Even more disturbing to him was the meekness with which his most trusted 
officials in Paris had “accepted a change of regime, without even giving a thought to the 
existence of the empress or the king of Rome.”391  After the events instigated by Malet, it 
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became clear to Napoleon that running an imperial government required close, personal 
supervision, especially in the homeland of liberté, égalité, and fraternité. 
 
 On 22 October 1812, General Claude-François de Malet’s expressive and determined 
reddish-brown eyes gazed onto the rainy streets of Paris from a window in Dr. Jacquelin 
Dubuisson’s rest home.  Nearly sixty years old, the tall, thin, but well-proportioned man with 
hair powdered in an outdated style appeared to be a charming and pleasant grandfather.  He was, 
in fact, a dangerous political malcontent.  The city was suffering, he believed, under the 
oppressive rule of a tyrant.  Despite numerous plebiscites validating Napoleon Bonaparte’s 
regime, the current state of affairs had not been part of the accepted deal.  The Revolutionary 
qualities that he had pledged to uphold—liberté, égalité, and fraternité—began disappearing as 
soon as he took power.  Some French citizens believed such decline foreshadowed society’s 
return to a system similar to the Bourbon’s ancien régime.  While some expected peace and 
stability to accompany such a restoration, others saw Napoleon’s infringement on their freedoms 
as betrayal.  Among the most disillusioned Frenchmen was General Malet, a man who was no 
stranger to disappointment. 
 His father, Jean de Malet, a minor noble, realized early that his family would never enjoy 
as much wealth as the higher nobility.  Determined to gain recognition and glory instead, he did 
so through military endeavors.  Over the course of his career, he rose steadily through the ranks, 
ultimately becoming regimental captain in the Beauvilliers Cavalry.  At the age of sixty, he led 
his company to garrison in the Franche-Comté at Dôle.  He decided to settle down in the 





woman, Gabrielle Fèvre, as his wife and finally began a family.  Together, they produced two 
sons and a daughter, welcoming their first child, Claude-François, on 28 June 1754. 
 Wanting to pursue a military career like his father, this young man enlisted in the first 
company of the King’s Musketeers on 26 December 1771.  Due in large part to his noble status, 
he quickly gained admission to the Royal Household Troops, the elite though anachronistic 
Musketeers, in which each man immediately received an officer’s ranking.  Made a lieutenant, 
Malet served dutifully for four years until France’s financial difficulties led to the dissolution of 
Louis XVI’s personal entourage on 15 December 1775.  He found himself, now at the age of 21, 
unemployed and forced to return to the modest estate of his parents in Dôle.  Although other 
positions were available to him by virtue of his experience and rank, he had a bitter taste in his 
mouth and little interest in continuing to pursue his military career.  Back home in the Franche-
Comté, Malet found himself swept up in an increasingly raucous vortex of political debate. 
 Most members of the nobility and clergy intended to maintain the monarchy, but they did 
not desire, or approve of, the absolute monarchy established by Louis XIV.  Although both 
groups hoped to regain some of the political and social influence they had lost during and since 
the Sun King’s reign, there had yet to be any serious consideration of instituting a constitution—
such as in England—to limit the king’s power.  The possibility of transitioning to a constitutional 
monarchy remained primarily a topic for discussion among “enlightened” philosophers.  
Rebelling against the monarchical loyalties inculcated in his youth, Malet became more and 
more interested in these proposals for building a liberal society and government—and made no 
effort to hide his preference.  Adolphe Thiers, a historian before becoming one of the most 
influential political figures in France during the nineteenth century, attributes Malet’s political 





of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  Thiers neglected to elaborate on this theory, simply explaining that 
many men of Malet’s time read the philosophe’s works, though few were so clearly affected.392 
 As innovative ideas began to take root in Malet’s mind, he found himself in direct 
opposition to his father and younger brother, Claude-Joseph, who remained fervent Royalists like 
most of the nobles in the Franche-Comté and elsewhere.  Nothing in Malet’s upbringing 
explicitly destined him to be a proponent of liberal political beliefs or, ultimately, of 
Republicanism.393  Perhaps he saw hope in the new proposals, thinking that with such changes in 
place, the country would enjoy more stability, not being subject to the haphazard whims of 
royalty and the privileged classes. 
 Although the next thirteen years brought France increasingly massive debt and 
widespread famine in the countryside and led the unwitting nation toward revolution, Malet 
enjoyed a peaceful and uneventful life at his childhood home, pursuing aimless leisure-time 
activities.  With time, his friends and family came to realize, through Malet’s various schemes, 
that he was a more unusual person than they had imagined.  In addition to his unique political 
views, his romantic decisions also drew criticism.  Denise de Balay, the youngest daughter of 
Baron Charles-Maximilien-Joseph de Balay and Dame Antoinette-Suzanne de Fabri, had grown 
up on her parents’ estate in Arbois, thirty-five miles from Dôle.  During her teenage years, she 
fell in love with her older neighbor, Claude-François, and expressed to her parents the desire to 
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marry him.  They vehemently refused, primarily on political grounds.  Balay, a steadfast 
Monarchist, would never dream of allowing his daughter to marry such a flagrant liberal, 
regardless of his noble status.  Resolute to the point of stubbornness and unconcerned with 
political dispositions, the young girl decided that if her parents could not respect her wishes, she 
would join the nearby Ursuline convent.  Because she was only sixteen years old, her parents 
initially dismissed both requests as spontaneous whims, characteristic of children who do not yet 
know what they want from life.  Ultimately, Denise headed to the convent, seemingly 
determined to disobey her parents’ wishes in one way or another:  either they would grant her 
permission to marry the man she wanted, or she would become a nun.  News of Denise’s 
decision reached Claude-François, who rushed to the nunnery where he found the young girl 
already covered in white veils.  He ran to her side despite the sacrosanct ceremony in progress 
and asked for her hand in marriage.  Having already taken initial vows, she insisted that he wait 
one year while she finished her novitiate training.  As the year passed, Denise’s parents came to 
accept the union, though they remained skeptical.  On 9 January 1788, the seventeen-year-old 
Denise wedded the thirty-three-year old Malet. 
 A year and a half into their marriage, the newlyweds were swept along with the rest of 
the nation down the path of the French Revolution.  In response to the fall of the Bastille on 14 
July 1789 and to more generalized bursts of nationwide violence, groups of men gathered 
together forming militias, known as National Guards, to defend local property and to maintain 
order.  With the creation of this new military came the need for experienced and qualified 
officers.  Owing to his previous experience and rank as lieutenant, Malet soon found himself 
serving as battalion commander of his hometown’s National Guard.  Yet his fervent liberalism 





 News of the royal family’s forced relocation to Paris led many Franche-Comté 
Monarchists to consider Louis XVI and Marie-Antoinette prisoners in their own capital.  
Remaining ardent supporters of the monarchy, the troops under Malet’s leadership wanted to 
march to the city and restore royal authority.  Originally raised during the summer of 1789, the 
kingdom’s National Guards now risked defying their initial purpose of maintaining order.  
Despite his liberal passions, Malet was willing to concede that France might not yet be ready for 
true Republicanism, seeing, in the meantime, a compromise in the conception of a constitutional 
monarchy.394  Reconciling himself to the idea that such a government, especially if led by a weak 
ruler like Louis XVI, could pave the way to a pure Republic, Malet latched onto his troops’ 
demand to journey to Paris.395  An opportune moment for the men to act never presented itself, 
however, and the guardsmen remained in Dôle. 
 Malet’s political ideology continually put him at odds with Royalist sympathizers, 
especially in his private life.  His father went so far as to disown him, thereby hoping to scare his 
son into rejoining the monarchist cause.  Not to be left out of the family endeavors, Malet’s 
younger brother, Claude-Joseph, tried numerous times to buy his allegiance, offering him large 
amounts of money to abandon Republican ideals.  Malet resolutely defended his political 
principles, refusing to sacrifice them for the sake of a more stable financial situation.  He and 
Denise lived on his meager salary during the initial disorderly years of the Revolution.  As he 
began to make a name for himself in the military, however, various opportunities and promotions 
brought more money to the couple, though they never became wealthy by any means.  Malet’s 
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reputation as a brilliant, and even more important, liberal-minded military commander allowed 
him to cultivate numerous relationships among Paris’s Revolutionary elite during his sojourns 
there. 
 Among his comrades were the Lameth brothers, Counts Charles and Alexandre, who, 
having served across the Atlantic for several years during the American Revolution, were eager 
to participate in their own country’s transformation.  Alexandre briefly served as President of the 
National Assembly in fall 1790.  Despite membership in the Jacobin club, Alexandre came to 
believe that this group of radical reformers was moving too far too fast and began seeking to 
reconcile himself with the royal court, a sentiment which continued to intensify over the 
following months.  He lashed out at the Jacobin party, especially Maximilien Robespierre, for its 
platform of inciting violence and insubordination throughout the country.  Charles became 
President of the National Assembly less than a year later, serving briefly during the chaotic time 
immediately following Louis XVI’s failed attempt to flee France on 20 June 1791.  Using his 
power as head of the Assembly, he spoke passionately about the possibility of maintaining the 
constitutional monarchy in France.  Given Louis’ recent attempt to flee, Charles acknowledged 
the difficulties his proposal would entail but insisted that the attempt was necessary for the 
overall good of the nation. 
 Playing on the mutual desire to see a constitution established for France, Malet carefully 
cultivated his relationship with the Lameth brothers, using their military and political 
connections to enhance his own standing.  On 30 June 1791, Alexandre suggested him for a 
position as his aide-de-camp and also for promotion to the rank of captain.  Within a month, 
Malet received the position, though nothing came of the recommendation for captain.  Later, in 





transfer to his command.  Broglie soon led his troops through Strasbourg, where a significant 
Republican society had formed with the blessing of the town’s mayor.  The group drew to it a 
number of well-known political figures, including Malet’s cousin and author of La Marseillaise, 
Claude Joseph Rouget de Lisle.  Malet’s numerous connections within the government and 
military hierarchy may have afforded him some benefits, but they were unable to provide a 
smooth route for his career to follow. 
 Only after a second recommendation for captain by Alexandre de Lameth, accompanied 
by support from Prince de Broglie, did Malet receive his long-sought promotion.  On 25 March 
1792, he saw himself appointed to captain.  The promotion came just in time for Malet to prove 
himself:  France declared war on Austria less than a month later.  Malet constantly sent letters to 
his wife, each increasingly excited about the events underway.  Not a single situation confounded 
him.  He had an answer for every question and a plan for handling every scenario.396  Either he 
never shared his insights with his superiors, or they simply never listened. 
  With his military career advancing, Malet’s fortune seemed to continue into political 
affairs.  Although he had been willing to accept a constitutional monarchy as an educational tool 
on the road toward a Republic, its abolition had always been his ultimate desire.  The official 
declaration of France as a Republic on 21 September 1792, he believed, would end the political 
discord and hostility afflicting the country, but not many were as pleased or as optimistic, 
including several of his personal connections. 
 Refusing to accept the Legislative Assembly’s pronouncement of the nation’s Republican 
status, Victor de Broglie tendered his resignation from the military.  His successor, General 
Alexandre de Beauharnais, provided Malet yet another useful political connection.  The general 
                                                 





was a powerful member of the Jacobin party and was especially active in Strasbourg.  As his 
aide-de-camp, Malet had a firsthand view into this world, strengthening his already fervent 
Republican opinions.  His rapport with the general helped not only to intensify his political 
sentiments but also to further his military career.  After seven months of working under 
Beauharnais, he received two promotions nearly back to back, a welcome change from the 
difficulties he had experienced during his quest to become captain:  elevation to head of brigade 
(major) on 16 March 1793 and then to colonel only two months later.  Despite the prosperous 
and fluid military career that finally seemed to be in the making, Malet’s past would soon come 
to haunt him. 
 A decree issued on 21 September 1793 removed all former members of the Royal 
Household Troops from active duty in France’s military.  Preparing for his trip back to Dôle, he 
received numerous letters lauding his abilities and dedication to the Revolutionary cause.  
Despite the praise as a loyal Republican and capable commander, the Committee of Public 
Safety’s decree swept Malet out of the military for the second time in his career.  Less than five 
months after his return to his hometown, the very people dismissed from the military due to their 
previous service for the monarchy became the ones the government specifically invited to 
reenlist.  Malet did so, reporting to Neustadt on 8 January 1794.  Only five months later, the need 
for troops to face foreign invaders lessened, and the French military found itself with a top-heavy 
hierarchy.  Yet again, Malet’s reputation could not save him from another career interruption.  In 
June 1795, he faced, for a third time, dismissal from the military with only letters of fulsome 
praise to show for his service.  Despite the lack of employment, Malet remained in Paris this 





 On 13 Vendémiaire IV (5 October 1795), right-wing opponents of the upcoming new 
government, the Directory, backed by thousands of National Guardsmen, squared off against the 
regime, intending to ensure that the former Convention members did not establish a chokehold 
on the new governing body.  Quickly massing together a defensive force, the Convention freed 
roughly 1,500 working-class prisoners to serve as protection.  Although he was not actively 
serving in the military, Malet volunteered to help coordinate the defense of the assembly’s 
gathering place.  The unruly and rebellious group approached the palace, outnumbering its 
defenders 25,000 to 6,000.  Despite their strength of numbers, many of the rebels were 
unprepared for battle, expecting little or no resistance from the much smaller force.  Having the 
advantage of tried and true leadership from various volunteer officials, however, the defenders 
quashed the rebellion.397 
 Although delighted to have participated in the defense of the Convention, and thus having 
furthered the Republican cause, Malet had also acted out of purely personal motivations.  He had 
anticipated that the successful suppression of the insurrection on 13 Vendémiaire would allow 
him to gain readmission to the military.  As soon as the event had ended, he approached General 
Henri Clarke about the possibility.  With the general’s backing, the army welcomed Malet back 
on 14 April 1796, placing him at Besançon.398  Another outcome of the victory over the rebels 
Malet had no way of knowing at the time.  The very event in which he was so proud of having 
participated served not only his own purposes but also those of an up-and-coming military 
genius, the man who would soon become his arch-nemesis:  Napoleon Bonaparte. 
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 Malet enjoyed a period of uninterrupted military duty, seeing battle in Piedmont (Italy) as 
France expanded its borders.  His loyal and competent service earned him promotion to brigadier 
general almost three years to the day of his reinstatement in the army.  Contentedly serving a 
Republican government, he was at the high point of his life.  On 15 August 1799, however, 
France’s Army of Italy suffered defeat at the Battle of Novi, prompting a thorough 
reorganization.  Malet bore no responsibility for Novi, but he found himself pushed from the 
forefront, sent back to garrison duty in the Franche-Comté.  Although several uneventful months 
passed with little to no action in his assigned area, the nation was heading toward another turn.  
Yet another new regime took hold on 18 Brumaire VIII (9 November 1799). 
 While Malet did not necessarily oppose the overthrow of the Directorial government—
many Frenchmen had recognized it as a poorly organized and ineffective regime from its 
outset—he did not approve of the immediate efforts of Napoleon to consolidate political power 
in himself.  Ever the political activist, Malet recognized in the Constitution of the Year VIII a 
step away from the true Republic for which he longed.  He developed an intense hatred of the 
nation’s new leader, which was compounded with every new decision the First Consul made. 
 To keep his officers from gaining too much influence and thereby threatening his regime, 
Napoleon made it a point to prevent them from serving in regions where they had a history.  
Stationed for two years in Besançon, less than thirty-five miles northeast of Dôle, Malet had 
enjoyed the close proximity to his hometown.  When news of his reassignment reached him, 
Malet considered the move a personal attack, though it had been, in fact, nothing more than a 
matter of policy to the First Consul.  On 9 August 1801, Malet received the order to relocate to 
the 9th territorial division in Montpellier, nearly 345 miles away, near the Mediterranean coast of 





Bordeaux in the southwest with the 11th division.  Both the distance from home, roughly 455 
miles, and the cost of relocating twice greatly annoyed Malet.  From this point on, his fellow 
officers and friends began describing him as a completely different person, cold, bitter, and 
openly hostile. 
 Even when his political opinions put him at odds with the regime in power, Malet had 
served loyally regardless of whose orders he received.  After his move to Bordeaux, he seemed 
to go out of his way to find, or make, trouble.  His fierce Republicanism put him into constant 
conflict with the town’s officials and sundered within eight months any of his helpful ties in the 
city.  Although his Republican ideals included denunciation of the privileges and elevated status 
enjoyed by the nobility prior to 1789, he acted as if he were an exception.  Whether he expected 
people to honor his requests—or more accurately, his demands—because of his noble birth or 
simply because of his current military status is unclear.  Regardless of the specific cause, Malet’s 
apparent expectation that his desires be satisfied without question infringed upon the idea of 
equality introduced by the Revolution which he so passionately claimed to follow.399  The 
constant hostilities prompted Malet to insist upon a transfer.  On 24 April 1802, he reported to a 
new post in nearby Périgueux.  Not yet satisfied with his location, he immediately demanded, 
and received, a two-month leave of absence at full pay. 
 The sham of a Republic run by Napoleon did not fool everyone.  Malet saw France 
returning to past oppression as citizens voted away the gains of the Revolution by placing all 
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political authority in the hands of one man.  Upon the establishment of Bonaparte as Consul for 
Life, Malet immediately swore a vehement hatred of the leader, a sentiment that proved 
lifelong.400  Initially, he took no direct action against the government and instead wrapped 
himself in his career, serving faithfully and admirably.  Stationed far from any especially 
Republican crowds, Malet tired of the Napoleonic acolytes surrounding him.  He demanded 
transfer to Angoulême, a city more overtly Republican.  Upon arrival, he began meeting and 
commiserating with local Republicans.  Opting to avoid violent forms of protest, Malet simply 
sent letters to various officials revealing his frustrations.  He sent one such report, for example, 
to Minister of War Louis-Alexandre Berthier on 19 Fructidor XI (6 September 1803) denouncing 
émigrés and expressing his disgust with several ministers.401  Eventually increasing the gravity of 
his actions, he refused to allow his men to serve at a number of political functions within the city.  
No truly disciplinary repercussions followed these spiteful acts because he coupled them with 
letters sent directly to Napoleon reminding the First Consul of the invaluable services he had 
performed in his name.  Expecting his respectable—though not flawless—military career to 
counteract any minor disturbances he created, Malet feared no punitive action. 
 Despite the general’s disobedience, Prefect of Charente Félix Bonnaire had no objection 
to Malet’s maintaining his position in the military, but preferred that he do it somewhere else.  
Demanding the troublemaker’s transfer to the Vendée, Bonnaire wrote that “the most important 
thing for this region is that he has a change of residence.”402  Although never reaching the point 
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of violence, Malet’s increasingly mischievous behavior had earned him the label of political 
malcontent. 
 Having granted Malet’s requests for relocation and frequent paid leave, his superior 
officers had hoped to suspend his defiance.  When this failed, Napoleon decided to try a new 
approach.  On 12 December 1803, in a blatant effort to purchase Malet’s devotion to the 
Consulate, the newly created Legion of Honor welcomed him with the rank of Commander.  He 
promptly responded in a letter humbly acknowledging the distinction and declaring his 
unshakable “love of country and liberty.”403 
 Given his admission to the Legion of Honor and the lack of disciplinary actions in 
response to his insubordination, Malet seems to have expected that a certain level of camaraderie 
existed between himself and Napoleon.  After the leader’s coronation as Emperor on 2 December 
1804, Malet wrote a short letter implying warm feelings.  He did, however, try to convince the 
Emperor to avoid a tyrannical reign, beseeching him not to turn his back on the people who had 
granted this new station:  “use all the power that your magisterial title grants you to ensure that 
this new form of government functions to save the nation from the incapacity or tyranny of your 
successors, and that, having ceded to you some of our precious liberty, we will not one day be 
reproached by our children for having ceded theirs.”404  While the tone of the letter was 
surprisingly positive and hopeful, Malet had in no way turned from his Republican principles.  
His passive resistance and insubordinate behavior in Angoulême had brought him unfavorable 
attention several years ago.  Surely, he did not actually expect Napoleon to heed his advice on 
how to run the nation. 
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 After the imperial coronation, Malet’s campaign of libel against local officials 
intensified, as he wrote more and more letters denouncing simple civil servants and senators.  By 
the end of 1805, he was serving with the Army of Italy in Rome.  Even out of the country his 
attitude did not change and so drew him into incessant conflict with superior officers and 
government officials.  Tired of dealing with the complaints about Malet, Minister of War 
Alexandre Berthier took decisive steps.  Not trusting insubordination to be a sufficient charge to 
dismiss him from military service—after all, Malet had not yet been punished for it—Berthier 
concocted additional allegations.  He charged Malet with showing favoritism to French soldiers 
after a profitable confiscation of goods, thereby creating hostility and insurrection among the 
accompanying Roman militia.  The indictment was serious enough that a board of inquiry 
immediately summoned Malet to Paris to answer for his conduct. 
 Malet and Denise moved to the capital city on 15 July 1807, taking up residency at no 75, 
rue des Saints-Pères.  During the investigation, which lasted nearly a year, he continued to 
receive the same salary as when on active duty.  Aside from the humiliation of having his life 
scrutinized for transgressions he had not committed, the time passed as nothing more than a paid 
vacation.  With the exception of periodically appearing before the board’s judges to defend 
himself, Malet had nothing to do.  Taking advantage of his free time, he fell in with an 
underground group of liberal activists.  The club comprised mostly well-off members of society, 
including doctors and high-ranking military and political officials.  Upon Malet’s admission to 
the group, he learned of a plot formulated by General Joseph Servan de Gerbey, briefly minister 
of war in 1792, to overthrow Napoleon’s regime.   
 Servan proposed replacing the imperial regime with a provisional government, though he 





found itself unable to continue, it would extend an invitation to the Bourbon family, offering to 
allow their return to the monarchy.  Servan was not willing, however, to sacrifice the gains 
achieved by the French Revolution.  The Bourbons would only be welcome under the conditions 
of the Constitution of 1791—real authority resting in a unicameral legislature, with the king 
maintaining solely the right to postpone legislation—with some modifications.405 
 Before he could risk putting his plan into motion, Servan needed to ensure that the plot 
had the support of key figures within the city.  He won several senators to his cause by promising 
them positions in the provisional government which would replace the imperial setup they 
despised.  They had lacked any true political power since Bonaparte’s takeover on 18 Brumaire:  
he had simply kept the Senate around to ensure that his regime continued to appear Republican, 
at least on the surface.  Should Servan succeed in reinstituting the Constitution of 1791, the 
senators would enjoy more authority than they currently possessed.  Even more important than 
the senators’ support was the allegiance of Minister of Police Joseph Fouché.  Given his 
passivity on 18 Brumaire, Servan expected gaining his backing to be an easy task. 
 Fouché was the type of man who served whoever or whatever regime happened to be in 
power at the time, looking out only for himself.  His position in the government made him privy 
to limitless information about criminals, general malcontents, and political dissidents.  His men 
constantly reported news of subversive endeavors in the making.  Some they thwarted in infancy, 
some they fabricated to justify the arrest of otherwise innocent citizens, and some they simply let 
happen.  Fouché had no intention of interfering in Servan’s plan, should he manage to get it off 
the ground.  As in the past, he was content to serve the victor of the situation.  Should Servan’s 
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plan succeed, Fouché would officer his services to the new regime.  Should it fail, he would 
devotedly perform the duties of his office and arrest the conspirators.  He seemed to have no true 
loyalty.  In fact, he once stated, “I don’t care for any particular form of government over another.  
All that means nothing.”406 
 Early in 1807, Servan and his cohorts believed their chance to act against the imperial 
regime had come.  Knowing more accurate details of the horrific outcome of the Battle of Eylau 
on 7-8 February than the general public, they expected Parisians to welcome a change in regime, 
or to be indifferent to it at the very least.  They began considering how the provisional 
government they intended to create would function.  They discussed how the regime would 
work, who would have what positions, and how they would handle various hypothetical 
scenarios.  By the time they managed to work the details out to everyone’s liking, the opportune 
moment to act had passed.  News of Napoleon’s decisive victory at the Battle of Friedland on 14 
June 1907 had nullified any ill-will the Parisians may have harbored toward him.  If Servan tried 
to put his plan into action with the city’s faith in the Emperor reinforced, he would have no 
chance of success.  Discouraged, he assured his followers that another opportunity would arise.  
Although he was right, he would not live long enough to make use of it. 
 Servan died in Paris on 10 May 1808 at the age of sixty-seven.  To some in his covert 
group, the hopes of overthrowing Napoleon’s regime passed along with him.  Others saw their 
aspirations continuing in Malet.  Thirteen men, each as eccentric as their new leader, initially 
united with the general in his attempt to overthrow Napoleon’s empire.  Several of them, sharing 
Malet’s political proclivities, had held positions in France’s previous Republican governments.  
Pierre-Alexandre Lemare, former president of the administrative commission in the Jura, found 
                                                 





himself swept out of office on 18 Brumaire, instantly instilling in him a deep hatred of the 
nation’s newest leader.  Antoine-François Ève, called Demaillot, and Blanchet represented 
Robespierre’s Jacobin club, while Jean-François Ricord, a lawyer and poet, had served in the 
Convention.  Other politically minded men, Gariot, Rigomer Bazin and Liébaud, previously held 
positions in various local governments and administrations but lacked strong ties to any specific 
Revolutionary regime.  Providing the group with some of their most important connections was 
former legislator Florent-Guyot, who had a good rapport with a number of Senators.  The plot 
drew men from not only political spheres, but other careers as well.  Baude, an ex-commissioner 
of police, and Malet’s own former aide-de-camp, Jacob Poilpré, supported the general’s 
conspiratorial efforts.  Another schemer was Philippe Corneille, a “gentle dreamer [who was] 
hardly dangerous.”407  He had previously served in the Royal Army but preferred spending his 
time writing both poetry and prose.  The group’s final two members came from the medical 
profession, Doctors Gindre and Saiffert.408  Once assembled, the eclectic dissidents began 
meeting on the rue Bourg-l’Abbé in the 3e arrondissement to plot the Emperor’s downfall. 
 Although the basis of his plot was similar to that of Servan’s, Malet intended to amend 
the plan’s ultimate goal.  After all, Malet risked the harshest punishment if it failed.  He could 
not bear the thought of leaving his wife and son without provision or subject himself to 
imprisonment or execution for a plan with which he was not completely satisfied.  Servan had 
been content with returning the Bourbons to the throne under a constitutional monarchy, but 
Malet had another idea.  Rather than reinstating any previous constitution, he proposed a new 
regime which he would call—dangerously enough—the Dictatorship. 
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 In spring 1808, Bonaparte turned his military focus to Spain, intending to depose Charles 
IV and to install his own elder brother, Joseph, on the throne.  He set out with his troops from 
Paris on 2 April, heading to Bayonne, nearly 480 miles southwest, near the Spanish border.  
Despite being closer to the capital than during some previous campaigns, the Emperor’s attempts 
at communication were no easier—there were no semaphore stations established toward the 
Pyrenees, and if Paris needed to get word to its leader, or vice versa, the only option was courier.  
The time required by such communication worked perfectly for Malet’s plot.  Once Napoleon 
arrived in Bayonne, he could hope for no faster communication with his capital than two days in 
each direction. 
 Four days was more than plenty to institute his plan, Malet believed.  After all, the plot 
was no more elaborate than the one that had brought Napoleon to power on 18 Brumaire.  His 
fellow conspirators agreed, and they launched phase two.  Philippe Corneille assumed that his 
writing experience would allow him to create believable political documents which would prove 
the legality of the Dictatorship.  Although the idea seemed good at the time, the assumption was 
wrong.  He ultimately proved entirely inept. 
 The first document, considered a necessity by all of the conspirators, was a forged 
senatus-consulte declaring Napoleon an outlaw and announcing the framework for a new 
government.  The Dictatorship would consist of nine men, Malet included, and would have the 
task of ruling France while also drafting a new constitution on which the people would vote after 
its completion.409  Bazin and Corneille, charged with the task of creating the faux Senatorial 
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decree, ultimately produced a mediocre and problematic text.  They faced three decisions, 
muddling them all.  First, the name chosen for the proposed government was a problem.  Bazin 
and Corneille understood that using the word “dictatorship” in their senatus-consulte would 
alarm the printer, who might alert authorities.  Wanting to avoid use of the term, they opted to 
have it spelled “diotatorship.”410  Once they had the copies in hand, they planned to erase the 
connection in the “o,” making it resemble a “c.”  Second, they dated the document 20 April 
1808, though Malet did not intend to execute the plot until late May.  If anyone asked about the 
discrepancy, they planned to explain that the Senate had debated the idea of ending Napoleon’s 
regime in secret, publishing the document but choosing not to circulate it until later.  Third, 
rather than concluding with a list of approving Senators’ names, they simply left “Signatures to 
Follow,” thereby casting doubt on the authenticity of the senatus-consulte, the very document 
intended to legitimize the Dictatorship.411 
 In addition to the senatorial decree, Bazin and Corneille produced three more 
proclamations to implement should they succeed in overthrowing the imperial regime.  One, 
simply titled “Decree of 29 May 1808,” outlined the Dictatorship’s initial twelve orders of 
business.  The two opening articles addressed the military, announcing the immediate withdrawal 
of French troops from foreign lands, the abolition of conscription, and an amnesty for anyone 
who had dodged the draft or deserted his post.  Malet and his conspirators considered recalling 
French forces a necessary step to ensure lasting peace under the supervision of the new 
government.  Previous regimes had come and gone, all the time struggling with the challenge of 
either maintaining war or finding a way to end hostilities on satisfactory grounds.  Malet 
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expected the withdrawal of troops to appease not only France’s European opponents but also 
French citizens, helping to ensure their loyalty to the Dictatorship and the government that would 
eventually take its place.  The article promising both an end to obligatory military service and a 
general reprieve for those who had eluded it served a similar purpose.  Several other clauses 
declared the abolition of the death penalty except, ironically, for cases of rebellion, and extended 
an official pardon to anyone exiled, imprisoned, or executed for political beliefs.  A final 
stipulation placed the nation’s military under Malet’s control.412 
 If the Dictatorship came to fruition, the general’s new position would bring with it the 
responsibility for providing Parisian troops with their daily commands.  Malet’s first decree, 
dated 30 May 1808, would reorder the organization of current officers, ensuring that the men 
holding those positions were loyal to him.  He declared that commands from anyone not 
specified in that group or in future “Orders of the Day” null and void and also banned the 
wearing of any imperial decorations, including the ones bestowed upon members of the Legion 
of Honor.  Troops with such commendations would receive medals deemed appropriate by the 
Dictatorship at a future date, assuming the regime proved lasting.413 
 The publication of the senatus-consulte and the two subsequent decrees would only 
inform government and military officials currently stationed in Paris about the demise of 
Napoleon’s empire.  To spread the word among the general public and French troops abroad, 
Malet ordered the printing of 12,000 proclamations titled “Dictatorship,” remarkable considering 
the group’s simultaneous effort to avoid using that very term.  The document assumed that 
French citizens had tired of warfare and longed to regain the fullness of the liberties they had 
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won during the French Revolution.  Should his plot succeed, Malet wanted to take an early 
opportunity to assure Frenchmen that tyranny would not pervade the new government as it had 
with Napoleon’s rise to power.  The final paragraph of the first section promised that the 
members of the Dictatorship had only France’s best interest in mind:  “Citizens and soldiers, in 
attacking tyranny, we took pride in aspiring to true glory, that of creating in France a liberal 
administration.  This result obtained, we will immediately rejoin your ranks.  The blessings of 
happy citizens are the only goal of our ambition, the sole treasure with which we want to enrich 
ourselves.”414  To the soldiers, Malet wrote that they had not been “Bonaparte’s troops,” that 
such possession was impossible.415  They owed the Emperor nothing, for their only true loyalty 
had to lie with France and the wishes of her people.  The general promised that his provisional 
government would be careful to uphold the liberties of the French people.  That is, if he and his 
co-conspirators were successful. 
 While some of the group’s ideas may seem eccentric, none was more so than a suggestion 
made by Lemare concerning their weapon of choice.  To avoid drawing attention by purchasing 
weapons, several of the plotters offered the use of guns already in their possession.  Lemare 
argued in favor of something quieter, something more befitting the situation.  A dagger, he 
explained “is the proper weapon of conspirators, a clever choice that can serve two purposes.  If 
need be we can use it against ourselves to prevent being taken alive by the hands of the tyrant or 
his devotees.”416  The group accepted the proposal, putting him in charge of acquiring enough 
knives to arm not only themselves but also those they expected to draw to their cause along the 
way.  Now the question became how to obtain the desired 1,200 daggers without raising 
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suspicions.  Wandering through Paris, Lemare purchased the handles from one shop and the 
blades from another.  With weapons acquired, the conspirators turned their attention to last 
minute details. 
 Four days before the date set for the overthrow, the group decided to confide in Generals 
Pierre Guillet and Guillaume for additional help while the plot unfolded.417  After Malet read 
aloud the false senatus-consulte, Guillaume asked question after question about nearly every 
aspect of the plan.  The level of anxiety among the original conspirators increased with each 
additional inquiry.  Perhaps his questions arose from genuine curiosity and interest, or perhaps 
they portended a disastrous ending.  As the group adjourned for the night, Malet suddenly 
declared that Minister of Police Fouché had somehow learned of their plan and that, to ensure 
their safety, they should postpone taking any action.  Although Fouché had, in fact, heard rumors 
of a Republican plot circulating for several weeks, it is unlikely that Malet knew.  He intended 
his exclamation to startle the two newcomers into not participating, at which point the original 
conspirators could reschedule their plans. 
 As the baffled men headed home from the meeting, Guillaume and Demaillot discussed 
the night’s events, each growing increasingly hostile toward the other.  Finally, Demaillot could 
take no more and launched into a screaming fit, blaming Guillaume for the plan’s sudden 
reversal.  Unfortunately for the two, the shouting match took place just outside of the Palais-
Royal where General Lemoyne happened to be within earshot.  Seeking readmission to active 
duty—the military had forced him to retire against his will in 1794 at the age of fifty-three—he 
saw his opportunity, knowing that his assistance in thwarting a conspiracy would not go 
unrewarded.  He immediately made his way to Dubois’ Prefecture of police, in the 4e 
                                                 





arrondissement, to report what he had heard:  that Guillaume and Demaillot were busy plotting 
against the imperial regime.  Although the information was inaccurate, Prefect Dubois acted 
quickly, unlike his counterpart Fouché, who had long known that a conspiracy was brewing but 
had done nothing—perhaps waiting for more details, but more likely, as in the past, never having 
any intention of interfering.  Within a week, Dubois ordered the arrest of the two alleged 
schemers. 
 Despite remaining silent in accordance with Malet’s final words at the last meeting, the 
conspirators were about to face trouble.  On the morning of 8 June 1808, Demaillot and 
Guillaume each woke to a knock on his door.  Greeting them were several of Dubois’ men 
waiting to take them into custody.  After escorting them to separate interrogation rooms at the 
Prefecture, Inspector Pierre Huges Veyrat, one of Dubois’ best men, grilled them about the 
details of the conspiracy.  The meeting was not the first for Demaillot and the inspector.  Prior to 
joining the police, Veyrat had made a living counterfeiting, a way of life cut short when 
Demaillot testified against him.  Facing charges of his own this time, Demaillot remained silent 
during questioning.  Guillaume, on the other hand, almost immediately crumpled under the 
pressure.  During his first round of interrogation, he rambled on and on, implicating the other 
prisoner as the mastermind behind the conspiracy but only hinting at Malet’s involvement.  
Having attended only one of the plotters’ meetings, he knew little of the actual plan.  Not 
satisfied with the information they had obtained thus far and making no progress with Demaillot, 
the police questioned Guillaume again later that same day.  This time he denounced every person 
whose name he could remember, though it was hardly a complete list:  Corneille, Guillet, and 





 As soon as he learned of the arrests, Malet fled his home to seek safety elsewhere.  After 
spending the night at the Hôtel d’Orient in the 7e arrondissement, he rushed to his next 
hideout—clearly an illogical choice—the house of fellow conspirator Poilpré.  Wanting to let 
Denise know that her husband was safe, Poilpré headed to her home, though his friendly deed 
severely compromised his own security, not to mention that of Malet.  Dubois’s police, knowing 
the former soldier’s connection to Malet, waited for him outside the general’s residence and took 
him into custody when he arrived.  His arrest quickly led to that of Malet.  Not at all denying 
involvement in the conspiracy, the general, even before the interrogation began, divulged every 
detail of the plot that the police could possibly have wanted, though he added his own twist.  
Rather than admit that he was the author of the plot, he denounced Florent-Guyot and 
Jacquemont as the ringleaders.418  No longer confident that he would receive leniency from 
Bonaparte, he sought to hide behind the names of two of his cohorts.  By mid-July, Dubois’s 
men had arrested each conspirator.419  Napoleon’s regime seemed safe. 
 When Napoleon received Dubois’s first account of the thwarted takeover, he replied 
calmly that he wanted the “shady business” stopped quickly and quietly.420  In each of his 
subsequent reports, the prefect passionately insisted that the men under arrest posed a real threat 
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to the Empire.  He portrayed them as serious insurgents who would stop at nothing to destroy the 
imperial regime as long as they freely roamed the nation.  In his own daily reports to the 
Emperor, however, Minister of Police Fouché consistently downplayed the danger of the 
conspiracy, referring to the interrogations still underway as “conversations without real 
value.”421  In response to Fouché, Napoleon explained that he knew of at least one earlier 
conspiracy in which Malet, the “wicked subject [and] cowardly thief,” had involved himself.422  
Although not convinced that the conspirators posed as serious a threat as Dubois depicted, 
Napoleon eventually wrote to Fouché telling him that he did not expect, nor approve of, the 
discrepancies between the two men’s accounts.423  Growing angry at the determination of the 
minister of police to disregard the seriousness of the situation, Napoleon wrote to Arch-
Chancellor Jean-Jacques Régis de Cambacérès on 17 July, “Fouché is spoiled, favoring 
crackpots whom he hopes to use to his own advantage and wanting nothing more than to 
discourage those people who anticipate deadly and extraordinary events.”424  Although annoyed 
at him, the Emperor knew of no other man as qualified to lead the Ministry of Police as Fouché 
and ultimately took no punitive measures against him.  While he recognized Fouché as an 
extremely talented official, he saw no such value in General Malet.  The Emperor’s wrath fell 
upon Malet and his co-conspirators, and by mid-July they found themselves prisoners of state 
incarcerated in Paris at La Force prison in the 4e arrondissement. 
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 Imprisonment only heightened Malet’s hatred of Napoleon and his regime.  Similarly, his 
stunt in June 1808 had increased, at least temporarily, the Emperor’s interest in him.  Napoleon 
had his police keep him up to date on the malcontent’s actions, wanting to know who his visitors 
were and to whom he spoke within the prison.  Writing himself to Napoleon on 23 October 1808, 
Malet sought to justify the plot he had hatched over the spring.  His actions, he argued, stemmed 
from a true desire to protect the long-term prosperity of France, something the current imperial 
regime endangered.  “What will happen to us if we lose our Emperor?” he asked.425  As long as 
Napoleon continued to insist upon being at the head of his troops amid the perils of war, his 
government was tragically fragile.  The Emperor had no obvious reaction to Malet’s explanation, 
but surely he recognized the validity of the general’s argument.  Whereas he had pardoned, and 
subsequently used to his own advantage, numerous plotters and dissidents in the past, he 
believed that the services Malet could offer were not worth any more effort.426  Bribery would 
not work on the general, as Napoleon had discovered upon admitting him to the Legion of 
Honor.  The only chance of preventing future conspiracies by the dissatisfied Malet was to lock 
him in prison indefinitely.  Or so the Emperor thought. 
 Prison was not enough to quell Malet’s insubordination.  On 29 June 1809, a Te Deum 
celebrating the capture of Vienna took place in Notre Dame.  At La Force, just under a mile from 
the cathedral, the general was aware of the event and knew that all important officials would be 
in attendance.  Although his means remain unknown, Malet managed to escape from his cell and 
made his way toward Notre Dame, where he hid among the crowd.  After the ceremony, the 
troops were the first to leave.  As they filed out, leaving the majority of politicians and high-
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ranking military officers inside, he slammed the main doors, momentarily trapping them.  
Climbing to the highest point possible outside the building, he began shouting to the soldiers:  
“Bonaparte is dead!  Down with Corsicans!  Down with the police!  Long live liberty!”427  
Following his already ludicrous claims, he announced an end to the Empire and the creation of a 
Republic.  He rattled off a list of names and their new positions within the government.  His 
outburst was a fast-paced version of the plot which had led to his arrest the previous year.  The 
outcome was only slightly different this time.  He faced not only recapture but also the hysterical 
laughter of his fellow soldiers. 
 Rather than return him to La Force, which was obviously not managed strictly enough to 
hold him, the police sent him to the prison of Saint-Pélagie in the 5e arrondissement.  Only a 
month after his arrival there, he began sending a constant barrage of correspondence to various 
officials, including Napoleon himself, about the possibility of his release.  In July 1810, Malet 
addressed the Emperor and the minister of police in two letters sent within a few days of each 
other, declaring his innocence and his respect for the nation’s leader.  To Minister Savary, he 
explained two reasons why he deserved his freedom.  First, he cited the “zeal and devotion” with 
which he had performed his military duties, even under Napoleon.428  Second, he reminded 
Savary of their shared “esteem and friendship” for a general with whom they served in the Army 
of the Rhine.429  To Napoleon, Malet explained that he wrote his missive “to clarify to your 
majesty my innocence.”430  His letter makes it clear that Malet did not find his efforts to 
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undermine and overthrow the imperial government worthy of detention.  “I am still detained like 
a criminal,” he informed the Emperor.431  In an attempt to assert one’s innocence, it seems 
logical to include information about why one was, in fact, not guilty.  Malet did not adopt this 
approach in any of his letters.  Instead, he constantly referred his recipients to his military service 
record, going so far as to include a detailed list of all his positions, deployments, and 
accomplishments with one of his letters to the Emperor.432  While the inclusion of such a list 
appears disrespectful and condescending, Malet heightened both by reprimanding Napoleon for 
the treatment he had received since 1808:  “I will succumb under the weight of misery, if your 
majesty persists in the goal of depriving me of the treatment due given my lengthy services.”433 
 The silence that met his supplications did not deter his letter writing.  In August, he 
penned two letters, separated by only a week, to the minister of police.  In his first 
correspondence on 10 August, Malet described his hopes—and expectations—of receiving his 
freedom once Savary discussed his predicament with the Emperor.  He wanted him to remind 
Napoleon of his “given services, [and] those that I will give to him again.”434  Believing a week 
sufficient time in which to receive a response, Malet wrote again to Savary on 18 August.  In his 
latest letter, rather than plead for release, he inquired about the possibility of a transfer to the rest 
home of Doctor Jacquelin Dubuisson.  He claimed to suffer from an illness contracted at La 
Force and looked forward to a healthier, more comfortable environment for the duration of his 
imprisonment, which he hoped would soon end.435  He received no response, prompting him to 
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write again on 9 October 1809 and to revert to his previous request for freedom.  He reminded 
Savary of his previous letter which had gone unanswered before asking directly for his release.  
He swore “on my word of honor” that he would leave Paris and return only if the Emperor saw it 
fit in the future.436  On 12 January 1811, Malet finally received a response to one of his letters.  It 
was not, however, a response to his request for complete freedom.  Instead, it was his wish to 
transfer to Doctor Dubuisson’s rest home that officials had approved.  The judgment behind 
moving Malet to a less scrutinizing location than Saint-Pélagie is questionable, as he had already 
escaped from one of Paris’s most notorious prisons.  Whether the officials had hoped to purchase 
Malet’s loyalty by granting the relocation or whether they simply believed that the general, now 
in his mid-fifties, would finally abandon his treacherous ways is unknown.  Whatever their 
reasoning, the officials unwittingly provided the determined dissident a dangerous opportunity, 
one that Malet quickly seized.437 
 Doctor Dubuisson’s rest home in no way provided the same security measures in place at 
either La Force or Saint-Pélagie.  The residence more closely resembled a retirement center for 
criminals than a facility designed to keep them within the law and under surveillance.  Étienne-
Dénis Pasquier, who replaced Dubois as Prefect of Police in 1810, explained that “any one 
confined in a private hospital was simply looked upon as a prisoner on parole, and nothing was 
easier for him than to escape, as in those places there were neither guard, wicket, railing, or bolt.  
The proprietor of the establishment was alone responsible for those entrusted to his care.”438  The 
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small and relaxed environment allowed Malet’s friends and family to visit as they pleased, often 
with no supervision.  Using such visits to obtain information about the public opinion of 
Parisians and about Napoleon’s latest military endeavors, Malet closely monitored events in 
preparation for a new attempt at ridding France of its allegedly tyrannical leader. 
 Malet understood the need for perfect timing if he hoped to achieve what he—and 
others—had failed to do in the past:  to overthrow Napoleon.  To recognize the right opportunity 
when it presented itself, he needed to understand the political and social atmosphere of France, 
an easy enough task, he thought.  He also needed to keep abreast of military events, another 
straightforward undertaking, given his background and rapport with other high-ranking officers.  
By October 1812, Malet believed that French society was ready—and eager—for a change of 
regime.  Loyalty to Napoleon wavered, especially among his closest advisors.  Economic 
conditions in France had faltered, and military endeavors in Russia were going poorly.  Malet 
began hatching his next plot to destroy the imperial government, anticipating support from high-
ranking officials and soldiers, as well as the common citizens, all of whom he believed were 
disillusioned with Napoleon’s reign. 
 Confident that the plan he adapted from Servan—forged government documents and co-
conspirators in high-ranking positions—offered the best hope of success, Malet had begun 
revising it almost immediately after its failure in May 1808.  He accepted no personal 
responsibility for the disappointing outcome of that effort; instead, he blamed his two boisterous 
cohorts who had been unable to keep their temperaments under control.  Taking to the extreme 
his desire to limit his accomplices had led to the hastily fabricated one-man attempt against the 
government at the Te Deum of 29 June 1809.  After this embarrassing failure, he acknowledged 





 The relaxed security at Dubuisson’s allowed Malet to converse freely with fellow 
prisoner Abbé Jean Lafon, a dedicated Royalist, who ultimately convinced him that a successful 
strike against the Empire would require the joint effort of all anti-Bonapartist camps.439  United 
in their belief that a conspiracy involving too many people would be doomed from its outset, the 
two men further continued revising Malet’s original plot, taking into consideration their desire to 
inform as few people as possible of their intentions.440  Although security was nearly non-
existent at the rest home, Malet and Lafon acknowledged the need for accomplices on the outside 
who could handle various preparatory details.  Turning to men with whom they were already 
acquainted, they confided in three of them:  Abbé José de Caamaño, a Spanish cleric whom 
Lafon had met while both men were serving time at La Force, Alexandre Boutreux, a law student 
and political dissident whom Malet most likely met through the clandestine group known as the 
Philadelphes, and Jean Rateau, a distiller turned career military man.441 
 Despite various revisions—fewer people aware of the plot and no accomplices already 
installed in the government—the plan closely resembled Malet’s designs of 1808, using the 
announcement of Napoleon’s death as grounds for the changes explained in a forged senatus-
consulte and in orders to the troops stationed in Paris.  To convince military officials that the 
orders he would deliver were valid, Malet planned to wear his own military decorations that 
clearly marked him as a general.  He also wanted his accomplices to exude legitimacy and 
entrusted the acquisition of several additional uniforms and weapons to his wife and Rateau.  On 
the chosen date for the plot, Malet and Lafon would escape from Dubuisson’s rest home and 
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meet their co-conspirators at Abbé Caamaño’s home.  After changing into their uniforms and 
arming themselves, the men would head to the nearby Popincourt barracks and present the 
forged orders to the officers in charge.  Once in control of several military units, Malet planned 
to lead the troops to various strategically important locations throughout the city, arresting high-
ranking political officials—and anyone else who might dare to stand in his way—and replacing 
them with men he deemed worthy as the plot unfolded.  His initial accomplices—Lafon, 
Caamaño, Boutreux, and Rateau—would not receive positions in the new government but, 
presumably, would collect other forms of reward once the plot succeeded. 
 To achieve the individual tasks culminating in the creation of Malet’s provisional 
government, which bore no name this time, the conspirators relied on both speed and the element 
of surprise.  Malet expected to persuade military and government officials to follow him simply 
by presenting authentic-looking orders and by explaining that the Senate had had to act 
immediately on learning of the Emperor’s death.  He wanted his actions to be seen as the result 
of the deliberate and legal decisions made by the Senate, not as a revolution.  Success would be 
his, Malet thought, once his accomplices had replaced several critical political positions and his 
provisional government had met at the Hôtel de Ville.  Adhering to Lafon’s idea that a successful 
overthrow would need to placate Monarchists as well as Republicans, Malet chose men from 
both political camps to serve in his provisional government, just as Napoleon had done in his 
own regime. 442  Once assembled, he planned to announce to the new regime the abolition of the 
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imperial government and make three crucial declarations:  that Napoleon was an outlaw, a 
seemingly unnecessary step if, in fact, the Emperor had died, that his marriage to Marie-Louise 
was annulled, and that the King of Rome was illegitimate and thus ineligible to inherit his 
father’s throne.443  After such announcements, Malet believed he would finally have succeeded 
in overthrowing Napoleon’s regime. 
 During October 1812, several weeks had passed without any news reaching Paris from 
the Emperor and his Grande Armée.  The lack of information quickly prompted rumors and 
speculation as to what might be happening in Russia.  Already aware that the campaign had not 
gone well, Parisians were increasingly nervous as each day passed.  Thinking the city rife with 
inquietude and disillusionment, Malet believed that the latest opportunity for him to strike 
against Napoleon had presented itself.  With the Emperor in Russia and no imperial bulletins 
forthcoming, he knew that verification of Napoleon’s death would be a slow and difficult 
undertaking.  Given the recent lack of information received from the army, Malet did not expect 
such an announcement to meet much, if any, disbelief, especially if seemingly official 
government documents seconded the claim.  The nation’s current situation caused him to think 
“that the downfall of Napoleon not only could, but should be immediate.  He was convinced that 
it could be easily decided by the slightest effort, especially if this effort was attempted in the 
capital.”444  Confident that the time to act had come, Malet advised his four accomplices that 
they would implement their plot on the night of 11 October.  Again, though, he saw his plans 
foiled through no fault of his own.   
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 On the chosen night, Malet and Lafon successfully escaped from the rest home and 
arrived at Abbé Caamaño’s residence without difficulty.  Once there, they settled several last-
minute details such as dating the forged senatus-consulte and the orders to various military units 
stationed throughout the city.  Rateau was to provide the conspirators’ uniforms and weapons, 
the final necessary step before initiating the plot itself.  As the designated meeting time passed, 
however, Rateau was still missing.  When he finally did arrive toward morning, his fellow 
conspirators feared that the most opportune moment had passed.445  As the group disbanded for 
the night, Malet and Lafon returned to Dubuisson’s.  Although they had escaped undetected, 
their effort to break back into the rest home drew the attention of their overseer.  He reprimanded 
them for having left the facility without permission and warned that he intended to advise 
Fouché’s successor as minister of police, René Savary, Duke of Rovigo, of their flight.  Whether 
he ever filed such a report is unknown, but regardless of what action he took—or failed to take—
the two prisoners had not yet resigned themselves to failure.  They decided to reschedule their 
plot for 22 October, a date by which they hoped Dubuisson would again have relaxed his watch 
over them. 
 Dubuisson locked the residence at 11:00 p.m. each night after ensuring that his three 
charges were in their rooms.446  Having successfully slipped out of the rest home eleven nights 
earlier, Malet and Lafon had no worries about doing it again.  With Dubuisson convinced that 
they were in their rooms, the two conspirators climbed out of their windows into the courtyard 
and retraced their steps back to Abbé Caamaño’s residence.  Unlike their prior attempt, everyone 
arrived without delay.  Considering the torrential rain falling outside, however, the group decided 
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to postpone taking immediate action, choosing instead to drink punch while waiting for a break 
in the weather.447  According to Ernest Hamel, this initial delay brought about the failure of 
Malet’s plot.  In his opinion, “if things had been executed during the night, not a single civil or 
military authority would have had the time to recognize [what was happening], and the 
conspiracy would probably have enjoyed complete success.”448 
 Finally, the group acknowledged that any action that night would have to take place in 
the rain.  As Malet reached the door to leave, Abbé Lafon stopped him.  He seemed to have lost 
confidence and begged the general not to attempt the overthrow.  “Stay,” he pleaded, “the 
guillotine is at the door.”449  Dismissing his accomplice’s fears and still determined to restore the 
French Republic, he set out with Rateau and Boutreux around 3:30 a.m.450  The two clergymen 
remained behind as Caamaño’s sole task of providing a meeting place was complete, and Lafon 
was too nervous for any further active participation. 
 By 4:00 a.m., the trio of conspirators had made their way through Paris’ rainy streets to 
the Popincourt barracks, where Malet planned to obtain the military force with which he would 
overthrow the Empire.  Upon reaching the garrison’s entrance, Malet provided the morning’s 
password and gained immediate access.  The day’s key word—ironically, “conspiration” 
(conspiracy)—had been delivered to the general that afternoon by a soldier stationed at 
Popincourt.451  He quickly sought out Colonel Gabriel Soulier, the man in charge of the National 
Guardsmen stationed at the barracks.  Initially, Soulier seemed of little use to Malet for he was 
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asleep, suffering from fever and influenza, but the illness was a lucky accident for the 
conspirator.  Fuzzy minded, Soulier neglected to inspect the forged senatus-consulte and Orders 
of the Day intended for the Guardsmen carried by Malet and paid little attention to the personal 
letter summarizing the actions to be undertaken.  Had he thoroughly reviewed the documents, he 
would have noticed several questionable aspects that might have brought the conspiracy to an 
end before it began.452  Malet explained that “the Senate is assembled.  The Emperor died on the 
7th of this present month before Moscow; and we come to give you information of a Senatus 
Consultum given this night, with an Order of the day, and a letter addressed to you, concerning 
the service with which you are charged under these circumstances; and in which you will act in 
concert with M. Frochot, Prefect of the Seine.”453  Soulier also learned that he was to receive a 
promotion to general and was also to cash an order for 100,000 francs.454  He was to distribute 
the funds among the men at Popincourt as a sign that they would receive their pay on time under 
the pending regime.  Ordinary Guardsmen would receive higher than normal recompense and 
officers twice their normal rate.455 
 Soulier was to read the announcement of Napoleon’s death to the Guardsmen before 
arming his troops and leading them to the Place de Grève and Hôtel de Ville, where he was to 
make arrangements for a room in which the provisional government could meet later that 
morning.  He was also to station a detachment at the bell tower of Saint-Jean “to sound the tocsin 
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at the moment when this became necessary,” calling everyone in Paris to action.456  Explaining 
that his sorrow over the news of the Emperor’s death had exacerbated his illness, Soulier opted 
to remain in bed for a while longer, appointing Adjutant-Major Antoine Piquerel to inform the 
Guardsmen of the recent developments.457  By lamplight in the pouring rain, the troops learned 
that the Emperor had died in Russia and that the nation would immediately return to a Republic.  
Now presumably in charge of the government, General Malet promised them “promotions, 
rewards, and vacations.”458  As recorded in various memoirs, the reaction to the news varied 
depending upon the source.  Some described “cries of Vive la nation,” while others reported that 
“there was not a cry, not a word, nothing but a great stupor.”459  Whatever the actual response, 
Soulier pulled himself from bed to undertake his orders while Malet personally led 1,200 men to 
La Force prison. 
 By 6:30 a. m., Malet and his troops arrived at the prison where he planned to free several 
detainees whom he believed would help further his plot.  He immediately ordered the release of 
Generals Joseph Guidal and Victor Lahorie—two men with whom he had previously served—
and a Corsican, Joseph Boccheiampe, a former Sergeant Major and Guidal’s cellmate.460  The 
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order met with no resistance.  When the door of his cell opened with orders to follow the guard, 
Guidal believed that the time for his transfer to Marseille for trial had come.461  Lahorie could 
conjure no explanation for his impromptu release and, therefore, “was slow in making his 
appearance; he was abed when called, and he took some time to get ready.”462  Finally appearing 
before his liberators, he recognized Malet as a fellow soldier, though he thought he had been a 
prisoner for some time.  Although both men were aware of Malet’s status as a known political 
malcontent, they had no more misgivings about the announcement of a provisional government 
than those unfamiliar with his past.  Convinced that the news of Napoleon’s death was 
legitimate, the three men brought the plot closer to reestablishing the French Republic.463 
 Malet gave copies of his forged senatus-consulte to his three newly-released accomplices.  
He ordered them to seize the offices or personal apartments of several key political figures 
throughout the city, to arrest these men, and then to take their place in power.  Boccheiampe 
made his way to the Prefecture of the Seine where he encountered no resistance in establishing 
himself as Prefect because Count Nicolas Frochot, who currently held the position, had not yet 
arrived at the office.464  Lahorie and Guidal went immediately to the home of Minister of Police 
Savary.  They found him still in bed and had little trouble placing him under arrest.465  With 
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Savary on his way to La Force prison, Lahorie took control of this key ministry.  Although he 
had not actively resisted the news of his arrest and replacement, Savary’s life was in danger.  
Malet had authorized each man assisting him to use any method of coercion or intimidation—
including unrestricted violence—to achieve the plot’s goal.466  Only Lahorie’s intervention kept 
Savary safe from the wrath of Guidal, a man who harbored personal animosity toward the 
minister.  At one point, as he led the former minister to prison, Guidal pointed his sword at his 
prisoner’s chest and demanded to know if he recognized him.  “I am General Guidal, whom you 
had arrested in Marseilles and brought to Paris,” he explained.467  Savary did, in fact, recognize 
the man as one he had placed under arrest less than a year earlier.  Lahorie promised the minister, 
despite Guidal’s constant threats of physical harm, that he had “fallen into the hands of a 
generous enemy, and you shall not be put to death.”468 
 Shortly after 7:00 a.m., having installed Savary at La Force, Guidal led Boutreux and a 
detachment of Guardsmen to the personal apartments of Prefect of Police Pasquier.469  Pasquier 
examined the order calling for his arrest and the forged senatus-consulte that Guidal presented to 
him and immediately concluded that each document was fraudulent.  In his memoirs, Pasquier 
noted, “it was an easy matter for me to see at a glance that these documents were apocryphal, and 
concocted by men who were ignorant of the form in which they were usually couched.”470  
Placed in a carriage destined for La Force prison, Pasquier—whose position Boutreux seized—
attempted to convince his escort that “he was the dupe of a gross imposture, that he was 
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doubtless not aware of the consequences of his participating in a most guilty enterprise, and that 
it might cost him his life.”471  The explanation went unheeded. 
 Unlike his previous attempts to overthrow Napoleon’s regime, which saw themselves 
frustrated from the outset by eavesdroppers, lack of real planning, and tardiness, the plot of 22 
October was already Malet’s most successful, having been underway for three and a half hours.  
By 7:00 a.m., men loyal to Malet’s provisional government had subjugated both the Ministry of 
Police and the Prefecture of Police without resistance.472  Thus far, the plot had unfolded 
perfectly, but Malet was not deluded enough to expect that it would continue so smoothly.  
Having maintained under his command 150 of the Guardsmen he had obtained earlier that 
morning, he set out to achieve what he believed would be one of the most difficult individual 
tasks of the entire enterprise:  neutralizing the governor of Paris.   
Count General Pierre-Augustin Hulin had earned a hero’s reputation because of the active 
role he played in the storming of the Bastille on 14 July 1789.  Less illustriously, he had also 
presided over the sham of a trial that convicted and executed the Duc d’Enghien in 1804.  He 
distinguished himself in the armies of Napoleon and received the position of Grand Officer of 
the Legion of Honor in 1809.  Hulin was a determined man who could not be seduced or 
intimidated into acting against his will.  If anyone were going to thwart the plan, Malet expected 
it to be the governor and, therefore, kept for himself the task of subduing him.473 
 Arriving at Hulin’s apartment in the Place Vendôme, Malet barged into the bedroom to 
find him still sleeping in bed next to his wife.474  Malet immediately launched into the 
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explanation that Napoleon had died in Moscow and that the Senate had abolished the imperial 
government, replacing it with a Republic.  Malet had two more announcements for Hulin:  that 
he was under arrest, and that he, Malet, would replace him in his position as governor of Paris.475  
Seeing her husband baffled into silence, Countess Hulin intervened, hoping to bring her husband 
back to his senses.  She advised him that if the news delivered were true, Malet would have 
corresponding written orders.476  Rousing himself, Hulin asked to see such orders, to which 
Malet calmly replied in the affirmative, asking him to join him in the office.  Once in the 
adjoining room, Malet revealed not the orders he claimed to possess but a pistol.477  Without 
further elaboration, he shot Hulin in the face.  The bullet entered his jaw, but the injury did not 
prove fatal.478 
Colonel Soulier had pulled himself from bed around 7:00 a.m. and made his way to the 
Hôtel de Ville.479  Count Frochot, the Prefect of the Seine, had received a sloppily scrawled note 
earlier that morning stating that the Emperor was dead.  Rushing to his office to seek details, he 
arrived shortly after Soulier and his Guardsmen.  Soulier presented Frochot with copies of 
Malet’s forged senatus-consulte and Orders of the Day which, unlike himself, Frochot carefully 
examined.  Finding discrepancies in these documents, he began questioning Soulier about the 
situation:  “I immediately looked for the signature, and finding it to be Malet, demanded to know 
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why it was not signed by General Hulin, and who was this General Malet?  The Commandant 
replied, ‘my General is wounded, and General Malet is Chief, or one of the Chiefs of the General 
Staff.’”480 
 Whereas the orders to Lahorie and Guidal had been to arrest various government 
officials, Soulier was simply to inform Frochot of the change in regime and to have him make 
arrangements for the provisional government’s meeting later that day.481  Wanting to have 
everything ready when Malet and the other members of the new regime arrived—and seemingly 
unconcerned about having been replaced as Prefect—Frochot delegated various tasks to other 
officials at the Hôtel de Ville.482  Despite his nearly unquestioning compliance, Frochot later 
maintained that he had not been convinced of the legitimacy of the orders he received.  In self-
defense, he asserted, “[I] fled to my own house, leaving the two Officers behind, telling them 
that I was going to change my boots; but deliberating in my own mind on what was to be done, 
and on the means of having an interview with the Prince Arch-Chancellor.”483  Frochot failed to 
reach Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, however, until late that afternoon, and by then, 
arrangements for the first meeting of Malet’s new Republican government were in place. 
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 Leaving Hulin’s, Malet next led his troops to the home of Adjutant-General Pierre 
Doucet, from whom he expected to acquire authority over more troops.  It was here where 
everything began to go wrong.  Prior to setting his plot in motion, Malet had written Doucet a 
personal letter, an action he thought would have won the Adjutant-General’s allegiance to his 
cause.484  But upon reviewing the senatus-consulte, Doucet immediately questioned the validity 
of the document presented to him.485  Further complicating the situation was the unforeseeable 
visit of Alexandre de Laborde, a police inspector, to Doucet’s apartments that morning.  His very 
presence caused a change in Malet’s attitude.  His composure dissolved as Laborde, recognizing 
him as a political malcontent who was supposed to be locked away in Doctor Dubuisson’s rest 
home, declared, “Monsieur Mallet [sic], you do not have permission to leave your home unless I 
come looking for you.”486 
 Believing himself in another situation where only violence would assure the plot’s 
success, Malet reached for his pistol.  Before he could fire, however, Laborde and Doucet 
wrestled him to the ground and placed him under arrest.487  Rateau, who had accompanied Malet, 
vainly cited the senatus-consulte as authorization for the actions taken over the last several 
hours.488  He drew his sword in hopes of rescuing the general, but quickly found himself under 
arrest as well.489 
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 At roughly 9:45 a.m., Laborde and Doucet brought the two conquered conspirators in 
bonds before the soldiers Malet had led to the house.  “The Emperor is not dead!”  Doucet 
exclaimed.  “Your father lives still!  These men are imposters!”490  Chants of “Vive l’Empereur!” 
immediately filled the air, after which the troops returned to their barracks as if nothing out of 
the ordinary had occurred, a sign that Malet believed heralded the official end of his plot.491  Not 
only was he, the conspiracy’s mastermind, in custody, but he had failed to achieve the true 
allegiance of the men who had aided his cause thus far.  Although the situation was coming 
under control, Doucet and Laborde knew that Paris and the imperial regime were not safe until 
each of Malet’s co-conspirators—both the deliberate and the unwitting—were under arrest.  In 
fact, had his accomplices been more active in their duties, the plot might yet have succeeded 
despite Malet’s arrest.492 
 Having replaced the Duke of Rovigo as minister of police, Lahorie busied himself not 
with the duties of his new position but with finding a tailor to fit him clothing appropriate to his 
new station.493  When Inspector Laborde and a detachment of troops arrived at the Ministry, he 
announced to Lahorie that he was under arrest for having conspired with General Malet to 
overthrow Napoleon’s imperial regime.  Upon hearing that he had been part of an illegal bid for 
political power, he proclaimed his innocence, swearing that he had no knowledge of the 
illegitimacy of Malet’s claims, apparently discounting the relevance of historical precedent.  He 
simply believed that he was taking part in yet another government change—“I believed I was 
seeing another 18 Brumaire, and I followed General Malet, the same way that twelve years ago I 
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had followed Bonaparte”—ushered in by the chaos of the Revolutionary spirit that had pervaded 
France for more than two decades.494  When Laborde asked how so sloppy an imitation as the 
senatus-consulte issued by Malet could have deceived him, Lahorie confessed that he had not 
read a single line of the document, believing Malet’s explanation of the situation as proof enough 
of the circumstances facing the nation.  Upon closely inspecting the forgery, Lahorie dejectedly 
allowed his own arrest, avowing, “It has never been said that I lacked either intelligence or 
judgment, and it would be necessary to look upon me as the most obtuse of men, to pretend that I 
willingly took part in an imposture so rashly concocted.  No, I was the first dupe of General 
Malet, and I am his wretched victim.”495 
 Boccheiampe was the only one of Malet’s unwitting conspirators to take his position in 
the government seriously.496  As soon as he had installed himself as Prefect of the Seine, he set to 
work signing the day’s paperwork as if his promotion from prisoner to Prefect was nothing out of 
the ordinary.  When Malet’s plot began to unravel, however, he was quick to abandon his post in 
hope of fleeing the police searching for him.  On 24 October, authorities arrested him when they 
found him hiding in a nearby residence.497  Unlike Lahorie and Boccheiampe, who spent at least 
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a brief time in their new offices, Guidal had abandoned his post immediately after replacing 
Henri Clarke, Duke of Feltre, as minister of war.  Rather than undertake the position’s duties, he 
left for a restaurant to have lunch.  A detachment of troops found him, “fork in hand,” quickly 
placed him under arrest, and returned him to prison.498 
 With each of the conspirators under arrest, the rightful government officials went about 
reinstalling themselves in their offices and returning the city to normal, a task that was complete 
by noon that same day.499  The ruse had been so convincing, however, that Prefect of Police 
Pasquier had a difficult time in re-entering his office, when troops refused to admit him without 
an order signed by Malet.500  Prefect of the Seine Frochot, who had given orders for the 
preparation of a meeting room for the new provisional government, had no trouble in retaking his 
post.  He immediately tried to set everything right, hoping to prevent anyone from suspecting 
him as a conspirator.  Only then did he make his way to Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès to explain 
to him what had happened.501 
 Although the conspiracy enjoyed several hours of success, the Parisian populace was 
entirely unaware of the events until the authorities had restored order.502  Malet had hoped that 
the citizens would rally to his cause upon hearing that he wanted to return the nation to a 
Republic and free them from the tyrannical Napoleon.  His hopes might not have been 
completely misplaced.  Minister of Police Savary described France as “a country so susceptible 
to the contagion of example,” seeming to validate Malet’s expectation that the nation would rally 
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to support him.503  There was no uprising or any sympathetic sentiment, however, when a brief 
written statement by the minister of police announcing the plot’s unfolding and subsequent 
failure, appeared in Le Moniteur Universel on the morning of 24 October.  The information 
given by Savary was vague, providing only the names of the plot’s masterminds—Malet, 
Lahorie, and Guidal—and the assertion that the disturbances they caused had been minor.504  He 
explained that “absolute calm reigns in Paris; there was no trouble but in the offices where the 
brigands visited.”505  In fact, the Journal de Paris reported enthusiastic cries of “Vive 
l’Empereur!” from citizens of all classes when the statement was read aloud.506  People in the 
city discussed Malet’s plot “as a piece of outrageous folly,” if they bothered to speak of it at 
all.507  Newspapers emphasized Parisians’ positive reaction for several days after the conspiracy 
had taken place.  “We insist on this point,” an article from 31 October explained, “because it 
honors the character of the inhabitants of Paris, and proves that they know their true interests, 
which cannot be separated from respect for the law and love of the sovereign.”508 
 Wanting to maintain the tranquility that had persisted throughout Paris during Malet’s 
undertaking and to put the ordeal in the past as quickly as possible, Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès 
and Minister of War Henri Clarke organized a commission of seven military officers, which held 
its first meeting on 24 October.509  The trial of twenty-four alleged conspirators, including Malet, 
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began four days later.510  During it, several issues hampered the accused men’s ability to defend 
themselves.  Boccheiampe, a Corsican, pointed out that his knowledge of French was inadequate 
and might prevent him from understanding the questions the commission presented.  Likewise, 
they might find his responses difficult to follow.  One of the judges quickly replied, “we will 
understand you enough.”511  An understandable response, given the fact that Boccheiampe had 
not felt hampered by the language barrier when he took his position as prefect of the Seine.  
None of the defendants were offered legal counsel, and when Colonel Soulier complained at the 
outset of the trial, a judge assured him, sarcastically, that they would have the opportunity to 
write to lawyers that evening, sniping that “all lawyers do not go to bed at eight o’clock.”512  
Malet was quick to reply that by then the “jailers are in bed and the prisoners are locked down, 
without light.”513  Ultimately, only one of the defendants managed to obtain the services of a 
defense counsel, who generously offered to say a few words on behalf of the other defendants as 
well.514 
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 Perhaps the most damning aspect of the trial was the judges’ preconceived notion of the 
men’s guilt.  The wording of the accusations left little room for debate.  Malet’s official charges 
were straightforward enough.  He stood “accused of a crime against the interior security of the 
State, by an attack of which the goal was to destroy the Government and the successive order of 
the throne, and of exciting the citizens and residents to arms against the imperial authority.”515  
His fellow defendants, on the other hand, faced the simple and vague charge of “complicity with 
Malet.”516  Several of the men adopted as their defense the claim that they were simply unwitting 
dupes of Malet’s deceitful plan, having been wrought with emotion upon hearing of Napoleon’s 
untimely death.  Given the wording of the charge they faced, however, this assertion hardly 
seems a sufficient defense.   
Jean-François Rabbe, one of the accused, justified himself by stating that “in losing the 
Emperor, he lost his protector; he burst into tears and did not think [about the fact] that in a 
monarchy the son succeeds the father.”517  Colonel Soulier also sought to defend his actions in 
this manner, citing his military service and multiple wounds sustained during it as evidence 
against the idea that he would knowingly act against the legitimate French government.518  He 
testified, “because of the state of the illness that I found myself in, and because of the emotion 
that the false news of his Majesty’s death caused in me, I completely lost my mind.”519  
Following this explanation, one of the judges snapped at him, declaring that during a crisis when 
someone unknown to him declares that the Emperor is dead is precisely the moment when 
military and civil officers need to keep their wits about them and handle the situation 
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appropriately.520  While the military commission failed to accept the validity of such a defense, 
Prefect of Police Pasquier believed in the men’s innocence.  In his memoirs, he sympathized 
with the accused:  “The officers of their command sought refuge in the obedience which they 
considered they owed to their superiors in rank.  It is a fact that among them all, not one was to 
be found who could be called intentionally guilty.”521 
 Each man, excepting Malet, professed his innocence throughout the trial.  Some hoped to 
save their lives while others had already resigned themselves to the idea of facing the firing 
squad.  One of the most vocal in proclaiming his virtue, Colonel Soulier, continuously begged 
for his life, reminding the panel of judges that he had “a wife and four children.”522  General 
Lahorie’s performance at the hearing was stoic.  When given the opportunity to address the panel 
of judges, he explained, “At all events . . . I am aware of the doom that awaits me; I do not speak 
for the purpose of saving my life, but to establish the truth, and to defend my memory from the 
odious charges with which it might be sought to dishonor it.”523  Malet made no effort to defend 
his actions to the commission, declaring that “the man who has constituted himself the defender 
of his country has no need of any defense:  he triumphs, or goes to his death.”524 
 The questioning of Colonel Soulier was unforgiving.  During the first round of 
questioning, the commission accused him of supporting Malet’s efforts because of the promised 
promotion to General of Brigade and the 100,000 francs.  Soulier replied, “It was neither one nor 
the other.”525  As a commanding officer accustomed to reviewing official documents, he could 
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easily have determined that the ones delivered by General Malet were forgeries, if he had taken 
the time to review them for himself.  For example, the order given to him for 100,000 francs had 
no date, but came from an alleged senatorial meeting on 11 October 1812.  When reminded that 
these and other discrepancies—and the fact that Malet had advised him to sound the tocsin if 
necessary—should have confirmed in his mind the illegitimacy of the events underway, Soulier 
acknowledged the fact, but reiterated that he had been too ill and emotionally distraught to act as 
he normally would have.526   
 While the judges did not seem to believe that the high-ranking officials could possibly be 
as gullible as they claimed, Malet defended each of his alleged accomplices, arguing that they 
were simply following the orders of a superior officer, exactly what their training taught them to 
do.  He added that had any of them not conformed to his wishes, he would have forced them to 
do so.527  Clearly, his threat was true, given his shooting of General Hulin.  Malet maintained 
that “alone he had done everything, trusting for the success of his enterprise to a spontaneous 
outburst of the feelings of hatred and indignation experienced by all classes, and which could not 
fail to respond to the first given signal.”528  During the interrogation, one of the judges asked 
Malet directly who his accomplices had been.  Again, he explained that he had acted alone, but 
added that if his plan had succeeded, he would have been joined by “all of France, even 
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yourself.”529  His willingness “to take upon himself the entire responsibility . . . revealed the 
nobility of his character,” according to Prefect of Police Pasquier.530   
 After an unusually brief hearing—a mere three days—the military commission reached 
its decision concerning the fate of each of the accused, handing down its judgment on 29 October 
1812.  Although the panel determined “that the entire conspiracy had been the personal work of 
Malet, and that his followers were the victims of a lamentable credulity,” fourteen men were 
sentenced to death for their roles in the plot.531  The remaining ten were acquitted of any 
wrongdoing.532   
As the condemned men made their way to the Plaine de Grenelle on 30 October to face 
the firing squad, Rateau and Rabbe benefited from a last minute decision to spare their lives, 
leading to suspicion that they had confessed to the police crucial information such as the 
participants and the working details of Malet’s plot.533  Prefect of Police Pasquier found Rateau’s 
                                                 
529 Salgues, Mémoire, 9:  210. 
530 Pasquier, Mémoires, 2:  40. 
531 Those unaminously convicted of their crimes and sentenced to death were Malet, Lahorie, 
Guidal, Soulier, Steenhouwer, Borderieux, Piquerel, Fessart, Lefebvre, Regnier, Beaumont and 
Rateau.  Rabbe received the death penalty by a vote of six to one.  Boccheiampe also received 
the death penalty by a vote of five to two.  Le Moniteur Universel, 30 October 1812.  Pasquier, 
Mémoires, 2:  39. 
532 The unanimously acquitted were Gomont (called Saint-Charles), Lebis, Provost, Godard, 
Viallevielhe, Caron, Limozin, Julien, and Caumette.  A sufficient vote of three to four also 
exonerated Rouff.  Their acquittal did not necessarily mean freedom, though.  When informed of 
the decision made by the military commission, Napoleon made his own decrees on the fates of 
the men.  He included in this decree two men who had not been on trial with Malet:  Lamotte 
could be freed, but had to leave Paris and Denoyer was to remain imprisoned.  As for those who 
had been tried along with Malet, Provost was to be freed and remain employed in the military; 
Godard’s and Viallevielhe’s fates would be determined after the Emperor received more 
information about their involvement in the conspiracy; Gomont, Lebis, Limozin, Caron, Julien, 
Caumetter and Rouff were to “be stripped of their ranks and imprisoned as prisoners of State” 
until he issued a new order.  Le Moniteur Universel, 30 October 1812.  Archives Nationales, 
F/7/6499, plaque 1, document 142. 
533 On 29 October 1812, Minister of Police Savary wrote to Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès 





reprieve especially bewildering.  He pointed to Rateau’s having been one of Malet’s initial 
accomplices, “present at the first meeting” when the plot was being devised.534 
 The theatrical qualities of the entire ordeal and discrepancies in protocol did not end with 
the trial.  Transported to the Plaine de Grenelle in a number of carriages, the doomed men 
continued to play the same roles as they had during the court proceedings.  Lahorie remained 
composed, Soulier constantly mumbled, “my poor children, my poor family,” and Guidal 
shouted slurs against Napoleon.535   The loudest performance was that of General Malet himself.  
Leaning out the window of his carriage, he yelled to anyone within hearing distance, “recall the 
23rd of October!” and “I fall, but I am not the last of the Romans.”536  He regretted his 
machinations only because his failure would leave his wife and son impoverished and at the 
mercy of his political opponents.537  The others traveled in stupefied silence, awestruck that they 
had not only been found guilty of participating in a political plot against Napoleon’s imperial 
regime but were to pay for having done so with their lives.538   
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 At 3:00 p.m., at the Plaine de Grenelle, the condemned were lined up against a wall, 
facing a twenty-five man firing squad.539  Contrary to protocol, Malet himself led the execution.  
He told his accomplices to prepare themselves for the volley.  The squad fired.  Once the smoke 
had cleared, Malet could be seen, standing unharmed before the wall, his hand over his heart.  
The first volley of bullets had failed to kill two others as well, though it had, at least, knocked 
them to the ground.  Bordérieux cried out “Vive l’Empereur!” before addressing Malet, “Go, 
poor soldier, your emperor received, like you, a mortal strike.”540  Staring at his ineffective 
executioners, Malet shouted, “Fire again, already!”541  Lahorie, lying on the ground still alive, 
amended, “me too, for fuck’s sake!”542  A second volley silenced Bordérieux and Lahorie.  
Malet, using his last breath to profess his political ideology, muttered “Vive la liberté” before 
falling face first to the ground.543 
 Napoleon learned of Malet’s failed plan against him on 6 November 1812, when he 
arrived in Mikhailovka, Russia.544  A waiting messenger described the people involved, outlined 
the basic events of the plot, and informed him of the execution of the conspirators.  Reports to 
the Emperor and to other generals in the field consistently expressed that the plot created no 
effect in the city at large:  “Paris is quiet.  The inhabitants and the garrison took no part in these 
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disturbances, of which they were unaware.”545  The reassurance did little to assuage Napoleon’s 
concern over the willingness with which his high-ranking political and military officials 
embraced the idea of a provisional government replacing his own.  The security of his empire—
which he thought he had achieved with the birth of his son was clearly in question.  Stupefied 
that a political prisoner could so easily threaten all he had created, Napoleon exclaimed to his 
secretary, Louis de Bourrienne, “It would appear that my crown is not fixed very firmly on my 
head if in my own capital the bold stroke of three adventurers can shake it.”546  His anger grew as 
reports from various ministers in Paris arrived.  Each man related information concerning the 
plot in such a manner as to minimize the role he had played in Malet’s success.   
 Stunned by events that had taken place in Paris, Napoleon commented to his advisers 
who had accompanied him on the Russian campaign that his presence was required back in 
France.  “In the current state of things,” he told them, “I can only impose on Europe from the 
Tuileries palace.”547 
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 In modern times, the term “conspiracy” often brings to mind incredible theories about 
ancient alien theory or government cover-ups.  In earlier eras, conspiracies and conspiracy 
theories were a part of life that impacted people of all social standing.  In terms of French 
history, prior to and during the Revolution of 1789, conspiracies were more theoretical than 
actual.  Popular politics introduced by the Revolution created a sense of mistrust and 
misunderstanding.  Believing there was only one correct path for the nation to travel, individual 
deputies alleged that their associates of a different opinion were conspiring against the republic.  
There was, in fact, no substance to these assertions.  They were driven by inexperience and 
paranoia.  Only after the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte to political power—through a successful 
conspiracy on 9 November 1799—did clandestine intrigues became tangible.  Dissidents 
launched actual plots against the Consular and Imperial governments, largely involving attacks 
against Napoleon himself.  The conspirators intended to bestow upon themselves or their 
preferred leader the political power of France.  Because Napoleon had achieved this very feat, 
political malcontents believed that they could accomplish the same.   
Conspiracy became a viable political tool, but only in the hands of capable and clever 
individuals.  Napoleon and his cohorts used an illegal plot to propel themselves to the highest 
ranks of the political sphere.  Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès already held one of the most prominent 
positions in the government when he helped design the plot of 18 Brumaire.  Napoleon’s 
participation brought with it the assistance of the military.  With both the political and military 
realms at least partially supportive—and the social realm increasingly indifferent by this point—
success was likely.  Those dissidents who conspired against the Consular and Imperial regimes, 





governments instead strengthened the leader’s grasp on the political reins of France.  The failure 
of the conspirators achieved the exact opposite of what they intended. 
The incompetence of those who acted against Napoleon’s Consular regime is readily 
apparent through an analysis of the traits required to constitute a conspiracy.  Although the plots 
did, in fact, include each of the characteristics outlined by Niccolo Machiavelli and Augustin 
Barruel, they were not well managed.  Machiavelli identified five traits necessary to elevate a 
simple plan to a conspiracy:  at least two participants, the participants were well-off or 
“madmen,” secrecy, a political nature to the plot, and violence.548  Barruel concurred with two of 
Machiavelli’s conclusions, that a conspiracy must be secretive and violent.  He added two more 
characteristics, however, which included a hierarchy among the conspirators and a plot’s self-
destructive nature. 
Even the required traits the Jacobin and Royalist conspirators excelled at ultimately 
worked against them.  One such trait was the involvement of two or more people in the plot.  
Machiavelli and Barruel both acknowledged this requirement, but Machiavelli cautioned against 
including too many people, as it made the scheme difficult to control.  Joseph Antoine Aréna and 
Joseph Céracchi claimed to have dozens of supporters within the French military for their 
conspiration des poignards.  Ultimately, there were, in fact, only four participants, who enjoyed 
absolutely no backing whatsoever from anyone.  The infernal machine plot of December 1800 
involved numerous people whose significance varied dramatically.  Only three people played an 
active role in purchasing supplies or in building the explosive device.  They had several more 
associates who supported their cause but did not actively participate in the scheme.  In winter 
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1804, Royalist beliefs that France was ripe with dissent and animosity toward Napoleon 
prompted the Bourbons to authorize and to fund the voyage of forty of their supporters to Paris.  
This large group of schemers was under the leadership of three masterminds, Georges Cadoudal, 
Jean-Charles Pichegru, and Jean-Victor Marie Moreau.  The loss of so many supporters to a plot 
whose foundation was not, in fact, well-established brought the Royalist efforts against Napoleon 
and his nation to an end. 
 The large number of individuals involved in the plots made it extremely difficult to 
maintain a sense of secrecy, an important aspect of conspiracy.  Machiavelli had advised, for this 
very reason, against engaging more than three or four people.  With so many conspirators 
involved, it was unlikely that the scheme could remain undetected.  Secrecy held long enough for 
the participants of the infernal machine plot to explode their device, but it fell apart with the first 
arrest.  The effective use of aliases among the conspirators complicated the police investigation 
until they placed François-Jean Carbon under arrest.  He promptly betrayed his cohorts’ trust by 
divulging everything he knew, including their whereabouts.  Participants in the Royalist effort of 
winter 1804 gave away the plot almost as soon as it began.  Arriving with the first batch of 
conspirators from England on 21 August 1803, Jean-Pierre Querelle found himself under arrest 
by 11 October.  His incapacity to keep a secret showed itself again in January 1804, when the 
threat of execution prompted him to reveal everything he knew to officials.  The testimony 
proved immensely beneficial for the police and for Querelle himself, who received a full pardon 
and a government-funded pension.  Whereas authorities cracked the infernal machine plot and 
the Royalist effort of winter 1804 because of participants’ testimonies after arrest, they had a spy 
working for them inside the network of the conspiration des poignards almost as soon as it 





with Jacques Harel, a man who had previously served under his command in the military.  Harel 
panicked and related each of his conversations to officials.  His denunciation allowed the police 
to steer the conspiracy down a road it might not have taken otherwise and, therefore, to protect 
the First Consul, maintaining political stability for the nation. 
Each of the plots launched against Napoleon was inherently political in nature.  Whatever 
form of government the conspirators preferred in lieu of the Consulate, conspiratorial action was 
necessary in order to implement it.  According to Machiavelli, it was the politics behind these 
events that resulted in their violent nature.  Aréna and Céracchi intended to assassinate Napoleon 
with daggers as he attended a theatre performance.  Pierre Robinault, known as Saint-Réjant, 
adopted an even more violent approach with his infernal machine, which did not accomplish its 
goal of murdering the First Consul but did result in the death of at least twenty people.549  
Barruel argued that the political nature of a conspiracy was not the cause of its violent nature but 
that it originated with the radical disposition of the conspirators themselves.  The Royalist effort 
of winter 1804 illustrated his idea.  Although the conspirators did not agree on the desired 
outcome of their attack against Napoleon on the road between Malmaison and Paris—some 
described capture and others assassination—violence was inherent.  Georges Cadoudal intended 
to attack the First Consul with a force of at least one hundred men.  If the group had managed to 
implement its plan, the attack would have looked more like a small battle than a traditional 
assassination.  Even though the plot never took shape, violence still occurred.  As officials 
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attempted to arrest Cadoudal, he shot two of them, one fatally.  Another leader of the conspiracy, 
Pichegru, was unwilling to endure his imprisonment any longer and committed suicide by 
strangling himself in his cell. 
 Cadoudal, Pichegru, and Moreau had organized their plot hierarchically, as Barruel 
believed was necessary to create an actual conspiracy, but such a system did not ensure a plot’s 
success.  The conspiration des poignards was so disorganized that no individual conspirator 
understood who was involved or what role he was to play.  Each of the core participants named 
supporters who turned out, in fact, not to be complicit in the crime.  Céracchi identified Joseph 
Diana as Napoleon’s intended assassin and claimed to have given him a dagger to use for the 
deed at the theatre where the attack was to take place.  For his own part, Diana denied that the 
plot designated him as the assassin.  He also did not possess any kind of weapon on his arrest and 
had taken no action whatsoever except to seat himself within the theatre.  The Royalist plot of 
1804 was hierarchical, but only obviously so at the uppermost levels.  The Bourbon princes were 
at the pinnacle of the conspiracy, as it was they who helped fund the actions and who would 
enjoy the most benefit from its success.  As the ones who would implement the actual plan and 
lead the politicians and military in the subsequent chaos, Cadoudal, Pichegru, and Moreau were 
on the next level.  There may have been an organizational system among the other forty 
participants, but it did not show itself clearly because the plot never came to fruition.  The 
infernal machine plot was the only orderly one launched during Napoleon’s reign as Consul.  
Saint-Réjant had designated himself as the plot’s leader simply because he was older than the 
other participants.  After appointing himself responsible for lighting the explosive device, he sent 
his only two active associates to the Tuileries palace environs to indicate the First Consul’s 





signal, Saint-Réjant remained dedicated to his role and managed to detonate the destructive 
device, though too late to murder Napoleon. 
 A self-destructive nature was the final trait of a conspiracy identified by Barruel.  Even if 
a plot managed to accomplish its goal, its success would be short-lived.  Because none of the 
conspiracies initiated during the Consular regime enjoyed any level of success, it is impossible to 
know if they would have self-destructed down the road.  The only remotely successful plot was 
that of General Claude-François de Malet, who acted during Napoleon’s imperial, rather than 
Consular, reign.  During the night of 22 October and early the following morning, Malet and his 
cohorts managed to confound or to capture several of the most high-ranking political officials in 
Paris.  The plot self-destructed when police inspector Alexandre de Laborde confronted Malet at 
the home of yet another official he was trying to dupe.  The general’s entire disposition changed, 
and his confidence faltered.  He attempted to rectify the situation by shooting Laborde, but the 
officer tackled him to the ground and placed him under arrest before he could act.  The 
ringleader’s own failings brought down the plot as a whole.  Thus marked the end of the only 
conspiracy to enjoy any level of success against either of Napoleon’s regimes. 
 General Malet’s efforts against Napoleon in 1812—and even his abortive attempt in 
1808—differed greatly from the conspiracies that preceded it.  Malet was, without a doubt, the 
leader of the plot as a whole.  He enlisted the help of four men at the earliest stages of planning 
and obtained additional support as the plot unfolded.  At the trial, a total of twenty-four men 
found themselves facing charges of conspiracy.  Several of them had willingly participated in the 
scheme, while others proved nothing more than unfortunate fools.  It was not only the number 





together:  “union is as essential to the conspirator, as secrecy to the cause.”550  The plots 
launched against the Consular regime included the requisite number of people, but few of the 
participants managed to work together.  The incomplete instructions and constantly changing 
details in the conspiration des poignards made for a team that could not cooperate.  The 
participants in the infernal machine plot worked together smoothly until the day of the attack.  
Saint-Réjant stood guard by the explosive device waiting for a signal from his associates.  When 
the signal never came, he investigated and learned that his cohorts had abandoned their posts.  
By the time he returned to the bomb, the appropriate time to ignite it had passed.  Had his 
associates followed through with their tasks, the group likely would have succeeded in 
assassinating the First Consul.  The Royalist plotters of 1804 believed that teamwork was one of 
their strongpoints, convinced that everyone knew the plot and his role in it before sailing to 
France from England.  Upon the first discussion with Moreau, however, they learned that their 
plot was no longer functional.  One of the key players in the conspiracy had chosen personal 
ambition over that of the Bourbons, leaving the Royalists without hope and leading to his co-
conspirators’ deaths. 
 The failed efforts against the Consular government had all included violent plans from 
their inceptions.  Malet’s plot did not.  The conspirators of 1812 had a concrete plan in which 
they would convince high-ranking officials of Napoleon’s death and would urge them to join 
their cause or to face arrest.  No one involved resorted to violence except Malet himself and only 
as a last resort.  Malet shot and wounded one official and, when Laborde recognized him as an 
escaped political prisoner, he attempted to do the same or worse to him.  The implementation of 
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violence marked the beginning of the end for his efforts.  Failing to shoot Laborde, Malet found 
himself wrestled to the ground and arrested.  Had he managed to keep his composure, he might 
have been able to continue with the implementation of his plan.  It is unlikely, however, that the 
French people would have allowed him to maintain control of the country once they learned that 
their Emperor was, in fact, still alive. 
 Throughout the Consulate, Napoleon’s strong reputation as a military commander, his 
continued successes on the battlefield, and the apparent strength of the regime—especially when 
compared with the impotent Directory that preceded it—made French citizens hopeful.  They 
expected the First Consul to restore the nation’s prosperity and to end the warfare that had 
plagued them since the Revolution’s early days.  When Aréna and Céracchi launched the 
conspiration des poignards on 10 October 1800, Napoleon had not been in power for a year.  
Even if they had succeeded in assassinating Napoleon, they would not have enjoyed the affection 
or enthusiasm of the French nation.  Citizens would have viewed them as murderers.  The same 
timing issue existed for Saint-Réjant and his cohorts.  Parisians considered the infernal machine 
horrific, not only because of its intended goal, but because of the carnage it wrought on the 
streets.  Again, if Saint-Réjant had succeeded, he would have achieved only a reputation as a 
violent murderer of innocent people who also took the life of the First Consul.  Little had 
changed by the Royalist conspiracy of winter 1804.  A brief period of peace had delighted 
French citizens.  Because England declared war on France again in May 1803, had Cadoudal, 
Pichegru, and Moreau achieved a Bourbon restoration through their conspiracy, the people of 
France would have viewed it as an English machination, rather than a victory solely for the 





would have resented the restoration even more than if the royals achieved it independently and 
would have been even more likely to work to destroy the monarchy yet again. 
 Malet believed that the political and military environment in which he acted in 1812 was 
entirely different from that which his predecessors faced.  He believed that French citizens had 
grown weary of the constant warfare they experienced under Napoleon’s leadership.  That the 
Russian campaign was not progressing favorably was widely known.  If Malet succeeded in 
implementing his new regime, he would put an end to the war and France would not have to 
suffer more of the same under the “bastard infant” who was poised to take his father’s throne.551  
To his chagrin, Malet learned too late that Napoleon’s reputation remained solid among 
Parisians.  Even the soldiers he duped into following his command as he unfolded his plot 
immediately turned from him when officials told them Napoleon was not, in fact, dead.  The 
citizens whom Malet expected to rally to his cause showed no warm feelings for him whatsoever 
upon news of the conspiracy.  They rejoiced in the news that the Emperor lived and denounced 
Malet as a dangerous “crazy person,” a sentiment shared by their leader.552   
 When Napoleon helped create the Consulate after the conspiracy of 18 Brumaire, he 
believed the regime’s most dangerous enemy was the Royalist faction.  The new government he 
and his associates had put into place was, after all, Republican.  Napoleon understood that the 
hope of revenge and restoration would persevere as long as the Bourbon family was not in 
control of France.  Dethroned and exiled, they engendered support from Europe’s other royal 
households.  The financial and military might of these allies gave them seemingly limitless 
potential to launch an attack.  Napoleon recognized that the Republicans within France were 
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fickle, with differing conceptions of how the government should function.  There was the 
possibility that a group of them could unite to strike against his regime, but their chance of 
success was slim.  The military’s attachment to the First Consul, especially in the lower ranks, 
would prevent the soldiers from supporting any action against him.  Without military backing, a 
conspiracy would not succeed.  His reasoning was sound, but Napoleon soon learned that he did 
not understand the political situation in France as well as he thought. 
 Plots from both camps politically opposed to his leadership showed Napoleon that he had 
not succeeded in healing the Revolutionary wounds as well as he thought.  He managed, 
however, to use the conspiracies to his own advantage, obtaining more power for himself, and, 
he argued, more stability and security for France.  The conspiration des poignards was the 
clumsy and uninspired project of a small handful of incompetent Jacobins.  Even if Harel had not 
proven to be a police spy, the group had no hope of achieving even the slightest modicum of 
success because of its high level of mismanagement and miscommunication.  The only success 
that came from the plot was enjoyed by Bonaparte.  “To see and to seize an opportunity was 
instinctive with him” and that is precisely what he did in light of the botched conspiracy.553  
Napoleon took no immediate action after the effort, but harkened back to it after Saint-Réjant’s 
explosive device missed killing him by mere seconds.  It did not matter to him that there was no 
evidence of Jacobin participation in the latest plot.  He ordered Fouché to fashion a list of known 
members who would bear the brunt of his anger and retribution.  These men found themselves 
deported from the country, having committed no crime and having faced no trial.  Napoleon 
could not resist the opportunity to rid himself of 130 political opponents, innocent or not.  The 
unjustified banishment quashed any further clandestine action against him from the Republican 
                                                 





camp.  Discussions continued among discontented Republicans about the need for a new leader 
or a new regime, but there were no tangible or serious threats to Napoleon from them until the 
efforts of Joseph Servan de Gerbey and his successor, Malet. 
 Having nullified the Jacobins by early 1801, Napoleon faced open opposition only from 
the Royalists for most of his reign.  He had long considered treating with the papacy in Rome to 
mollify many of his constituents, but the nearly successful attack against his life on 24 December 
1800 pushed him into action.  He understood that a reconciliation between the French Republic 
and the Catholic Church would remove one of the Bourbons’ strongest supporters.  If the pope 
endorsed his rule, he could not support schemes against it.  In July 1801, Napoleon and Pope 
Pius VII signed the Concordat.   Although the arrangement disappointed Revolutionaries who 
saw the restoration of religion, especially of the hierarchical and conservative Catholic Church, 
as a step backwards, it did not prompt them to take any action against the First Consul.  Many of 
the chouan fighters put down their weapons upon learning of the Church’s reestablishment.  
Those who had led their battles against Republican France, however, remained dedicated to the 
Bourbons. 
 Even devoted royalists like Cadoudal did not take further action against the Consulate for 
several years.  By winter 1804, when they believed France ripe for the restoration of the 
monarchy, they were unable to form a cohesive plan of action.  The bungled conspiracy did, 
however, restore France to a monarchical form of government, but it was that of Napoleon, not 
the Bourbons.  The First Consul used the mismanaged plot to suggest to the Senate, which then 
agreed, that he should take the imperial title of Emperor to shelter the nation from the chaos that 
would ensue should something happen to him.  He had restored a sense of stability to French 





him.  In response to cries of tyranny from some of his officials, Napoleon answered, falsely, that 
the Revolution had been against the Bourbons, not against monarchy itself.  After all, the 
Revolutionaries only decided to rid themselves of the monarchy once Louis XVI proved entirely 
unwilling to retain his title with a constitution in place.  Napoleon indicated that the marriage of 
Revolutionary ideals with the stability of a hereditary monarchy under the leadership of someone 
who cherished the nation’s citizens offered the best of both political worlds.  Upon learning that 
the Senate had, in fact, decided to transition the Consular regime into an imperial one, Cadoudal 
was said to have lamented:  “I came to make a king and instead I have made an emperor.”554 
 Some historians have argued that the plots launched during the Consular regime were 
figments, orchestrated entirely by French police for the benefit of Napoleon.  Mismanaged and 
poorly conceived as they were, the conspiracies did, in fact, exist.  Although he was the kind of 
person who had always had ambitious plans—even his brothers recognized it when they were 
children—he neither fabricated nor ordered someone else to fabricate the attempts against him.  
He did, however, exploit the events to their fullest extent.  His political opponents, Jacobin and 
Royalist alike, had hoped to climb the social ladder as he had done after 18 Brumaire.  What they 
accomplished was to fall off of it themselves while simultaneously pushing Napoleon even 
higher up the rungs to the prestigious position of Emperor. 
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